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The policing landscape in the Netherlands has 
changed considerably over the past three decades; 
now various new uniformed officers share patrolling 
duties with the traditional police. This book is about 
one of the most prominent groups of these recent 
surveillance professionals: the municipal officers. 
It discusses how this profession has changed over 
time, how municipal officers act in public places, 
and how these new officers view their work. 
Through a rich yet compact analysis, the author 
shows that the emergence of this new occupational 
group can be understood as being the result 
of a focused (political) approach to citizens’ 
annoyances, concerns and fears. The book also 
demonstrates that the work of these officers is a 
unique Dutch phenomenon, partly defying theories 
of disorder policing developed in other countries. 
This study will appeal to readers with an interest 
in plural policing or policies on urban disorder, as 
well as to those interested in how local governments 
respond to their citizens’ concerns.
About the author Teun Eikenaar (1981) 
studied cultural anthropology and philosophy. 
In recent years, his research has focused on 
issues of public safety and policing. The current 
publication builds on his earlier explorative study 
of municipal disorder policing, funded by the 
Dutch research programme Politie & Wetenschap 
(Police & Science).
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Foreword
This study is about municipal disorder policing, a relatively new form of surveillance
and law enforcement by Dutch local government officers. As ‘non-police policing
providers’ these officers fulfil vital policing tasks while not being part of the police
itself. They share in policing responsibilities.
Such sharing of responsibilities raises questions, for instance about how and
why these new officers evolved, who decides on their work, and what kind of
work they do. By addressing these questions, this book not only sheds light on the
issues of a newly evolving policing occupation, but also on the way in which local
governments try to deal with issues of public safety and citizens’ concerns about
disorder.
Getting involved with municipal disorder policing
In the spring of 2012 I was first introduced to the subject of this study when I was
asked to undertake a two-year research project of municipal disorder policing in
six large Dutch cities. It was to be my first experience with the study of police and
policing.
During this first experience being largely unacquainted with police and police
work appeared to be something of an asset. It gave me the opportunity to study
this occupation with an open mind, to be amazed by a new professional world and
to approach these municipal officers as a new occupational group of which I was
hitherto largely unaware. This first two-year timespan resulted in a first publica‐
tion, in Dutch: Van Stadswacht naar nieuwe gemeentepolitie? (‘From city warden to
new municipal police?’).
Yet, it was not until the second part of this research that the subject of munici‐
pal disorder policing grew on me. In 2015 and 2016 I was given the opportunity to
extend the first publication into a dissertation. I was able to study municipal disor‐
der policing in depth during this second half of the research, to develop a more
thorough understanding of the various ideas, meanings and discourses that shape
the policies and practices of this occupation.
This meant I had to find my way into a large body of texts yet unknown to me. I
had to re-compose a theoretical framework with which to approach previous find‐
ings and with which to collect new material. Moreover, a large part of the initial
publication did not fit with this new approach and new research questions and I
had to invest a considerable amount of time in re-entering the field and collecting
new material. Writing itself sometimes felt like wrestling with an amorphous body
of findings, interview material, notes, theoretical reflections and preliminary con‐
clusions. At times I had the idea that I managed to direct this monster towards a
proper dissertation, with a clear mark of my own perspective. At other times, it felt
the monster was taking over, and it would take several days before I could force
myself back on top of it.
Limitations
My particular perspective on municipal disorder policing implies several aspects
are not addressed here. Some of these are mentioned briefly in chapter 1, but I also
name a few here. Hence, my research is limited, both in scope and time frame and
with this book I do not pretend to present a definite image of this profession, but
merely an impression that is limited to a specific time span and defined by my own
academic point of view.
First of all, this is not an evaluative research. Efficiency and effectivity of munic‐
ipal disorder policing are not taken into account. Secondly, some readers may be
interested in my point of view on an expansion of powers and equipment. My
approach, however, does not provide sufficient ground for such considerations,
nor does this study consider what elements of municipal officers’ approach would
‘work best’. Thirdly, municipal disorder policing appears to be quickly changing.
Structures, policy perspectives and relations with other organisations sometimes
seemed to have changed as soon as I left a specific research site. For one part, this
seems typical for a new profession that is looking for new concepts and trying out
new policies. For another part, municipalities appear to be particularly prone to
reorganisations and a reframing of recurrent ideas in changing terms. Any refer‐
ence to local policies, numbers and particular points of view are therefore restrict‐
ed to the period the fieldwork for this book was done: 2012-2015.
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1 Introduction
1 Concerns about Disorder
In the past thirty years the Netherlands has faced a growth of new concerns about
disorder in public places. This comprises a large range of issues as diverse as ille‐
gally dumped household waste, dog fouling, cars parked on the pavement, cyclists
in pedestrian areas, loitering youths, drunks and junks.
Although these issues might not all be novel, many interventions to deal with
them are, new forms of surveillance and law enforcement being among the most
obvious. In addition to regular police forces, new officers are given the responsibil‐
ity of dealing with allegedly neglected incivilities, addressing improper behaviour
and trying to take mounting concerns about disorder seriously. In this book one of
these new forms of policing in the Netherlands is discussed – municipal disorder
policing.
In recent years many countries have witnessed changes in policing and the advent
of new forms of disorder policing in particular. As such, Dutch municipal disorder
policing should be seen as part of a more general trend of an ever growing body of
services providing ‘policing’, such as surveillance, patrols, law enforcement and
criminal investigation. This evolving and expanding group of officers has been
named the police extended family (Crawford & Lister, 2006; Johnston, 2003), or the
police’s junior partners (Button, 2002), but is mostly referred to as ‘plural police’
(Jones & Newburn, 2007; Jones, Van Steden & Boutellier, 2009; Loader, 2000).
In this introductory chapter several general developments are addressed before
the goals and scope of this study are presented. In section 2 the backgrounds of
municipal disorder policing are sketched briefly. This is done by addressing how
changes in crime and disorder, the urban environment and policing responsibilities
have resulted in the advent of municipal disorder policing. Section 3 introduces
some of the most important changes in Dutch public safety policies over the past
thirty years. Next, section 4 presents some relevant findings on the present practice
of disorder policing – the officers’ daily work, professionalisation and collaboration
with the police. In the fifth section of this chapter the scope of this study and the
research questions are introduced. An outline of the book is presented in the final
section.
2 Backgrounds of new forms of disorder policing
In recent years the policing landscape of various Western countries shows corre‐
sponding changes that can be associated with similar social and cultural develop‐
ments. At least three of these developments are relevant to explain the rise of disor‐
der policing.1
First of all, new forms of disorder policing are related to factual changes in
crime and disorder on the one hand, and to the idea that fear of crime is rising on
the other. Many Western nations have witnessed a steep rise in crime and disorder
during much of the 1980s and 1990s (Terpstra, 2010b: 16). This growth in crime fig‐
ures was such that police and criminal justice were increasingly confronted with
their inability to address these high numbers and started to outsource some of their
initial responsibilities (Garland, 2001; cf. chapter 3). In addition, feelings of fear and
insecurity grew among the general public.2 These initially increased parallel to ris‐
ing crime rates, but remained on a high level or rose further, even when crime rates
started declining (Crawford, 2006; Van der Vijver, 2004). As a result, the advent of
new forms of disorder policing can be seen as both a response to factual changes in
disorder and to the perceived need for visible reassurance by uniformed officers
(Terpstra, 2010b; Terpstra, Van Stokkom & Spreeuwers, 2013; Van Steden, 2017).
A second cause for the rise of new forms of disorder policing is the increased
emphasis on anti-social behaviour. Although also caused by higher civic expecta‐
tions, this emphasis appears to be related more to the changes in the public spaces
of large cities. One of these changes is the decline of informal social control and the
growth of what is called ‘urban anonymity’. Control and guardianship by ordinary
citizens and by professionals that fulfilled secondary forms of guardianship next to
their primary tasks – such as caretakers or stationmasters – have diminished since
the 1970s (Blokland, 2009; Newburn, 2001; Terpstra, 2008b, see further chapters 2, 3
and 5). Other factors contributing to the emphasis on anti-social behaviour are rela‐
ted to changes in urban public space. Security has won great economic significance
in many (large) urban areas, for example as a precondition to attract tourists and
events. Therefore new forms of policing help convey the message the city is “safe
for consumption” (Sleiman & Lippert, 2010). Particularly in city centres, this
implies behaviour such as begging, loitering or sleeping in public are more readily
considered to be anti-social threats to ‘clean, intact and safe’ shopping and enter‐
tainment areas (Millie 2008, Van Stokkom, 2013a; cf. chapter 3). Van Steden and
1. The overview presented here functions as a preamble to what follows in chapters 2 and 3 of this
book.
2. However, some authors state it is not fear or feelings of insecurity that have increased, but citizens’
concerns about the moral condition of society (Spithoven, De Graaf & Boutellier, 2012).
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Roelofs (2010) describe the new surveillance officers as “guardians of the hygienic
city”. The growth of hybrid forms of public and private space in urban areas, such
as large office complexes and shopping centres, has further added to the employ‐
ment of private security officers (Jones & Newburn, 1999; Van Steden, 2007).
A third change that might have caused the rise of disorder policing is formed
by the relocating and redefining of police responsibilities. In many Western coun‐
tries there has been a reconfiguring debate on what comprises police work and
what exactly are police responsibilities (Jones & Newburn, 2007; Newburn, 2001;
Van Steden, 2007; Terpstra, 2010b; Terpstra et al., 2013). Closely related to this is
the establishment of a security complex – a situation in which security and policing
are no longer provided by the state alone, but by a variety of actors. The result is a
network of both public and private suppliers of policing and public and private
governing bodies (cf. Terpstra, 2010b). In this new constellation the public police
are focusing more and more on so called ‘core tasks’, like crime fighting and crimi‐
nal investigation.
In summary, the three developments of a rise in (fear of) crime, the changes in
the urban environment and the reconfiguring of police responsibilities have led to
more or less comparable developments in disorder policing across Western nations
(cf. Terpstra et al., 2013). Adding to these general changes, Dutch security policies
have evolved in their own particular ways.
3 Developments in Dutch security policies and disorder policing
Dutch attention to disorder: from Roethof to the present
In the Netherlands issues of disorder in public places have also received more
attention in the course of the past thirty years, leading to various new policies.
The need for such new policies was first mentioned around the mid-1970s, but
it was not until the 1980s before issues of disorder featured prominently in political
debates (Commissie Roethof, 1984: 3). In 1984 the abundance of what were known
as ‘petty crimes’ (kleine criminaliteit3), such as simple traffic offences, minor damage
or vandalism in the streets triggered the establishment of a special governmental
committee, the Roethof Committee. This committee was charged with the task of
developing a new approach to these petty crimes, not the least because police and
judicial authorities did not have enough capacity to deal with these issues (Com‐
missie Roethof, 1984: 4). The ideas of the Roethof Committee and the ensuing gov‐
3. It was not only the factual increase of crime that set the stage for the Roethof Committee. Public
concerns over crime rates were of equal importance in understanding the increased political atten‐
tion for ‘petty crimes’ (Van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014). Moreover, especially in recent years it
appears concerns are only loosely connected to these crime rates: although crime rates have
dropped and feelings of insecurity have diminished since 2005, the concerns of citizens over public
safety have become stronger (cf. Terpstra, 2010b: 20).
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ernment policy plan, Society and Crime4, set the focus for the years to follow. The
abundance of petty crimes was to be addressed through prevention as well as
through the involvement of non-police actors such as youth workers and social
workers. In addition, local government authorities were meant to play an impor‐
tant part in the development of these new policies.
In the 1990s the role of municipalities became ever more important, evolving
into what became known as local ‘Integrated Public Safety Policy’ (integraal veilig‐
heidsbeleid). This new nomenclature was represented most clearly in the Integrated
Public Safety Report5 (Cachet & Ringeling, 2004). The policy aimed for an all-encom‐
passing approach with diverse organisations contributing to the solutions for prob‐
lems of public safety. Once again, an important reason was that judicial authorities
were lacking capacity (Pleysier, 2008; Ministry of Justice, 1990). As a result, public
safety increasingly became the concern of local administration. Simultaneously, the
discourse changed subtly – ‘petty crimes’ became ‘frequent crimes’.
Towards the end of the nineties and at the start of the 21st century the emphasis
in public safety policy shifted, albeit within the framework of integrated public
safety policy. In consecutive public safety programmes and reports6, the tone hard‐
ened (Terpstra, 2010b: 39). The most prominent of these is the 2002 policy pro‐
gramme Towards a Safer Society.7 A call for consistent rule enforcement and decisive
action became the key feature (Terpstra, 2010c: 29). In addition, the programme
indicated that governmental organisations involved in public safety are not visible
enough: more surveillance was needed, also by the police (cf. Terpstra, 2010b: 39).
In later government policy this tougher stance on public safety and anti-social
behaviour was combined with ideas about prevention and the sharing of responsi‐
bilities, giving precedence to the regulation of behaviour in public places in society
and politics alike (Terpstra, 2010c: 31).8
Developments in Dutch policing
These changes in disorder policy and the growing prominence of municipalities in
dealing with public safety issues cannot be understood without taking into account
the specific changes in Dutch police work.
One of the most important of these is the tendency of the Dutch police to define
minor infractions of public order as non-police work. This process, for an impor‐
4. Samenleving en criminaliteit, 1986.
5. Integrale veiligheidsrapportage, 1993.
6. Integraal veiligheidsprogramma 1999; Nota criminaliteitsbeheersing, 2001.
7. Naar een veiliger samenleving, 2002.
8. See for instance action plan Disorder and Decline (Overlast en verloedering, 2008). In chapter 2 ele‐
ments of these changes will be discussed. In chapter 5, these developments will be dealt with chro‐
nologically, more extensively and specifically with regard to the changes in municipal disorder
policing.
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tant part, is the result of what has been named the debate on the core tasks.9 This
debate has resulted in the police increasingly focusing on crime fighting, and parti‐
ally withdrawing from public spaces, at the cost of visibility, surveillance and gen‐
eral disorder policing (BeBOA, 2010; Crijns, 2010; Haagsma, Smits, Waarsing, &
Wiebrens, 2012; Terpstra & Kouwenhoven, 2004; Terpstra, Gunther Moor & Van
Stokkom, 2010; Terpstra, 2012).10
In addition, new policies and non-police interventions to tackle disorder should
equally be understood in the light of a “creeping centralisation” of the Dutch police
(Terpstra, 2004). Two vital reorganisations of the police have contributed to this
process, starting more or less with the police reorganisation of 1993. Until then, the
Dutch police consisted of a central Royal Police force and local, municipal police
forces for all municipalities over 25,000 inhabitants. After 1993, the police were
organised into 25 districts and one central supplementary force. As a result, the
central government gradually became more influential, leading to a growing lack
of police involvement in local communities (Terpstra, 2004; Terpstra, 2013; Terpstra
et al., 2013).11 This process seems to be further strengthened by the latest police
reorganisation – the re-introduction of a national police force in 2013 (Terpstra,
Van Duijneveldt, Eikenaar, Havinga & Van Stokkom, 2016).
The advent of municipal disorder policing
Following these developments, municipalities started looking for ways of replac‐
ing the police and dealing with concerns over disorder. The first programmes for
municipal disorder policing consisted of surveillance by so-called city wardens.
Initially enabled by the subsidies of the Roethof Committee at the end of the 1980s,
the work of these wardens, who were drawn from the large numbers of long-term
unemployed people at that time, usually amounted to surveillance to prevent petty
crimes. Many Dutch cities had their own contingent of these officers (Hauber, 1994;
Van Steden, 2012; Van Steden, 2017; cf. chapter 5).
These early forms of municipal disorder policing changed in the first years of
the 21st century. Partly as a result of a nation-wide call for strict law enforcement,
9. This is known as the Kerntakendiscussie. The Netherlands is not unique in this respect. Many West‐
ern countries have seen a reconfiguring debate on what comprises police work, and what exactly
are police responsibilities (Terpstra et al., 2013).
10. Although this movement can be contrasted with a simultaneous recognition of the need for a police
force that is responsive to community needs, this never solidified into a type of officer for general
patrol and disorder policing in the Netherlands (cf. Savage, 2007). The function of police surveil‐
lance officer (politiesurveillant) as an acknowledgement of the growing demand for surveillance in
public spaces was abolished fairly quickly after its introduction and for reasons that are not quite
clear (cf. Hauber, Hofstra, Toornvliet & Zandbergen, 1996; Terpstra et al., 2013). See further chap‐
ter 5.
11. Even though 1993’s reorganisation was de-central by objective.
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city warden projects were merged with other municipal law enforcement agen‐
cies.12 These new city surveillance agencies were mostly called Toezicht en Handha‐
ving or Stadstoezicht. In the course of this process, city wardens either resigned, or
progressed to become qualified municipal enforcement officers. Thus many of
them became BOAs, a Dutch abbreviation of Buitengewoon Opsporingsambtenaar,
freely translated as municipal law enforcement officers (Van Steden, 2017). Nowa‐
days these BOAs form by far the largest part of municipal city surveillance agen‐
cies (Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014; see further chapter 5) and have the objective
of “combating minor annoyances, nuisance and other facts that affect the quality of
life” (Ministry of Justice, 2015: 10). As opposed to their predecessors, the city war‐
dens, they have more powers and are expected to impose fines for common forms
of disorder and anti-social behaviour, further enabled by the introduction of new
administrative penal orders and administrative fines in 2009 (see further chap‐
ter 5).13
4 Municipal disorder policing: some recent developments
By now several studies have shed light on these relatively new municipal officers
for disorder policing.14 These studies address their daily work, education and pro‐
fessionalisation, as well as their relation with the police.
Daily work
On the one hand, municipal officers appear to focus on a limited range of rule
infringements (Flight, 2012; Flight, Hartmann, Nauta, Hulshof, & Terpstra, 2012).
The fines they impose – mostly administrative penal orders – for instance target
non-compliant dog owners who refuse to put their pets on a leash or refrain from
cleaning their excrement, or people who pollute the streets, for example by litter or
taking out the rubbish too early. In addition, officers often impose fines for parking
12. Parking attendance and the policing of environmental offences had been a municipal responsibility
since the police reorganisation of 1993 and existed alongside the city wardens. See further chap‐
ter 5.
13. Moreover, the role of these officers in criminal law enforcement is getting bigger and “they are
increasingly taking over tasks of the police”. Letter from Minister Opstelten of Safety & Justice to
the House of Representatives: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/documenten-en-publica‐
ties/kamerstukken/2013/07/01/kamerbrief-samenhang-in-toezicht-en-handhaving-in-de-open‐
bare-ruimte.html (see also: Ministry of Justice, 2015).
14. There is still a sizable number of municipal disorder policing officers who are not qualified to
impose fines. These are mostly called ‘surveillance officers’ (toezichthouders), as opposed to
‘enforcement officers’ (handhavers). To include both officers, the more generic term ‘municipal offi‐
cers’ is used here, avoiding the more exclusive terms of ‘enforcement officers’, ‘BOAs’ or ‘SIOs’
(short for ‘Special Investigative Officers’) used in other studies (Van Steden, 2017).
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violations and check parking permits (Flight et al., 2012; Van Steden, 2012).15
Hence, if their work must be seen as setting normative standards in public places,
this would apply only to a small range of rule infringements and not to anti-social
behaviour in general (Van Steden & Bron, 2012).
On the other hand, municipal officers’ work comprises of a lot more than fining
offenders. Officers have a wide range of strategies and approaches at their disposal
to make citizens comply with the rules. Imposing fines is but one of these strat‐
egies, and allegedly the least popular (Bervoets & Rovers, 2016; Terpstra, 2012).
Other means may be used, ranging from addressing non-compliant citizens with‐
out fining them, informing citizens, carrying out general surveillance of public
places or signalling and reporting offences that are beyond their authority (Van
Steden, 2012). In addition, these officers follow up on citizens’ reports, have pre‐
ventative tasks, provide assistance to the police and cooperate with other profes‐
sionals (Bervoets, 2013; Bervoets & Rovers, 2016; Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014;
Terpstra, 2012). Some state their work is equally imbued with the idea of reassur‐
ance, aiming to contribute to citizens’ feeling of security by uniformed presence
(Terpstra, 2010b).16 Lastly, their work may be filled with administrative obligations
or a rather aimlessly driving around when there is not enough to do (Bervoets,
2013; Terpstra, 2012).
This wide variety in daily activities, for an important part, can be explained by
their large discretionary autonomy (Bervoets, 2013). Following the seminal work of
Michael Lipsky (2010), several authors state these officers – like other frontline pro‐
fessionals in safety policy (Moors & Bervoets, 2013) – have a considerable amount
of room to make autonomous decisions. As a result, some of them might highlight
‘service provision’, whereas others see themselves more as law enforcement offi‐
cers (Bervoets & Rovers, 2016; cf. chapter 7).
Education, professionalisation and reputation
In line with the growth of city surveillance agencies, educational facilities and
requirements have also developed. Apart from the basic BOA certificate that
municipal officers are obliged to obtain if they want to become a BOA, the most
important training is the MTV and HTV courses17, providing trajectories for
respectively officers without and with power to fine. Added to these trajectories,
BOAs are obliged to complete several courses that differ widely between munici‐
palities, such as violence and de-escalation training programmes or professionali‐
15. The enforcement of parking permits is done without using administrative penal orders, but as a
retrospective collection of taxes.
16. Although other authors highlight that this plays but a minor role in their work (Bervoets, 2013).
17. MTV stands for medewerker toezicht en veiligheid (surveillance and security employee), HTV for
handhaver toezicht en veiligheid (surveillance and security enforcement officer). The prerequisite for
the latter is the BOA certificate. As most municipalities only assign BOAs, the MTV education can
be expected to lose its relevance (Van Steden, 2012).
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sation training for specific juridical knowledge (Van Steden, 2012). As from 2013,
the demands for education have increased, leading to a system of permanent
schooling and external examination by a national organisation18 (cf. Mein & Hart‐
mann, 2013). In addition, occupational organisation BeBOA has been initiated as a
national consultative body and centre of knowledge.
Nevertheless, various studies point out that municipal officers struggle with
their professional level and public reputation as ‘good for-nothing city strollers’
(Bervoets & Rovers, 2016; Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014; Van Steden, 2012). Some
state that the problem of low professional standards is real. In 2012 the Audit
Office of Rotterdam indicated its municipal officers generally lacked essential com‐
municative competencies, mostly with regard to the treatment of non-compliant
citizens and de-escalation. Moreover, Mein & Hartmann (2013) state coordinators
and police officers often point to the deficient quality of fines and the alleged
clumsy interaction with non-compliant citizens (cf. Eikenaar & Van Stokkom,
2014). Apart from these estimations, their reputation seems to be easily influenced
by footage on social media that shows rude and tense officers (Bervoets & Rovers,
2016).
Two recent studies found that this reputation is not as bad as many – even some
municipal officers themselves – seem to believe (Bervoets & Rovers, 2016; SMV,
2013). A quarter of all citizens appear to be (highly) positive and only ten percent
(highly) negative about the presence of BOAs in general (including enforcement
officers in other domains; SMV, 2013). A study with a more specific focus on
municipal enforcement officers found that most citizens do not have pronounced
ideas about them. As far as citizens do have an idea, they see municipal officers
mostly as ‘service providers’ (instead of as authoritative officers), particularly valu‐
ing their helpfulness. In addition, even citizens who did have first-hand experience
with municipal officers – for instance, because they were fined or addressed – are
mostly positive about that experience (Bervoets & Rovers, 2016).
Relation with the police
Finally, several studies have described the relation between these municipal offi‐
cers and the police (Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014; Mein & Hartmann, 2013; Van
Stokkom & Foekens, 2015). This relation has been enacted formally in the Decree
on BOAs.19 Insofar as these municipal officers are BOAs – which applies to the vast
majority – this Decree designates the Public Prosecutor as general supervisor and
the police as direct supervisor (cf. Mein & Hartmann, 2013: 23). Moreover, the
police are assigned the operational management of these officers. However, these
formal regulations seem to have little meaning in practice (Eikenaar & Van Stok‐
18. The foundation for Examination Surveillance and Rule Enforcement (Dutch acronym: ExTH).
19. Ministry of Justice (1994) Besluit Buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaar.
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kom, 2014; Mein & Hartmann, 2013; Van Steden, 2012). The supervision of BOAs is
mostly regarded as nothing more than a formal obligation, with but few conse‐
quences for the interaction between the two organisations. Operational manage‐
ment of these officers by the police proves to be rather complicated, as municipali‐
ties are still responsible for ‘strategic management’, meaning BOAs are part of
municipalities’ local safety policy.20 This division of responsibilities causes much
confusion. Once again, most studies that scrutinise the daily work of these munici‐
pal officers find that operational management by the police is poorly developed,
not to say absent all together (Bervoets, 2013; Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014; Van
Steden, 2012; Van Steden & Bron, 2012).
Daily collaboration between the two organisations seems equally deficient, even
though emergency back-up by the police appears rather well-organised in the case
of escalating interaction between municipal officers and unruly citizens (Reken‐
kamer Rotterdam, 2012; Rekenkamercommissie Schiedam-Vlaardingen, 2012;
Gemeentelijk ombudsman Amsterdam, 2013; Van Steden & Bron, 2012). Often
municipal officers and police officers do not adjust their activities, the police often
seems reluctant to share information and quite a few police officers appear to have
trouble accepting municipal officers as policing colleagues (Bervoets, 2013; Eike‐
naar & Van Stokkom, 2014; Gemeentelijke ombudsman Amsterdam, 2013; Mein &
Hartmann, 2013; Terpstra, 2012; Van Steden, 2012; Van Steden & Bron, 2012). In
addition, collaboration in practice is not stimulated by formal agreements, but
largely depends on the willingness of local team coordinators and on local circum‐
stances (Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014; Van Stokkom, 2013b).21 Hence, both police
and municipal officers seem to operate within the confines of their own respective
work domain.
5 This study
To sum up, recent studies have shown how municipal wardens have developed
into policing professionals. These professionals resemble traditional police officers,
but they also have their own specific tasks. These tasks fall mainly in the ‘quality of
life’ sphere, a category that is used to indicate the policing of mostly physical disor‐
der issues (cf. chapters 7 and 9). Although professional levels might not always be
adequate according to some studies, their reputation as ‘city strollers’ seems
largely unjustified. In contrast, previous studies have provided rich descriptions of
20. Letter from minister Opstelten of Safety & Justice to the House of Representatives: http://
www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/07/01/kamer‐
brief-samenhang-in-toezicht-en-handhaving-in-de-openbare-ruimte.html.
21. Exceptions to these findings can be found in the city of The Hague, where municipal officers are
housed at police stations and police constables are assigned as team chiefs (cf. Van Stokkom &
Foekens, 2015), or in specific projects where both types of officers collaborate (Eikenaar & Van
Stokkom, 2014; Van Stokkom, 2013b).
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the multifariousness of their daily work and their professional and deliberate inter‐
actions with citizens.
However, the wider context in which these officers have to do their work
remains under-examined. By focusing on frontline work, previous studies provide
insightful descriptions of their work, but leave their historical, societal and organi‐
sational background aside. They merely give a brief mention of the administrative
and political reality in which these officers have to work (Bervoets, 2013). As a
result, the image of these municipal officers is largely based on colourful, but
somewhat restricted accounts of their daily work and their relation to police offi‐
cers.
These accounts lack a deeper, more thorough understanding of this relatively
new professional group. In addition, few of these studies go into detail on the soci‐
etal and cultural changes that inform these forms of policing. Generally they
merely touch on the observation that the call for social control has become more
vociferous, the tolerance of deviant behaviour has declined, or that a hardening of
the social climate has occurred. These findings are often not investigated further.
The reasons for disorder being seen as a problem and how new forms of disorder
policing are assumed to be important remain unclear. Recent studies do not
explain how and why municipal forms of surveillance and enforcement have
developed. The policy goals and assumptions of municipal disorder policing also
remain obscure; neither do these studies show if and how such goals might change
in municipal decision making processes or in the everyday practice of these officers
themselves. Lastly, current studies do not examine thoroughly which diverging
views, expectations and conflicting interests could occur in the field of disorder
policing. Possible tensions between different strategies and interests and between
policy and frontline work remain under-examined. Municipal management, local
politics, citizen groups, municipal professionals and the police are all these parties
involved and might have different views on how to shape these new forms of
policing.
Based on these points of view, this study aims to contribute to a deeper and
richer perspective on the evolution of municipal disorder policing, its changing
policies and how these policies relate to the unruliness of a frontline practice.
The main research question is:
Which factors and perspectives are relevant in understanding the policies and
practices of municipal disorder policing in the Netherlands?
This question is divided into several sub-questions:
A. Which developments contributed to the establishment and growth of munici‐
pal disorder policing?
B. What are dominant policy perspectives and how did these change over time?
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C. Who decides on disorder policing and how are decisions made?
D. How do municipal officers see their work and strategies and how do they
relate to the police?
As a result of this focus, several important aspects of municipal disorder policing
are not addressed here. First of all, changes in policy and discourse are given prec‐
edence over the juridical background of these officers. Regulations on different
penal orders and fines and other developments in administrative law and criminal
law are addressed only as far as they are relevant for a better understanding of pol‐
icy and practice of these municipal officers. Next, several detailed aspects of pro‐
fessionalisation, such as powers, equipment, training and uniforms will not be
addressed here. Such questions would need an extensive frontline study of the
functioning of municipal officers. Lastly, a detailed examination of their daily work
and (daily) collaboration with the police is lacking in this study. Only in a few spe‐
cific situations (chapter 8) will their daily work be described through close obser‐
vations, and even there it will be studied mainly in its relation to encompassing
policy and its organisational context.
6 Outline
This book is structured as follows.
The first part, which comprises chapters 2 and 3, explores disorder policing theo‐
retically. In chapter 2 three different strategies of disorder policing are presented,
providing insight into underlying views and assumptions. In these strategies, dis‐
order policing is seen as – respectively – a way to reconquer the streets, situational
crime prevention and a way to improve informal social control and trust. With
every strategy, various police models, as well as the reception in the Dutch context,
are discussed. Chapter 3, the second theoretical chapter, discusses the wider con‐
texts of disorder policing and presents three sociological interpretations of its
advent and growth. As such, it addresses the question which social, political and
cultural developments could have contributed to the growth of disorder policing.
These interpretations can be seen respectively as benevolent, sceptical and compre‐
hensive readings of disorder policing.
In chapter 4, the methodology is introduced. It discusses the research design, the
selection of cases and the various methods that are used, as well as several consid‐
erations of methodological quality.
The next part is the largest, empirical part and is comprised of five chapters.
This part starts with the most extensive chapter (chapter 5), which answers sub-
questions A and B above. These questions cannot be answered in isolation: policy
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goals and the shifts therein cannot be discussed apart from contextual develop‐
ments. As a result, this chapter will be structured largely chronologically, alternat‐
ing between historical developments and changes in the policies of municipal dis‐
order policing and its underlying assumptions. This chapter will address national
developments as far as they are relevant for understanding changes in municipal
disorder policing.
The next chapter, chapter 6, deals with the organisational context of municipal
officers. It takes the analysis from the macro level to a meso level. It describes how
decisions on disorder policing are made locally (sub-question C), presenting three
different ‘logics’ – political, managerial, and frontline logic. This leads to highly
divergent ideas of how disorder policing is performed and what issues are dealt
with.
After this, chapter 7 addresses on a micro level how municipal officers them‐
selves think about their responsibilities and the policing strategies they pursue. It
serves to scrutinise what municipal officers highlight as the most important aspects
of their work. Special attention will be paid to the concepts they use and the extent
to which these ideas differ from the earlier described policy goals. As such, this
chapter deals with sub-question D.
Whereas chapters 5 – 7 deal with a macro, meso and micro level analysis of
municipal disorder policing respectively, chapter 8 will show that these levels
interact in the case of specific hotspots, thereby providing an additional answer to
sub-question C. Many of the disorder problems that are subject to the new munici‐
pal agencies are concentrated on a fairly confined area, with a dynamic that is best
studied through the interests of local ‘stakeholders’ – managers, municipal politi‐
cians, municipal officers, inhabitants, etcetera. As such, the views of officers can
only be understood in the municipal context of political and managerial decision
making, a context in which policy and practice interact.
In the last chapter of part II (chapter 9) a final aspect of municipal disorder
policing is discussed – its relation to police work. However, the approach is not
factual, but rather – once again – more fundamental. This chapter deals with the
ongoing debate about the proper domain of municipal disorder police in relation
to ‘traditional’ police work. As will become apparent, the determination of tasks
and their scope – and thereby the importance that is ascribed to municipal disorder
policing – has to this day been the subject of much controversy. By describing four
positions on the division of tasks between these two occupational groups, this
chapter also provides an answer to sub-question D.
The final chapter, chapter 10, sums up the most important findings, presents con‐
clusions about dominant strategies and goals and reflects on the findings of this
study by referring back to the sociological interpretations of chapter 3.
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2 Strategies of disorder policing
The previous chapter pointed out that issues of disorder started to feature promi‐
nently in political debates in the eighties. In these debates a major role was played
by notions of prevention and social control. Nowadays these notions are still pivot‐
al in municipal disorder policing.
Many of these conceptions have been formulated earlier, especially in the con‐
text of American debates on police models. In the seventies and eighties many
police theorists and researchers criticised the standard model of policing (a reac‐
tive, incident-driven model, with little attention to citizens’ interests) and they
brought about major innovations in policing (Weisburd & Braga, 2006). These
innovations included community policing and broken windows policing, strategies
that attempted to redirect policing efforts to crime and disorder problems about
which residents were worried (Kelling & Coles, 1996).1 Many of these policing
strategies were introduced and reframed in Dutch policy discourses and policing
practices. As is often the case in ‘policy transfer’, the original strategies were fil‐
tered out to fit them into the new cultural context and implement them in policing
practices (cf. Jones & Newburn, 2007; Savage, 2007; Terpstra et al., 2013).
In this chapter three disorder policing strategies are reviewed, along with the
assumptions that inform these strategies. In the first section broken windows polic‐
ing is discussed, and in particular its influential zero tolerance interpretation. Sec‐
tion 2 points to situational crime prevention, while section 3 focuses on disorder
policing as a way to improve informal social control and trust. Each of these sec‐
tions first discusses some relevant assumptions of these policing strategies, and
subsequently the reception of (aspects of) these strategies in the Dutch context.
1 Zero tolerance and reconquering the streets
Many accounts of disorder policing start with a short article that appeared in The
Atlantic Monthly in 1982. It was written by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling
1. See further Kelling & Coles (1996) for a more extensive discussion of how in the 1960s US police
had been taken over by a paradigm of “fighting crime”, alienating them from mounting issues of
disorder.
and was called Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. This article forms
the starting point for the influential Broken Windows theory.
The basic assumptions of this theory are as simple as they are appealing: disor‐
der leads to more disorder and even crime, and therefore needs to be addressed.
This applies to both physical disorder, such as litter, graffiti, broken windows, and
to social disorder, such as rude behaviour, loitering, begging or sleeping in public.
The attractiveness of this idea resides in a straightforward causal ratio. If one win‐
dow is broken in a neighbourhood, more will follow because a broken window
that is left unrepaired gives a signal that “no one cares” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982). It
will function as an invitation for more people to commit vandalism. In fact, a
neighbourhood communicates by way of its tidiness and a general sense of order.
Orderly neighbourhoods signal that their inhabitants care, whereas disorderly
neighbourhoods, with apparent high levels of vandalism, rubbish and untended
behaviour signal that “communal barriers” are absent (ibid.).
The key assumption of Wilson & Kelling’s basic broken windows theory is that
neighbourhoods will decline if seemingly minor issues of disorder are neglected.
In fact, disorder has grown because the police have neglected this basic feature of
policing (Kelling & Coles, 1996: 69). A large part of their short article thus focuses
on forms of policing to stop this gradual downward slide, providing a solution that
is as simple as its problem definition. Policing should be redirected from reactive
crime fighting to paying attention to early neighbourhood decline and maintaining
order (Skogan, 1990). Moreover, what applies to unmended broken windows,
applies to disorderly behaviour in general. “Street crime flourishes in areas in
which disorderly behaviour goes unchecked. The unchecked panhandler is, in
effect, the first broken window” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982: 62). An arrest of a single
disorderly person may seem unjust, but “a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants
may destroy an entire community” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982: 5). Although many
forms of disorder strictly speaking are not illegal (sleeping drunks, loitering
youths), they have “a considerable impact on the community,” and might increase
neighbourhood decline (Skogan, 1990a: 3).
Ever since its inception in 1982, the broken windows theory has had an extensive
impact on both academic and political discussions, and has been interpreted in
many different ways (Harcourt, 2001; Herbert, 2001; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006).
Although the theory can be interpreted in terms of community needs (see the third
section below), the ‘zero tolerance’ interpretation has become the most influential
version.3
2. For references, the online version has been used: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.
3. The third perspective discussed below shows that the Broken Windows theory is suitable for vari‐
ous interpretations. The zero tolerance model is but one of the more dominant interpretations and
some would say undeservedly so (cf. Jones & Newburn, 2007; Van Stokkom, 2008; Terpstra, 2009).
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The most famous example of zero tolerance policing was introduced in 1993 by
the mayor of New York and the chief of police of the NYPD at that time, Rudolph
Giuliani and William Bratton, under the name of the ‘quality of life initiative’ (Her‐
bert, 2001; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006).4 Policing disorder here amounts to tough,
hands-on policing of disruptive behaviour and incivilities. Police officers should
fine (and arrest) citizens for minor rule-infractions and quality of life offences such
as public drinking, vandalism, begging and vagrancy. Thus zero tolerance policing
became mainly associated with crackdowns on minor disorder problems (New‐
burn & Jones, 2007).
Zero tolerance policing starts with defining those neighbourhoods that are at a
‘tipping point’. This term was borrowed from Wilson and Kelling (1982) to indicate
neighbourhoods “where the public order is deteriorating but not un-reclaimable,
where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive people, where a win‐
dow is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly be fixed if all are not to be
shattered” (Wilson & Kelling, 1982: 10). In these neighbourhoods public space
must be reclaimed.
Within this disorder policing strategy, frontline police officers play a pivotal
role, albeit somewhat ambivalently. On the one hand, police officers should be
given ample room to make their own decisions when doing their work; they ought
to settle problems of disorder by their own estimation of what are appropriate
interventions (Newburn, 2007). This would provide plenty of scope for pro-active
street-work and a large discretionary authority to police officers. By their presence,
they send out messages to disorderly persons and collect information about
offenders. On the other hand, through zero tolerance policing police officers have
been compelled to adhere to stricter targets and increased performance measures.
In New York this happened through the Compstat-system (Newburn & Jones,
2007). This management system was meant to make it easier to review and control
officers’ activities (Newburn & Jones, 2007).5
Reception
Zero tolerance has become immensely popular in policing policies and practices,
and is “probably the largest ‘policy transfer’ in criminological history,” according
to some (Van Swaaningen, 2005: 292, cf. Beckett & Herbert, 2009; Harcourt, 2001;
Herbert and Brown, 2006; Van de Bunt & van Swaaningen, 2012). Other cities cop‐
ied and adapted this initiative of the city of New York. This happened first in the
4. As a result of the use of the term ‘quality of life’ in this context, the restrictive forms of policing
described here might come to mind. However, the chapters that follow will show that the term
‘quality of life’ and the related Dutch term leefbaarheid has another relevance in the context of Dutch
municipal disorder policing: it is used to designate certain tasks are the responsibility of municipal
officers rather than police officers (cf. chapters 5 and 9).
5. See also Eterno and Silverman (2012) for distortions and negative consequences of this system.
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United States and eventually also in other cities in the Western, and even non-
Western world, albeit rarely in a strict zero tolerance variant (Harcourt, 2001: 57;
Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; cf. Newburn & Jones, 2007). As several scholars claim,
this popularity is not due to the alleged effectiveness of zero tolerance policing, but
to certain cultural and political circumstances that influenced the adoption of this
theory (Herbert, 2001; Mooney & Young, 2006).6
Likewise, representatives of the Dutch police travelled to New York to learn
from this ‘miracle’, leading to an adaptation of several zero tolerance elements in
the Netherlands (Punch, Hoogenboom & Williamson, 2005; Schuilenburg, 2013).7
Thus the Dutch police embraced elements of zero tolerance policing, albeit mostly
in specific neighbourhoods of Rotterdam, Amsterdam and Utrecht (Punch, 2006).
These policing practices differ from the strict New York prototype discussed above
because, for instance, the approach to drug addicts who cause disorder problems,
often also involves healthcare. Zero tolerance policing is restricted to measures
taken in deprived neighbourhoods with severe issues of disorder. Nevertheless,
Dutch examples of ‘Very Irritating Policing’ or the Amsterdam Streetwise pro‐
gramme are unmistakably influenced by overseas “vigorous law-enforcement”
strategies to combat disorder and decline (Newburn & Jones, 2007: 226; Punch,
2006; Terpstra, 2009; Van Stokkom, 2005).
These tendencies should equally be understood in the light of the changing secu‐
rity policies at the beginning of the 21st century in the Netherlands. After 2002, the
general political stance in the Netherlands tended toward a tougher approach of
issues of security and public safety. In its 2002 policy programme Toward a safer
society the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior at the time stated issues of secu‐
rity and disorder had been ‘festering too long’ (Ministry of the Interior and Minis‐
try of Justice, 2002). The programme further claimed that citizens’ feelings of
insecurity had been neglected for too long and called for a turn away from the leni‐
ency and the policy of too much tolerance of the past, for offensive plans and
action programmes (cf. Martineau, 2006). In doing so, this new policy programme
seemed to make a clear distinction between those that cause incivilities and crime
6. Although zero tolerance policing was received differently in the UK, the US and the Netherlands
(Mooney & Young, 2006; Newburn & Jones, 2007; Terpstra, 2009) several factors can explain the
overall popularity of this approach. Hence, the popularity of zero tolerance policing might not only
be explained by its basic, appealing idea of a causal relation between disorder, fear and crime, but
also by a simultaneous drop in crime rates in New York at the time of the introduction of broken
windows policing (Herbert, 2001; Herbert and Brown, 2006). In addition, several cultural and polit‐
ical circumstances contributed to its acceptance. These encompass inherent traits of police culture,
such as an affinity with the use of force, and the “moral purpose with which police officers imbue
their work” (Herbert, 2001: 453; Taylor, 2006), and zero tolerance’s accordance with a wider societal
understanding of crime as something that is inflicted upon the community from outside (Herbert,
2001). Lastly, similar changes in the political climate might have contributed to its acceptance, as
various countries have embraced a tougher approach on crime (Herbert, 2001).
7. Some state that the term ‘zero tolerance’ is rarely used or even rejected by the Dutch police and as
such mostly limited to political slogans (Martineau, 2006; Punch 2006; Van Dijk, 2012).
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(the disorderly) and those who go about their daily lives peacefully (the orderly).
By removing these ‘notorious sources’ from the streets or by excluding ‘bother‐
some individuals’ from public transport insecurity and incivilities were thought to
diminish and the decline of public space to be halted (Ministry of the Interior and
Ministry of Justice, 2002: 35). The renewed stress on visibility and visible enforce‐
ment also provided a new perspective (ibid.: 34 ff.), for instance to enhance rule
enforcement and surveillance in public places such as “railway stations, nightlife
districts, shopping centres, the areas surrounding coffee shops, areas where youth
assemble” (ibid.: 34). Moreover, this recalibration of public safety policy would
have to be done mostly at a “local level” by local governments and their way of
enforcing laws. Thus, employment of enforcement officers other than traditional
police for disorder policing is mentioned for the first time in a government plan
(ibid.: 37).
The city of Rotterdam is often mentioned in this respect. Rotterdam apparently
underwent a sea change from previous lenient ideas about public safety issues to a
tough approach. Tops (2007) speaks of a regime change, backed by an electoral
landslide from the long reigning social democratic party (PvdA), to the right-wing
populist party LPF, and with more attention being paid to the insecurities, fears
and annoyances of its inhabitants. In Rotterdam this led to a new municipal policy
in which “public safety becomes the primary lens” (Tops, 2007: 68; see also Schui‐
lenburg, 2013; Van Swaaningen, 2005). What is more, then mayor Opstelten
– dubbed Rotterdam’s Giuliani, and well known for his clear break with previous
policy – played a crucial role. The Rotterdam approach includes a fixation on tar‐
gets (the ‘Safety Index’), “action logics”, an “almost fanatic longing for concrete
and visible results” (Tops, 2007: 212), intrusive house calls (Dutch: huisbezoeken),
‘firmness’ and a priority of the frontline over policy.
The national policy programme Towards a Safer Society claims the Rotterdam
approach provides a guide. This municipality has been investing in what is termed
the ‘social reconquering’ of public space in its ‘deprived neighbourhoods’8, specifi‐
cally defining those neighbourhoods that have passed a ‘critical limit’, reminiscent
of Wilson & Kelling’s tipping point (Engbersen, Snel & Weltevreden, 2005). This
decisive strategy appears to leave little room for the classical social worker, as
security and justice personnel are expected to cover all the bases, together with
municipal neighbourhood professionals, intervention-teams, housing associations
and the private sector (ibid.: 19). Moreover, frontline professionals were meant to
become ‘streetwise’, to be ‘de-bureaucratised’, and they were given the room to
rediscover what is happening on the streets. Their intrusive approach also aimed at
setting moral standards, leading some to see this as a ‘civilisation-offensive’ (cf.
Van den Brink, 2004). Although this policy of “social reconquering” involves con‐
cerns about social disadvantages and encompasses social support, the emphasis on
8. A loose description of what in Dutch are termed achterstandswijken.
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strict enforcement and repression of disorder is undeniable (cf. Schuilenburg,
2013).
2 Situational crime prevention
Summing up the first section, zero tolerance strategies aim to nip the process of
neighbourhood decline in the bud by addressing the hitherto neglected issues of
disorder and incivilities and by making a clear distinction between orderly and
disorderly persons.
In many ways the second strategy of disorder policing suggests the opposite.
The strategy of situational crime prevention sees disorder as a problem that could
be caused by anyone. Whereas the zero tolerance model draws a clear line between
insiders as honest citizens and outsiders as loitering youths, tramps or drunks, this
theory assumes that everyone might be inclined to commit crime and that all citi‐
zens tend to make the same choices under similar situational circumstances – “all
people have some probability of committing crime”, and “situational prevention
does not draw hard distinctions between criminals and others” (Clarke, 1997: 4, see
also Felson, 1998; Newman, 1972).9 Theories of situational crime prevention
assume that crime can be reduced effectively by altering situations rather than the
personal dispositions of the offender.
Rooted in socio-ecological theories and theories on opportunity reduction, this
approach to disorder is mainly concerned with the question how local situations
could influence the rational choices individuals make (Clarke, 1997; Felson, 1998;
Newman, 1972). High rise buildings for example, with a lot of anonymous space
and little opportunity for surveillance by residents will have more risk of becoming
locations with a high incidence of crime and disorder (Newman, 1972). Felson
(1998) elaborates these basic premises in his theory of the chemistry of crime: the
incidence of crime is dependent on three variables, all contributing to define the
probability of someone actually committing an offence. A likely offender and a suit‐
able target must be present, whereas a “capable guardian” must be absent (Felson,
1998: 53). Taking these three basic conditions into consideration, the probability of
a crime can easily be determined, according to Felson. As such, guardianship is
only one of several elements that might predict crime.10
9. However, some authors state that theories of situational crime prevention do make a clear distinc‐
tion between insiders and outsiders, the normal and the pathological (Herbert & Brown, 2006: 758).
Newman for instance, seems to suggest that residents should be given more opportunity to guard
their neighbourhood from “intruders” (Newman, 1972: 72). This evidently influences Newman’s
commitment to rational choice theory, in which good and bad moral options do not play a role, but
simply the individual considerations on whether or not to commit a crime or (here) act in a disor‐
derly manner (Herbert & Brown, 2006: 763).
10. Albeit an element that does not get as much attention as victim/target suitability and the motiva‐
tion of the offender (Hollis-Peel, Reynald, Bavel, Elffers & Welsh, 2011).
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Theories of situational crime prevention propose solutions that revolve around
changing the rational choices of possible offenders. This applies equally to forms of
guardianship: guardians are important as they change the opportunities for crimi‐
nal or disorderly behaviour.11 In the initial writings on situational crime prevention
this is mostly understood as informal guardianship. Public spaces should be
designed in such a fashion that there are more possibilities for inhabitants them‐
selves to control their own environment so they will be less reluctant to deal with
“the problem of security” (Newman, 1972: 49). This in fact is “the traditional
responsibility of the citizenry” (ibid.: 14). The ‘defensible space’ approach to crime
and disorder is even aimed at previous models of urban design and the allegedly
ineffective forms of policing that came along with it: “[t]he high-rise prototype,
with its myriad of resident janitorial and security staff” (ibid.: 7).
Nevertheless, several forms of disorder policing are in line with the situational
approach. Formally guarding against the opportunities for offences might well be a
reply to weakened informal guardianship by citizens themselves. Thus policing
disorder is meant to reduce the probability individuals will behave in a disorderly
fashion at given times and given places. Examples of such formal guards are secu‐
rity guards, urban citizen patrols, place managers (e.g. bus drivers or car park
attendants), actively monitored CCTV and neighbourhood watch groups (Hollis-
Peel, Reynald, Bavel, Elffers, & Welsh, 2011: 61 ff.). All have a (situational) role to
diminish the risk of crime and disorder.
The theory of situational crime prevention has also influenced several policing
strategies. One example of this is problem oriented policing. In the explanation of
Goldstein (1979), problem oriented policing is based on a “detailed analysis of the
everyday problems [the police] handle and the devising of tailor-made solutions”
(ibid.: 9).12 The police are there to deal with a series of problems, not just to enforce
the law in the coded, bureaucratic way they tend to do (Goldstein, 1979: 246). Thus,
Goldstein makes explicit reference to situational crime prevention and the theory
of Newman (ibid.: 251), as ‘smart forms of guardianship’ might be good alterna‐
tives to prevent issues of crimes and disorder. A second example of policing influ‐
enced by situational crime prevention is hotspot policing. Opportunities for crime
and disorder are reduced if certain places are ‘painted blue’ at certain times and
possible offenders are deterred by the presence of uniformed personnel. This
approach focuses equally on both inquiring extensively into local problems and on
the most effective forms of uniformed interventions in the places with the most
problems – the hotspots. Thus, hotspot policing and problem oriented policing
11. Here guardianship by and large is understood as a notion that is in accordance with situational
crime prevention thinking, but guardianship may be equally associated with strategies that high‐
light trust and informal social control (see further below).
12. According to Goldstein (1979), problem oriented policing first and foremost should be seen as an
answer to previous, allegedly ineffective ways of policing and provided an opportunity to reorient
policing on “the primary purposes for which they were created” (Ibid.: 237).
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might have a lot in common in their (empirical) assessment of what works best at
certain times and in certain places and their embrace of situational crime preven‐
tion (Weisburd & Braga, 2008).13
Reception
In the Dutch case, theories of situational crime prevention influenced local safety
policies mostly in the form of administrative prevention. This is most clearly repre‐
sented in the solutions proposed by the Roethof Committee and the ensuing 1986
national policy programme Society and crime that have already briefly been men‐
tioned in chapter 1.
Both this Committee and the Society and Crime policy programme noted the
need for a combination of preventative and repressive measures.14 To address the
abundance of petty crimes the committee proposed solutions that were strongly
influenced by situational crime prevention theories, highlighting a reduction of
opportunities by redeveloping the built environment and by fortifying functional
surveillance for instance, by conductors, caretakers or shop attendants (Ministry of
Justice, 1985: 9; cf. Van Dijk, 2012).15 Likewise, these ideas of opportunity reduction
found their way to Dutch policy makers (De Haan, 2001). The popularity of these
theories was further strengthened by the widely shared idea that opportunities for
crime and disorder abounded due to a loss of informal guardianship by citizens
themselves (Hauber et al., 1996; Ministry of Justice, 1985). As a result, the first
municipal city wardens, police patrol officers and surveillance officers in public
transport seemed to find an important legitimation in the compensation for this
loss (Hauber et al., 1996; Van Andel, 1989).
By contrast, the Dutch police seemed to have a minor role in these administra‐
tive ideas of situational crime prevention (Straver, 2006: 202). Only with the later
government paper Towards a Safer Society (2002) was the police’s role in order
maintenance reintroduced, albeit more in terms of (reactive) law enforcement (see
above). That does not mean however, that situational crime prevention wholly dis‐
appeared from Dutch police policy. Through the innovations of problem oriented
policing and hotspot policing a situational approach did find acclaim within the
Dutch police. The vision elaborated in police policy document Police in Development
(Politie in Ontwikkeling; Projectgroep visie op de politiefunctie, 2005) for instance,
13. These approaches allegedly ‘work’ better than “misdemeanour arrests and social service strat‐
egies” (Braga & Bond 2008; see also Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Weisburd & Braga, 2008).
14. As the Roethof Committee did not provide a clear theoretical or juridical definition of these ‘petty
crimes’, their abundance seemed more important than their exact definition, which was proved by
the later shift in focus from ‘petty’ to ‘frequent’ (in Dutch: veelvoorkomend, cf. Boutellier, 2008).
15. The third prominent solution proposed by the Roethof committee deviates from these situational
interventions. Inspired by Travis Hirschi’s theory of social bonds, it highlights that petty crimes
can also be prevented by improving the integration of (mainly) youth in society (Commissie Roet‐
hof 1984, see also Hirschi, 1969).
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highlights the breach with traditional concepts that was already evident in the ear‐
lier report Police in Transition (Politie in Verandering; Projectgroep Organisatie Struc‐
turen, 1978; see also below). The former document highlighted – among other
things – “situationally determined action” (Projectgroep visie op de politiefunctie,
2005: 73), provided room for problem oriented variants of policing and greater visi‐
ble presence of police on the streets (Straver, 2008).16 In addition, other recent
police concepts also lean on some of the basic premises of situational crime preven‐
tion, such as the notion of tegenhouden (obstructing) as a preventative crime fight‐
ing strategy (Hoogewoning, 2004).17
3 Improving informal social control and building trust
A last strategy that is discussed here focuses on the disruptive effects of disorder
on neighbourhood residents’ feelings of security. Disorder leads citizens to avoid
public places, or even move away from their neighbourhood. As such, it induces
fear and aloofness. If police addressed the basic signs of disorder that matter to
neighbourhood residents, and if they invested in relations with residents, citizens
might regain trust in them and might eventually be willing to address seemingly
minor disorder issues themselves. Thus, disorder policing can help to restore infor‐
mal social control.
This interpretation can be seen as an alternative reading of the broken windows
thesis and as such can be contrasted to the abovementioned zero tolerance
approach. Instead of seeing disorder as a precursor to crime and repressively
focusing on “the subset of incivilities” (Taylor, 2006: 107), this strategy targets
underlying causes of neighbourhood decline that lead to both disorder and crime:
“Lack of social control might cause both graffiti and robbery” (Sampson & Rauden‐
busch, 1999: 608, emphasis added, see also Bottoms, 2006). Even if disorder has a
cascading effect, “encouraging people to move […] or discouraging efforts at
building collective responses,” merely fighting disorder is a “simplistic and largely
misplaced” way of fighting crime (Sampson & Raudenbusch, 1999: 637).
However, that does not mean that issues of disorder are irrelevant (Bottoms,
2006: 268; Sampson, Raudenbusch, & Earls, 1997; Sampson & Raudenbusch, 1999;
Taylor, 2001; Taylor, 2006). On the contrary, when residents see that the police are
fighting disorder, they might feel less insecure and helpless, gain trust and eventu‐
ally even the willingness to address disorder themselves. The work of Sampson &
Raudenbusch (1999) proves especially insightful here. They define the prepared‐
ness to intervene in public space and to settle issues by informal social control as
‘collective efficacy’. Or, to put it somewhat more elaborately: “the ability of [a]
16. Although some of these interpretations seem closer to zero tolerance policing than to problem ori‐
ented or hot spot variants, see also below.
17. See also Versteegh, Van der Plas & Nieuwstraten (2010) for an elaboration of problem oriented
policing as a solution to crime in the wider region of The Hague.
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community to regulate its members and to realize collective goals such as control‐
ling group processes” (Atkinson & Flint, 2004: 335). As disorder leads to aloofness
and fear in public space, directing policing attention to disorder will assumedly
strengthen a community’s collective efficacy.18
This emphasis on collective efficacy echoes with some conceptions of community
policing. Although the first ideas of community policing predate the broken win‐
dows theory, and its ideas vary greatly between countries, all conceptions of com‐
munity policing point at the disrupting effect of disorder. In effect, disorder polic‐
ing understood from this perspective mainly aims at restoring trust of citizens, but
also at (re)building police legitimacy.
First and foremost, community policing focuses on priorities of neighbourhood
residents and what bothers them most (Punch, Van der Vijver, & Zoomer, 2002;
Skogan, 2006a). In general, this means the police are prepared to be involved with
more (disorder) issues and to widen their scope (Skogan, 2006a: 8). The main rea‐
son for this approach is that addressing disorder has an important psychological
relevance: “visual cues matter” (Sampson & Raudenbusch, 1999: 605; Innes, 2004).
The restoring of visible order involves visible surveillance, foot patrols, neighbour‐
hood storefront offices and physical presence – a “maximalistic” strategy of polic‐
ing (Van Stokkom, 2008; see also Kelling and Coles, 1996; Skogan, 1990; Wilson and
Kelling, 1982). In this respect, community policing is closely related to the notion of
reassurance policing, as this is also a strategy that aims at taking into account the
problems that matter the most to feelings of insecurity of citizens (Terpstra, 2010b).
Giving prominence to these feelings and how they are related to visible signs of
disorder implies that policing aims to reassure residents. Policing might even
regain public trust by engineering ‘control signals’. These are acts of social control
that communicate to citizens that disorderly behaviour is regulated (Innes, 2004;
Van Stokkom, 2007). It is claimed that investing in these signals would eventually
bolster informal social control (cf. Bottoms, 2006). In other words, identifying those
problems that matter most in the eyes of neighbourhood residents and showing
that something is done about these issues, not only reassures residents, it might
also invite them to address these problems themselves.19
Secondly, this perspective on disorder policing aims at restoring police legiti‐
macy, involving a strengthening of bonds between citizens and police in general
(Taylor 2006: 105, Punch et al., 2002: 69). Past policing strategies such as incident-
driven crime fighting and rapid response have generally failed because they
18. Some authors warn against seeing disorder and fear as necessarily causally related, as disorder is
perceived differently at different times and in different places (Matthews, 1992; Hancock, 2001 in:
Van Stokkom, 2008: 56).
19. Especially in American interpretations of community policing the emphasis is on the strengthening
of informal social control, and even re-invigorating lost ideals of community and social cohesion.
In this respect, disorder policing would be an opportunity to strengthen or remobilise ‘the com‐
munity’ in general (Skogan, 1990).
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neglected both the importance of interaction with citizens, and their concerns, and
because they estranged the police from “the communities they serve” (Skogan,
1990: 89, see also Kelling & Coles, 1996). In some cases, it is also assumed that
police auxiliaries – such as the Police Community Support Officers in England and
Wales – can play an important role in this respect. These officers might provide an
opportunity to “instigate informal, and even innovative, means of engagement to
improve dialogue with diverse populations within local communities through
their enhanced visibility, familiarity and accessibility” (Cosgrove & Ramshaw,
2013: 82, cf. Crawford & Lister, 2004). These auxiliaries function as intermediaries
between the police and the public, reconnecting the two in times of mounting dis‐
tance and distrust (Cosgrove & Ramshaw, 2013; Crawford, 2006; Paskell, 2007).
Reception
In the Netherlands the perspective that highlights reassurance and trust can be
found in various forms of community policing. Although it differs notably from its
American counterparts, Dutch community policing can also be seen as a response
to the standard, incident-driven policing model. At the start of the 1970s the Dutch
police were seen as drifting too far from the Dutch populace. In addition, they
were considered ineffective, too reactive and overtly bureaucratic. Through several
developmental phases (cf. Terpstra, 2008b) – and with an important role for the
abovementioned report Police in Transition – this change involved several ambi‐
tions that distinguish it from previous policing models. Terpstra (2010a) mentions
five – enhancing citizens’ trust in the police, broadening the scope of the problems
with which the police is involved, using preventative and proactive strategies,
cooperating with other agencies and cooperating with citizens. With these changes
in policing strategies the Dutch police have taken the concerns and feelings of inse‐
curity of neighbourhood residents more seriously.
What sets Dutch community policing apart from American ideas of community
policing is its geographical orientation. Whereas the American variants of com‐
munity policing (among other things) highlight notions of community building
and social cohesion (Herbert, 2006), Dutch community policing prioritises the
embedding of officers in geographical areas. It is mainly for these reasons that
Dutch community policing is known by the name of ‘area specific operating’
(gebiedsgebonden werken; Terpstra, 2008b). This has little to do with the reinvigora‐
tion of romantic or classic ideals of community. Dutch ambitions seem more prag‐
matic and centred around notions of being a familiar presence in the neighbour‐
hood (‘to know and to be known’), and what might “work” (Van der Bunt & Van
Swaaningen, 2012: 501). In addition, informal social control is emphasised less than
proximity and the idea that citizens could join the police in preventing and fighting
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minor infractions of public order.20 Dutch community policing seems related more
to reassurance policing than to American variants that stress social cohesion and
informal social control. This is all the more relevant for an interpretation of munici‐
pal disorder policing in the Netherlands, as municipal officers appear to be influ‐
enced by the idea of reassurance (Terpstra, 2008a, 2010b; see further chapter 5).
Nevertheless, notions of community and cohesion do play a role in Dutch public
safety policy. Van Houdt & Schinkel (2014) for example, note that national Dutch
safety policy incorporated concerns about “the morality of citizens and their nor‐
mative attachment to society” (2014: 6). In this case, the policy paper Law in
Motion21 leads these authors to conclude that the “Dutch government of crime has
been influenced by the rationality of communitarianism” (2014: 54, see also Van
Stokkom & Toenders, 2010). On a local level too, Van Houdt & Schinkel (2014) pro‐
vide the example of safety policy in Rotterdam where the wish for citizens to
become more active was connected with the concern over “responsible communi‐
ties” and “vital coalitions” (ibid.: 11). Furthermore, prominent examples of local
policy that is aimed at bolstering informal social control can be found in citizen
participation projects in public safety. In these projects, residents are for instance
stimulated to patrol their own neighbourhoods or set up their own network for
reporting issues to police or municipality (cf. Van der Land, Van Stokkom & Bou‐
tellier, 2014).22
4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a theoretical exploration of three strategies of disorder
policing. For each of the strategies, the main assumptions were discussed, as well
as the reception of (parts of) these strategies in the Dutch context.
The first strategy is based on a specific interpretation of the broken windows
theory. The basic premises of the theory, as well as the way its most famous exam‐
ple – ‘the New York miracle’ – was advertised, makes this one of the most popular
and most discussed theories in the field. This zero tolerance strategy centres on the
police being supposed to crackdown on minor forms of disorder, because this
would prevent these minor infringements from leading to worse forms of disorder
and crime. This amounts to a repressive way of policing, in which a distinction is
20. The thesis that policing disorder could enhance informal social control is not supported by the
daily practice of community policing in the Netherlands. Moreover, citizens are only summarily
involved in everyday police work in the Netherlands. Whereas ideals might highlight the involve‐
ment of citizens through citizen panels or beat meetings, or else involve an elicitation to ‘decent
citizenship’ (Nap & Van Os, 2006), in their daily work, community police officers are involved with
contacting citizens only to a very limited extent. In fact, “there is only one form of citizen participa‐
tion which community officers are generally prepared to support: citizens as a source of informa‐
tion for the police” (Terpstra, 20010a: 69).
21. Recht in Beweging (Ministry of Justice, 1990).
22. Although such projects mostly concern a rather pragmatic activation of informal networks for the
problems defined by the police or the local government.
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made between orderly insiders (neighbourhood residents) and disorderly outsid‐
ers.
The second prominent strategy of disorder policing is the situational crime pre‐
vention approach. This theory is the most pragmatic of the three. Assuming any act
of disorder is preceded by rational considerations, such acts can be prevented by
reducing the opportunities for crime and disorder. In the case of disorder policing,
this amounts to an investment in guardianship. The policing practices that bring
these assumptions to mind are forms of problem oriented policing and (some)
forms of hotspot policing.
The third strategy of disorder policing aims at improving informal social con‐
trol and trust. By inviting residents to indicate the most pressing disorder prob‐
lems and showing that these problems are tackled, residents might feel reassured.
By accentuating visible cues of order, residents might even be persuaded to
address these problems themselves, thus restoring informal social control. This
interpretation is most evident in different variants of community policing.
Although the expectation that informal social control can be restored is not promi‐
nent in every variant, these variants share a concern about reassurance.
Finally, it should be noted that this exploration of different strategies contains
abstractions and simplifications. Although these strategies and their assumptions
in theory can be distinguished, in practice many conceptions cross-sect and overlap
(see also Onrust & Voorham, 2013; Terpstra, 2008b).23 Hotspot policing for
instance, is often a preventative practice, but it may also adopt the contours of a
repressive and zero tolerance intervention, especially where it concerns the tempo‐
rary increase in the number of police officers to suppress and deter disorderly
behaviour (Rosenbaum, 2008). Likewise, in community policing different policy
perspectives might intertwine. Here it has been explained mainly as valuing citi‐
zens’ concerns and priorities, but a problem-oriented intervention may equally be
dubbed community policing (Braga & Bond, 2008; Skogan, 2006a).24 Moreover,
some variants of community policing might even border on zero tolerance
approaches (Punch et al., 2002: 71). In practice various policing strategies intermin‐
gle. As will be elaborated in the second part of this study, Dutch municipal disor‐
der policing is characterised by a sometimes confusing mix of approaches to disor‐
der, showing the influence of diverging policing strategies.
23. Even in theory there is a large overlap and similarity between these perspectives. Newman for
instance, has been presented here as a founding father of theories of situational crime prevention,
but his work also emphasises informal social control and the importance of paying attention to
early disorder and decay (Newman, 1972).
24. Some even state that community policing derived its basic methodology from problem oriented
policing (Punch et al., 2002).
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3 Sociological interpretations of disorder
policing
As stated in the first chapter, this study aims to develop a better understanding of
Dutch municipal disorder policing by addressing both its dominant perspectives
and the social and cultural context that contributed to its growth. Having explored
three strategies of disorder policing in the previous chapter, this second theoretical
chapter deals with the broader societal developments that might have contributed
to its emergence. It does so by discussing various sociological interpretations of
urban disorder and disorder policing. Nevertheless, some of these readings are
closely related to what has previously been discussed, as some strategies of disor‐
der policing appear to relate to specific societal developments, such as the weaken‐
ing of informal social control.
In the first section disorder policing is interpreted as a response to changes in
the urban social fabric. Largely based on the writings of Jane Jacobs, this section
discusses readings that take up disorder policing as a benevolent response to a
changed informal social order and to other aspects of what is called an ‘urban cri‐
sis’. The second section discusses sceptical interpretations. Instead of interpreting
disorder policing as an intervention to invigorate the quality of life, it is seen as a
part of revanchist and exclusionary policies. In the third section, disorder policing
is understood as part of what David Garland calls the ‘culture of control’. Garland
provides a comprehensive theory of changes in crime and disorder and govern‐
mental responses, ranging from risk management to rhetorical and emotionalised
political reactions. The fourth section provides an overview by summing up the
most important characteristics of these three interpretations.
1 Benevolent interpretations: disorder policing as a response to
changes in the urban social fabric
The first interpretation presented here regards disorder policing as a well-meaning
response to various urban changes – the decline in informal social order and the
lack of trust between citizens and police forces. Part of these transitions in the
social fabric of large cities in the last seventy years or so are famously captured by
Jane Jacobs in her seminal work The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1962). In
this book Jacobs provides insight into how concerns over rising segregation, the
loss of informal social control and animosity in large, anonymous cities might be at
the base of urban disorder.1
Her concerns are rooted in a somewhat nostalgic remembrance of city life as it
used to be, noting how cities increasingly become segregated, uninviting places,
where different people have stopped meeting or interacting in public (cf. Zukin,
2010). Jacobs mainly blames urban planners for this as they intend to reshape cities,
creating a division between different functions and different types of residents,
leading to a demise of vital and diverse cities into homogenous, characterless and
open cityscapes, a “monotonous, unnourishing gruel” (Jacobs, 1962: 7). Moreover,
these cities become increasingly segregated, with affluent citizens living in seclud‐
ed suburbs and deprived citizens residing in ghettos. Through the demise of diver‐
sity, and through segregation of different functions and different groups of people,
street life is lost. Jacobs laments in particular that pavements are less and less used,
citizens withdraw from public space and cities are increasingly homogenised and
compartmentalised into areas in which different lifestyles are isolated from each
other (cf. Sennett, 1971). Jacobs essentially seems to grieve over the loss of a truly
public space, in that it is less and less a meeting place for strangers or what she
calls a ‘sidewalk ballet’.
Most important for the point made here, The Death and Life of Great American Cit‐
ies also discusses the preconditions for a more vibrant public space. According to
Jacobs, a livelier and inviting street-life can only be attained by re-centring citizens’
own interests and ways of maintaining order. Thus, an important part of her ideas
about city life concerns the social order that accompanies these city scenes as “thea‐
tres of differences”. Cities can only be vital if there is a healthy degree of informal
social control among different users of public space: “there must be eyes on the
street, eyes belonging to those we might call the natural proprietors of the street”
(Jacobs, 1962: 35). Particularly this latter perspective became increasingly popular
in later thinking about disorder and how to police it.
Although there is an evident rift between Jacobs’ longing for informal social
control and formal disorder policing, the establishment of disorder policing can
equally be seen as an answer to a lack of trust among city residents and to their
fear to enter public space. Thus disorder policing might be a way of controlling the
‘publicness’ of public places. Focusing on predictability, reliability and maintaining
a level of ‘normality’, disorder policing enables people to trust others in their envi‐
ronment and to interact freely in public (cf. Misztal, 2001). Understood in these
terms, the later advent of disorder policing is a contribution to basic ordering that
1. Although Jacobs herself does not mention formal social control, her thinking seems to have notable
influence on later theories of disorder policing, especially the broken windows theory (Ranasinghe,
2012).
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“makes possible a basis for action” (Lofland, 1973: 95, see also Bottoms, 2006).2
Other authors relate this to what they call the “domestication” of public spaces,
helping people “to be at home in cities” (Koch & Latham, 2012: 19). City land‐
scapes that have changed into uninviting spaces can be revitalised. Often this is
done by physical design-led interventions, such as putting up benches, opening up
dark and secluded parks or creating other interventions to enhance “pleasurable
encounters” and stimulate “convivial forms of sociality” (Koch & Latham, 2012: 7,
Van Stokkom, 2008). The term domestication here in a sense refers to what Lofland
would call “creating home territories” (1973: 119). Surveillance and control by uni‐
formed wardens might be seen as part of this domestication.3
Jacobs’ thinking does not stand alone. In fact, it seems indicative of a wider aware‐
ness of the urban issues in the 1960s and 1970s, albeit this awareness was expressed
in various terms. Other writers refer to, for instance, “the urban problem” (Wilson,
1969) or “the urban crisis” (Banfield, 1970, in: Ranasinghe 2012) and see the omni‐
presence of “improper behaviour” as a result of “the failure of community” (Wil‐
son, 1969). Yet other studies and reports address racial segregation, the frequent
occurrence of riots and widespread distrust between citizens of lower-income
neighbourhoods and the police in the 1960s (Taylor, 2006).
These observations, diverse as they might be, also form the intellectual founda‐
tions of later, more elaborate concerns about community policing and the first for‐
mulations of disorder policing in the broken windows theory (Ranasinghe, 2012;
Skogan, 2006b; Taylor, 2006). New forms of (disorder) policing would provide an
opportunity to involve communities in crime fighting and to enhance trust
between police officers and neighbourhood residents. Thus, already these early
conceptions of disorder policing are characterised by a wish to provide a solution
to different problems – distrust between police and (deprived) citizens on the one
hand, and changes in the urban environment and informal social control on the
other hand (Taylor, 2006; see also Rosenbaum, 1988).
Although the Dutch situation is not comparable to the widespread antagonism
in some large American cities in the 1960s, early Dutch forms of community polic‐
ing in fact were also a response to changed urban conditions and a wish to restore
the relation with the “societal environment” (Terpstra, 2008b). Police forces were
seen as bureaucratically isolated, as focused too much on (reactive) law enforce‐
ment, and therefore needed to be brought closer to the communities they were
supposed to serve (even though these ambitions were generally not related to
2. Some actually assume an important role for ‘intermediary’ plural policing functions in this respect.
Neighbourhood wardens for instance, can create the conditions for ‘vibrant communities’, quite
contrary to “a narrow state police-centred focus on law enforcement in the promotion of civility”
(Crawford, 2006: 974).
3. Although domestication also has a pejorative ring to it, privatising or ‘colonising’ interventions
seclude unwanted people, enhance exclusion and limit the use of public spaces by multiple and
diverse cultures (Atkinson, 2003; Lofland, 1973). See further below.
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notions of a growing underclass). In this respect, especially the 1977 police policy
document Police in Transition (Politie in Verandering) led the way for a more decen‐
tralised police organisation that was better integrated in society and could regain
the police’s legitimacy (Terpstra, 2008b: 16).
2 Sceptical interpretations: disorder policing as an exclusionary
response
Although rooted in diverse observations, disorder policing may predominantly be
interpreted as springing from citizens’ concerns or worries over urban communi‐
ties. In this respect, disorder policing is seen as an inclusive intervention, aimed at
involving different residents, defending ‘the publicness of public space’, and at its
core concerned with diversity.
By contrast, a more sceptical interpretation points out that the rhetoric of citizen
oriented policing merely shrouds the exclusionary practice of disorder policing.
Hence, disorder policing may be seen as defending narrowly defined interests. It
sees disorder policing as part of ‘urban revanchism’, as the extension of the inter‐
ests of middle-class citizens at worst, or as a mistaken response to problems of
marginality at best. Other sceptical readings highlight its exclusionary character,
especially where it concerns the policing of incivilities or anti-social behaviour.
One such sceptical reading pointing to disorder policing as an exclusionary prac‐
tice can be found in the work of Neil Smith (1996, 2002). Smith describes initiatives
that are meant to improve the quality of life of neighbourhoods, but his analyses
and conclusions are at odds with the abovementioned benevolent readings. In fact,
quality of life initiatives are part of what Smith calls ‘urban revanchism’.
Smith specifically targets urban policies that are advertised as ‘gentrification’.
By these policies, governments stimulate well-to-do people to move into streets
and neighbourhoods on the verge of ‘tipping’, of sliding into further decline
(Smith, 1996). The influx of these residents is thought to help improve neighbour‐
hoods and create an upward spiral of amelioration (Smith, 1996: 15). The effect
however, is that the less well-to-do allegedly lose their “right to the city” (Mitchell,
2003). Thus the quality of life this policy aims at is not meant to benefit all popula‐
tions in the city, but has an exclusionary character. Here, ‘quality of life’ becomes
an instrument to condemn other, marginal life styles. Urban upgrading, regenera‐
tion and gentrification thus benefit only middle class citizens (Smith, 1996: 89).
Crucial to understanding this revanchism according to Smith, is the loss of middle
class optimism in times of economic setback (Smith, 1996: 47). Revanchism “repre‐
sents a reaction against the supposed “theft” of the city, a desperate defence of a
challenged phalanx of privileges, cloaked in the populist language of civic mor‐
ality, family values and neighbourhood security” (ibid.: 211). Moreover, processes
of gentrification and revanchism are closely intertwined with neo-liberal tenden‐
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cies, as consumerist values prevail. Thus, influenced by the predominance of
global capital and neo-liberalist values, various cities across the globe are now
characterised by an exclusionary regulation of public space, changing large areas
into what might be termed ‘pseudo-private spaces’ (Mitchell & Staeheli, 2006;
Smith, 2002).
In this respect, disorder policing can also be seen as a mistaken response to
issues of marginality (Wacquant, 2008).4 French sociologist Loïc Wacquant for
instance, opposes the view that urban disorder is the result of a moral crisis of the
working class (ibid.: 24), or – in Jacobsian terms – of a loss of eyes on the streets.
Instead, Wacquant sees the “public disorders caused by dispossessed youth”5 as a
result of “massive structural violence unleashed upon them by a set of mutually
reinforcing economic and socio-political changes” (ibid.: 24), resulting in “mass
unemployment”, “relegation to decaying neighbourhoods” and “heightened stig‐
matisation” (ibid.: 25). Even though American ‘hyper-ghetto’s’ and French banlieues
are not comparable to Dutch deprived neighbourhoods, the gist of Wacquant’s
interpretation might equally apply to forms of disorder policing found here.
Entrusting the police with providing the solution to complex problems of margin‐
ality transforms feelings of social insecurity to problems of criminal insecurity (ibid.:
12). Hence, disorder policing might exacerbate social tensions, urban unrest and
marginality, especially where the police are prone to violence and intimidation
themselves. One could even go so far as to say that sending in police as a response
to marginality might be no more than a way to give state authorities the “comfort‐
ing feeling that it is responding to the demands of the ‘people’ while at the same
time exculpating its own historic responsibility in the making of the urban outcasts
of the new century” (ibid.: 12).
Closely related to Smith’s ideas of urban revanchism, various studies are equally
sceptical of disorder policing. However, these studies limit themselves to specific
contexts and mostly refrain from the revanchist terminology altogether, instead
focusing on the process of exclusion as such.
Some authors point to the increase in social control and the criminalisation of
minor forms of disorder (Crawford, 2006; Hughes, 2007, in: Devroe, 2012), a proc‐
ess that is also referred to as ‘net widening’. This term, first coined by Stanley
Cohen (1979), implies that an increasing array of incivilities or disruptive behav‐
iour is criminalised. Others see this as proof of the criminalisation of everyday
4. Some oppose the terminology of classes altogether, as this merely obscures a more profound and
nuanced analysis of “struggles over the city,” where notions of inclusion, identity and the ‘civilis‐
ing’ of the urban poor are of more importance (Van Eijk, 2010; Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). In
fact, the labelling of different ‘classes’ itself springs from a state-led “moulding” of marginality
(Wacquant, 2008: 8) in which ‘the underclass’ is a category imposed from outside and used to
define “groups who are socially and morally disconnected from the rest of society with different
values; the ‘depraved rather than the deprived’” (Crawford, 2006: 959).
5. In Wacquant’s case, large scale disorders such as mass rioting, or looting.
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behaviour (Bannister, Fyfe & Kearns, 2006), or of a process of ‘defining deviancy
up’ (Devroe, 2012; Krauthamer, 1993). Yet other authors point out that the quest for
a new urban aesthetics, and the ensuing focus on anti-social behaviour use ques‐
tionable definitions of what exactly is anti-social (Cook & Whowell, 2011; Millie,
2008; cf. Mitchell, 2003). In some studies new forms of disorder policing are dis‐
cussed as part of such dubious exclusionary practices. Often these forms of disor‐
der policing target homeless people, such as in Beckett & Herbert’s (2010) account
of banishment by the use of off-limit orders in the city of Montreal. Van de Bunt &
Van Swaaningen (2012) point out that such exclusionary tendencies can also be
found in the Dutch context.
This interpretation provides a contrasting perspective on what was earlier
called the domestication of public space. Instead of opting for diversity, state actors
privatise public places and choreograph urban landscapes in a fashion that sends a
clear signal that certain people and lifestyles are not welcome (Allen & Crookes,
2009; Macleod & Johnstone, 2012). In doing so, they create new “dwelling scapes”
meant for consumerist middle class households, thereby both sanitising these back‐
ward areas and instilling civility and control (Allen & Crookes, 2009). In addition,
other authors see exclusionary disorder policing as limited to specific urban areas,
or see negative consequences as concomitant with specific localities and times,
such as the night-time economy – a reading that is of equal relevance for develop‐
ments in the Dutch context (Van Aalst & Van Liempt, 2012; see also Hae, 2011,
Hobbs, Lister, Hadfield, Winlow & Hall, 2000). Hence, the outcomes of state-led
strategies to enhance the quality of life of poorer neighbourhoods might in fact
include “deepened social cleavages and growing indifference” instead of creating a
public space that is accessible to anyone (Uitermark, Duyvendak & Kleinhans,
2007: 137).
3 Comprehensive interpretations: disorder policing as risk
management and ‘acting out’
The two interpretations of disorder policing discussed hitherto leave us with two
sharply opposing views. Whereas the first interpretation sees disorder policing as a
benevolent reaction to urban problems, the second set of interpretations assumes
that the structural causes for disorder do not tally with the exclusionary reasons
why state actors would invest in disorder policing in the first place.
A third and final interpretation of disorder policing presented here unites these
two contrasting visions into one comprehensive theory. David Garland’s The cul‐
ture of control (2001) provides an opportunity to see both developments in crime
and disorder and the diverse responses to those as part of a larger cultural frame‐
work (Young, 2003). Vital in understanding this framework is Garland’s notion of
a ‘criminological predicament’. Put simply, crime has been rising over the years,
whereas the capacity of the criminal justice system to deal with it is limited (Gar‐
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land, 2001: 106). Garland states that any crime policy (and rhetoric) basically can be
seen as a response to the governmental “loss of sovereignty” over issues of disor‐
der and crime. Thus this predicament of high crime and limited state capacity
functions as the organising principle of his theory and encompasses contradictory
state responses, a schizoid form of policy and a portrayal of man torn between dif‐
ferent ideologies.6
Garland accounts for these contradictions by stating that in this newly emerged
culture of control, several opposing ‘criminologies’ inform policy simultaneously;
multiple ideologies conflict over crime and punishment. In this way the culture of
control is characterised by both a primacy of rational choice on the one hand, and
strong and punitive interventions for moral wrongs on the other hand. Garland
frames these distinct state responses to the abovementioned criminological predic‐
ament by calling them ‘adaptive’ or ‘non-adaptive’ (Garland, 2001: 106 ff.).
Disorder policing as risk management: a criminology of the self
Adaptive state responses to the abovementioned predicament can be characterised
by their move away from previous rehabilitative penology. Instead of a welfarist
belief in the malleability of man, adaptive responses to the loss of state sovereignty
over disorder are led mostly by administrative actors, trying to control instead of
structurally change disorder. Hence managing the risks of crime and disorder is
seen as a viable alternative to alleged unrealistic reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders. Since offenders are seen as “rational actors who are responsive to disin‐
centives and fully responsible for their criminal acts,” crime or deviancy regarded
as the result of individual pathology or abnormality with a role for “faulty sociali‐
sation or social dysfunction” have no more validity (ibid.: 16).7
An important result of this focus on control is the administrative ‘defining
down’ of deviance. By reducing the number of acts that are penalised, limited state
capacity is dealt with in an adaptive way. As a result, governments try to minimise
the harm caused by offenders, without a true interest in rehabilitation or correction
(O’Malley, 2010). This adaptive strategy can explain the strong influence of a para‐
digm of rational choice and the popularity of situational crime prevention strat‐
egies (Garland, 1999). As everybody is thought to act in the same way under the
same circumstances, disorder and crime are controlled by anticipating how possi‐
ble offenders might make their choices in specific situations. For this reason, this
adaptive response may equally be called a ‘criminology of the self’.
6. Garland presents a highly ambitious and all-encompassing theory. Here I do not have the room to
explore this theory in all its refinedness. For a more extensive discussion of his theory and how it
applies to new legislation on incivilities in Belgium, see Devroe, 2012.
7. Just as poverty or social exclusion is the result of “poor choices made by uninformed, unmotivated,
incompetent or irresponsible individuals” (Crawford, 2009: 814).
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Two other characteristics of this strategy are of interest here. The first is the
relocating and redefining of responsibilities for dealing with crime and disorder in
“an enhanced network of more or less directed, more or less informal crime con‐
trol, complementing and extending the formal controls of the criminal justice state”
(Garland, 2001: 124). The formation of a “strategic relation to other forces of social
control” is crucial (Garland, 2001: 124). A second characteristic concerns the aim of
preventing crime, as an alternative to reactive strategies. In Garland’s view, these
preventative goals and the tendency to relocate responsibilities for crime and dis‐
order control are closely connected. Non state-actors, such as the private sector or
communities themselves, share in the management of crime and thereby make it
easier to manage security (Ashworth & Zedner, 2014: 10). Thus one can see an
expanding infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety in the form of
“preventative partnerships” (Garland, 2001: 17; cf. Newburn, 2001). In Dutch pub‐
lic safety policy these developments can also be noted, especially in the aforemen‐
tioned ‘Integrated Public Safety Policy’ (cf. chapter 1; Van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014).
These tendencies to control can also be linked to an expanding system of legal
and administrative regulatory innovations. In recent years the criminal justice sys‐
tem of several countries (most research focuses on US and UK examples) has seen
the ascendance of preventive orders (Ashworth & Zedner, 2014; Beckett & Herbert,
2008; Crawford, 2009; Koemans, 2011; Simester & Von Hirsch, 2006). These rela‐
tively new orders are used as partly rhetorical alternatives to dysfunctional reac‐
tive punishment, moving the focus from punishment to regulation (Ashworth &
Zedner, 2014; Crawford, 2009). Here the drive to control deviancy and the ten‐
dency described above to banish unwanted people are interconnected, as these
orders provide an opportunity to deal with disorderly conduct that escapes crimi‐
nal law (Crawford, 2009). Possibly deviant persons are confronted with an con‐
tract-like agreement that restricts their behaviour in public places. Some of these
preventive orders specifically target ‘disorderly behaviour’, the most well-known
being the ‘Anti Social Behaviour Order’ (ASBO; Ashworth & Zedner, 2014; Koe‐
mans, 2011; Macdonald, 2006). In the Dutch context, restraining orders used by
Dutch local governments to deal with anti-social behaviour of unruly juveniles are
reminiscent of these British preventive orders. The most notable example is the
Dutch soccer law (Dutch: Voetbalwet8), meant to impose restrictive preventive
orders on football hooligans and other deviant persons, but in reality used mostly
for preventing disorder in residential areas by banishing troublesome persons (Van
de Bunt & Van Swaaningen, 2012; see also Becket & Herbert, 2008).
8. In Dutch known as Wet maatregelen bestrijding voetbalvandalisme en ernstige overlast.
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Disorder policing as ‘acting out’: a criminology of the other
Contradicting these adaptive responses, state actors respond equally in a ‘non
adaptive’ way to the loss of state sovereignty over crime and disorder. In this
respect, and as opposed to the primacy of rational choice and the management of
disorderly behaviour, the ‘culture of control’ also encompasses absolute ideas
about moral good and bad. State actors – in this case politicians rather than admin‐
istrative actors – vocally respond to high crime and disorder by ‘acting out’: they
vent emotionalised and rhetorical reactions that suggest decisiveness. Thus disor‐
der policing can also be seen as part of an emotional reaction to threats by outsid‐
ers, a ‘criminology of the other’, with a clear depiction of the “fearsome stranger”
(2001: 137):
As crime and punishment came to be highly charged election issues, government and opposi‐
tion parties competed to establish their credentials as being tough on crime, concerned for pub‐
lic safety, and capable of restoring morality, order and discipline in the face of the corrosive
social changes of late modernity (Garland, 2001: 131).
Many of these reactions have a highly symbolic significance, especially those that
involve political attention to ‘the public’. On the outset of The Culture of Control,
Garland mentions several changes that show the emotional tone of crime policy.
Thus not only crime in itself is targeted, but also and chiefly, its effects in terms of
fear and the emotional reactions of the public. In other words, “[c]rime has been re-
dramatized” (ibid.: 10), conjuring up “stereotypical depictions of unruly youth,
dangerous predators, and incorrigible career criminals” (ibid.). This leads to strong‐
er reactions from an emotional public, a “righteous demand for retribution” (ibid.).
Closely related is “the return of the victim” (ibid.: 11), a discursive emphasis on the
victim’s experience as representative for the whole population and the notion that
“the public must be protected” (ibid.: 12). Lastly, and likewise closely related, there
is a tendency to distrust expert knowledge on crime fighting, instead emphasising
‘common sense’ and the “authority of the people” (ibid.: 13) as reflected in a “politi‐
cisation of crime policy and a ‘new populism’” (ibid.).
As such, this interpretation has some similarity to the urban revanchist and
exclusionary interpretation mentioned above as it puts an equal emphasis on clear
boundaries between insiders and outsiders, between order and disorder. However,
it is informed by different reasoning. Whereas the urban revanchist interpretation
highlights disorder policing as the result of a neo-liberal and rights based middle
class pressure on local government, Garland’s idea of this non-adaptive strategy
has an emotional, neo-conservative tone and should be understood more as an act
to reinvest in the impression that the state is in control of crime and disorder.
These responses therefore should be seen as informed by symbolical interests of
state actors themselves. What has been described in chapter 2 about the influence
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of zero tolerance thinking in Dutch security policies could be seen as concurring
with this non-adaptive reading. Especially the rhetorics of decisiveness and of a
‘turn to the people’ that are inherent in the policy plan Towards a Safer Society
appear to be in line with what Garland calls a “criminology of the other”. More‐
over, several authors have shown such a non-adaptive reading might be of rele‐
vance in understanding the establishment of new legislation for controlling disor‐
der (cf. Devroe, 2012).
4 Overview
In this chapter several sociological interpretations have been discussed to provide
support for a better understanding of the growth of disorder policing. Expanding
on the exploration of various strategies of disorder policing in the previous chap‐
ter, it has provided a more thorough understanding of various cultural and social
factors that may have led to these strategies.
The first set of interpretations of the establishment and advent of disorder polic‐
ing might be termed benevolent responses to changes in the social order of large
cities. Firstly, by addressing Jane Jacobs’ seminal writings on the disappearance of
‘eyes on the streets’ that once made a vibrant urban life possible, disorder policing
may be understood as a governmental response to a decline of informal social con‐
trol. This interpretation emphasises that public spaces will lose their ‘publicness’
when they lack such basic ordering, as they will devolve into uninviting and
unpredictable spaces, avoided by most citizens. Viewed from this perspective, dis‐
order policing might be a form of domesticating public space, keeping it open for a
diverse public with diverse interests. Secondly, the initial forms of disorder polic‐
ing were informed by concerns about the alienation of police officers from urban
communities. Thus disorder policing can be seen as attempts at police reform and
at improving the relation between police and society.
The second set of interpretations, in many respects, opposes these readings.
Instead of the benevolent view of disorder policing as a sincere and inclusive
response to a changing urban environment, it sceptically regards disorder policing
as the defence of more narrowly defined interests. In the most radical of these
interpretations, the urban revanchist view of Neil Smith and the like, disorder
policing is the result of the strong influence of the middle class on the local agenda.
Moreover, disorder policing seems a mistaken solution to problems of marginality
that beg for other approaches. Addressing marginality through such solutions
might only heighten social tensions, increase urban unrest and encourage segrega‐
tion. Other authors assert that ‘quality of life’ initiatives or ‘anti-social behaviour’
agendas are cloaked attempts at excluding or banishing marginal groups of citi‐
zens. This might be of equal relevance to the Dutch context, especially with regard
to shopping districts and the night-time economy.
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The last sociological interpretation of disorder policing combines the preceding
theories by acknowledging both the commonality of crime and disorder issues and
state responses. David Garland’s Culture of Control proved to be of help here. By
encompassing both adaptive and non-adaptive responses to the predicament of
high crime and limited state capacity, his theory provides an opportunity to under‐
stand contradictory tendencies in disorder policing. Thus where disorder policing
on the one hand might be an example of risk management in which the abundance
of crime and disorder are merely controlled through a variety of preventative
measures and interventions, on the other hand it might be characterised by an
emotional, politically incited acting out against threats from the outside. Both these
reactions are part of the same inherently contradictory ‘culture of control’ and thus
could provide ample support for interpreting various forms of Dutch municipal
disorder policing yet to be unearthed in this study.
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4 Methodology
After the theoretical exploration of disorder policing, this chapter deals with the
methodological design and approach of this study.
In section 1 the general research strategies and process are described. Next, sec‐
tion 2 deals with the research design and the selection of respondents and cases.
This is done by describing the two different phases of research and the various ele‐
ments that constitute these phases. Section 3 focuses on the specific methods.
Finally, section 4 reflects on the methodological quality of the study in terms of val‐
idity and reliability.
1 Approach
Research strategies: case studies and ethnographic research
The main questions of this study as described in chapter 1 demand a research
design that allows for an open approach of the phenomenon of municipal disorder
policing. This approach helps to find out how this subject is “locally constituted,”
how those involved define it and give meaning to its practice (Silverman, 2011: 17).
Only a qualitative research design provides this opportunity. Within that design I
chose two research strategies: case studies and ethnographic research.
A case study design allows studying a phenomenon in a specific locality and as
part of a network of relations, perceptions, attitudes and behaviour (Swanborn,
2010). As the research interest concerned the context of municipal disorder policing
and the divergent perspectives that might inform it, case studies seemed appropri‐
ate for studying relatively confined cases of municipal disorder policing (cf. Leys,
Zaitch, & Decorte, 2010). In addition, this strategy provided the best opportunity
for studying the changes within certain cases, as well as for a cross-comparison
between different localities (Swanborn, 2010). Finally, as a case study is best suited
for how and why questions, this matched the abovementioned division in two con‐
secutive phases (Leys et al., 2010; Yin, 1984). The first phase contained six case
studies of municipal disorder policing in six different cities (see below) and was
aimed at developing a better understanding of how municipal disorder policing is
done in the Netherlands. The second phase involved two case studies, focused on
local policy, and dealt with why-questions and the in-depth description of local cir‐
cumstances, interests and views that determine municipal disorder policing. Thus,
what exactly constituted a single case differed between the first and the second
phase of research.
The second research strategy is that of the ethnographic study.1 This strategy
partly overlaps with case study design, but deserves to be mentioned separately
here.2 On various occasions in this study, municipal officers or municipal disorder
policing was approached as a “cultural or social group or system” (Creswell, 1998).
As such, the enquiry was not always led by the cases of local policy, but also by an
interest in what municipal officers as members of an occupational group think, say
and do (Creswell, 1998). As will become more evident below, this is of specific
importance for chapters 7, 8 and 9.
A cyclical research process
As a result of the exploratory approach, this research had a notably cyclical charac‐
ter (Spradley, 1980). Whereas linear research designs have a clearly defined and
chronologically ordered research pattern of hypotheses, operationalisation, data
collection, analysis and reporting, a cyclical approach is characterised by the possi‐
bility to frame new questions or fine-tune existing questions after data has been
collected (ibid.). Hence questions were (re)focused at several key moments during
this research. At the outset of the first phase for instance, questions were formed to
provide direction and scope for the case studies (Simons, 2009: 31). These initial
questions allowed room to develop into more focussed questions, depending on
the first findings. Consequently, they were adapted as a result of new insights.
Thus, refocused research questions helped to define interesting cases and spot
those situations that urged a more thorough description and explanation.
This cyclical process impacted equally on the use of literature. On the one hand,
studying literature helped to focus the research questions. On the other hand,
exploratory intentions demanded an open approach, implying the research was
not purely theory-led. Thus, this study contained phases of a more theory-generat‐
ing character (Glaser & Strauss, 2012). This implied that theoretical reflections were
often involved only after the patterns of the empirical findings had been assessed,
analysed and coded. This approach – loosely inspired by the notion of grounded
theory (ibid.) – will prove to be of importance for several aspects of the methodol‐
ogy described below. Moreover, it implies that the theories that were discussed in
chapters 2 and 3 served mainly to provide a framework for orientation and retro‐
spective interpretation.
1. Although not all text books define it as a separate strategy (cf. Marshall & Rossman, 2006).
2. Some define ethnographic case studies as a particular subtype of case studies (Simons, 2009).
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2 Research design and case selection
As the organisational and political context of municipal disorder policing has
received only scant academic attention, I only gradually developed an idea which
respondents could provide most insights. This implied that the research evolved
gradually, relying on initial insights to develop a better understanding of the most
important stakeholders. In the first phase of research, this happened through rely‐
ing on ‘gatekeepers’. These are initial, well-versed contacts who are part of the
municipal city surveillance agency or the encompassing organisations. These per‐
sons were of great help in extending contacts within their organisation. This way of
designing fieldwork resembles what is known as ‘snowball sampling’, implying
the use of first respondents’ accounts to find other important and influential
respondents (Bernard, 2006).
Phase 1: Study of municipal disorder policing in six cities
The first, most extensive phase concerned the study of municipal disorder policing
in six major Dutch cities. As mentioned above, this initial phase was motivated by
a special interest in local policy and collaboration with the police.
For this initial study I used purposive sampling to select city surveillance agen‐
cies in the largest Dutch municipalities (Leys et al., 2010; Silverman, 2011). Large
cities were selected as they involve their own, specific type of public safety prob‐
lems. These are mostly concentrated in central areas, surrounding central stations,
in night-life areas and close to tourist attractions. In contrast, residential areas have
their own particular problems of public safety. This variety makes large municipal‐
ities interesting locations for in-depth studies of municipal disorder policing.3
Focusing on city surveillance agencies as an initial unit for case selection
implies that the emphasis is on a meso level, in between macro and micro develop‐
ments (Leys et al., 2010: 186). These agencies have to deal with national and munic‐
ipal (macro) developments in policy and legislation. At the same time, studying
these agencies as cases gives many opportunities to study views and developments
on a micro-level, such as ideas of local (neighbourhood) stakeholders, the views
and expectations of municipal officers or specific (nested) cases of local policy.
The most important criteria for selecting the six agencies mentioned below con‐
cerned the characteristics of the cities and of the agencies themselves. Hence, the
size of the city, its geographical location and the presence of a variety of notable
public safety and quality-of-life issues were considered. I selected six cities with
3. As such, the findings in this study apply exclusively to the development of municipal disorder
policing in these larger municipalities. Municipal disorder policing in middle-sized and small
Dutch municipalities might not be comparable to its counterpart in larger cities, not in the least
because police reorganisations of late may have had more of an impact in these municipalities (see
also: Bervoets, 2013; Terpstra et al., 2016).
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relatively similar public safety issues. In addition, the city surveillance agencies
themselves were relatively well developed and professionalised. In contrast, the
selection was varied in terms of the geographical location of the cities, and the pol‐
icy and approach of the different agencies (insofar this could be ascertained based
on initial orientations). This combination of a number of equal characteristics, with
variety in other aspects, allowed comparison between different cases of municipal
disorder policing (Simons, 2009: 30).
The following six cities and their city surveillance agencies were selected as
cases, in order of size and their place on the list of largest municipalities in the
Netherlands:4
– Rotterdam (2nd),
– Den Haag/The Hague (3rd),
– Utrecht (4th),
– Eindhoven (5th),
– Tilburg (6th), and
– Nijmegen (10th).
The most remarkable absentee in this list is the city of Amsterdam. As one of the
few cities in the Netherlands, Amsterdam has been the subject of a relatively large
number of studies in recent years (cf. Van Steden & De Groot, 2011; Van Steden &
Bron, 2012; Van Stokkom, 2013b, Van Stokkom & Foekens, 2015). Both to avoid a
possible burden of too much research and overvaluing insights from this city, this
selection starts with the 2nd largest city, Rotterdam. Furthermore, the largest Dutch
cities can be found in the urban conglomeration in the central West area, indicated
as Randstad. I included three cities in this area – Rotterdam, The Hague and
Utrecht. The three other cities in this study are outside this administrative and
political region – Tilburg, Eindhoven and Nijmegen. Tilburg and Eindhoven were
chosen as large, provincial cities and because of the prominence of public safety
issues in these cities (Fijnaut et al., 2008). Furthermore, as these cities are both locat‐
ed in the province of Noord-Brabant, the sixth city was selected outside this prov‐
ince – Nijmegen, 10th on the list of largest municipalities in the Netherlands.5
In each city, approximately 16 persons were interviewed, totalling 98 individu‐
als. These respondents were spread over four different types of organisations. First,
and obviously, interviews were held with representatives of the city surveillance
agencies – municipal officers, coordinators and managers. Second, to get a proper
view of the organisational and historical context, interviews were conducted with
4. https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijst_van_grootste_gemeenten_in_Nederland; indicating the larg‐
est municipalities as per 1-4-2016.
5. Almere, the 7th city on the list, was not involved due to its proximity to the Randstad area. Breda,
the 8th city on the list, was not selected as it would have been another city from the province of
Brabant. Groningen, number 9, was not involved due to practical circumstances (mainly: its rela‐
tive remoteness – an example of “convenience sampling”; Leys et al., 2010: 187).
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respondents from the wider municipal organisation, such as senior managers from
policy departments of public safety, neighbourhood managers and employees
from other municipal units (e.g. public maintenance). Third, police representatives
of various ranks were interviewed.6 Lastly, several political respondents and repre‐
sentatives of the local offices of the public prosecutor were interviewed. In addi‐
tion, policy documents were scrutinised in each city, especially those that provided
insight in policy and organisational structure. In section 3, I will explain more
about the study of available policy documents, the nature and type of the inter‐
views and their analysis.
Phase 2: In-depth study – renewed analysis, historical development, and two in-depth case
studies
The next phase of this study comprised additional in-depth research and was divid‐
ed into three different elements.
First of all, part of the material collected during the first research phase was re-
analysed. Due to the use of an exploratory approach and semi-structured inter‐
views in this first phase (see below), many respondents reflected freely on a variety
of themes during interviews. Thus, these initial interviews proved to be rich in
insights that had remained unearthed. Through a renewed analysis of existing
material, these elements were given more attention in the second phase, resulting
in a new set of findings. For this renewed analysis, I selected those interviews that
were particularly rich in views about the importance of disorder policing and that
provided the most information on how decisions about disorder policing are made
locally.
The second element of the new research phase consisted of extra research to
find out more about the historical developments of municipal disorder policing in
the Netherlands. Earlier interviews and previous studies supported some general
notions of these developments, but these remained of a somewhat unspecific
nature and demanded extra study. As this extra study concerned the history and
development of municipal disorder policing, it involved both the study of docu‐
ments (see below for a further explanation), and interviews with some managers
and researchers who were involved with early forms of Dutch municipal disorder
policing.
The third element of the new research phase consists of two case studies on
municipal disorder policing in situations of urgent disorder. The main reason to
involve case studies is again informed by the wish to deepen earlier analyses of
municipal disorder policing. After having developed a better understanding of dif‐
6. The initial research design preserved more space for studying the relations and collaboration
between municipal and police officers. Although the views of police representatives were of vital
importance for chapter 9, insights from these interviews are discussed more thoroughly elsewhere
(Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014).
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ferent stakeholders and their respective views, case studies provided the best
opportunity to obtain insight into how these stakeholders might actually influence
each other and the practice of municipal disorder policing. In addition, the first
phase of the research showed that many of the disorder problems are concentrated
in fairly confined areas. As such, the agendas for disorder policing differ to a great
extent and are constantly (re)defined on local levels, especially if disorder is seen as
an urgent issue.
For this part of phase 2 in the study I returned to two previous cases of ‘target
group policing’ in which the activities of municipal officers are directed at specific
groups. One case concerned street youth, the other concerned drug dealers, drug
users and homeless people. In these cases a total of 12 extra respondents were
interviewed. In addition, I joined municipal officers on their daily (or nightly)
work. During these shifts I was able to observe the way these officers fulfil their
tasks, and had the opportunity to conduct what are called walking (or informal –
Bernard, 2006: 204) interviews and have conversations with approximately 15 dif‐
ferent officers.
3 Research methods
Interviews
To answer the research questions, my most frequently used method was the semi-
structured interview. This form of interviewing allowed me to conduct the inter‐
view with a topic list, but provided sufficient space for following new leads and
incentives, and prevented the impression of “excessive control” (Bernard, 2006:
205).
Due to the variety in the design of the enquiry, respondents from various back‐
grounds and affiliations were questioned, both about facts and their views on rele‐
vant matters. This was often because of their specific expertise, but in several cases
also to collect a wide variety of opinions. As noted, I specifically aimed at involv‐
ing respondents from various organisational affiliations to develop an all-encom‐
passing view of the policy and practice of municipal disorder policing. This applies
to both the first and the second phase of the research.
Interviews were generally conducted at the work place of the respondents and
in an unconstrained atmosphere. This was created using relatively little interfer‐
ence with the respondents’ accounts by “get[ting] people on a topic of interest and
get[ting] out of the way” (Bernard 2006: 209) and by assuring the respondent of
anonymity. On average, the interviews lasted one hour. They were generally
recorded, with one or two exceptions, depending on respondents’ requests. In a
few cases, respondents were interviewed in pairs, sometimes because work sched‐
ules did not allow two interviews, and sometimes because interviewees could com‐
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plement each other’s answers. In general, respondents showed willingness and
openness to talk about their experiences and ideas.
In order to structure the interviews (Bernard, 2006), topic lists – based on rele‐
vant topics and questions – were prepared in advance. These topic lists were adap‐
ted to suit the variety of respondents. As a result, topic lists for the initial research
phase were grouped in four categories, depending on the respondent’s organisa‐
tional affiliation (see above). Then I developed topic lists for each function in the
respective organisation, for instance frontline worker, coordinator or (senior) man‐
ager. In the second phase, obviously other topic lists were needed.
Document study
A second research method was the study of documents. Policy documents were
collected to get a better understanding of policy goals, organisational structure and
the municipal organisation of disorder policing.
Several types of documents were used. First of all, policies on a national level
were studied by involving a range of policy plans and policy statements. Among
them were the policy plans that announced nation-wide changes in public safety
policy, written to the Lower House and also the letters that the Minister for Safety
and Justice wrote to inform the Lower House were used on several occasions.
Other policy documents that transcend local policy are the BOA note (BOA circu‐
laire) and its successors, its juridical backing (the Decree on BOAs and the Police
Act of 1993, article 142), as well as statements, for instance by the Dutch association
of municipalities (VNG) or vision documents from occupational organisation
BeBOA. Second, local policy was scrutinised by studying ‘enforcement plans’ and
documents that targeted the (re)development of municipal surveillance and
enforcement. In addition, several documents with a more political stance were ana‐
lysed – coalition agreements and policy programmes insofar they concerned the
development of local safety policy and the role of municipal officers. Next, docu‐
ments were studied that provided more insight into the approach of the city sur‐
veillance agencies themselves. These included what the Dutch mostly refer to as
plan van aanpak (action plan) and the evaluations of defined projects. Organisation
matrices and departmental schemes provided further grip on the organisational
structure of the city surveillance agencies. Lastly, on several occasions – especially
in chapter 5 – literature study and empirical study were combined. Thereby the
results of previous studies, for instance on early administrative prevention were
merged with new insights from policy documents and the accounts of respond‐
ents.
It proved hard to obtain certain documents: in none of the cases was an easily
accessible or coherent collection of policy documents available. Not least, so it
seems, because explicit policy theory is poorly reflected in municipal disorder
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policing.7 For this reason, I had to rely on a variety of resources to develop a better
understanding of policy and how it developed. It implied that (early) thoughts on
municipal policy in some cases were best acquired through interviews. In some
cases, I was able to access municipal archives, obtaining documents on the devel‐
opment of municipal disorder policing itself or on the political debates that are rel‐
evant to understanding its background. In other cases, municipal archives were not
accessible until a relatively recent date or did not yield any relevant results on the
subject of municipal disorder policing. My account of the history of municipal dis‐
order policing therefore is based on a somewhat varied and disparate assembly of
resources and earlier insights recorded by previous researchers.
Observation
Observation was the final method used in this study; and it was used only in the
two in-depth case studies of the additional research phase. The reason for the mod‐
est amount of time dedicated to this approach is that observation was mainly
meant to deepen prior insights. Joining the shifts of municipal officers was of vital
importance to develop a better understanding of how the daily work of frontline
professionals is influenced by different stakeholders. During the shifts on which I
joined municipal officers I was able to observe what they do and how they spend
their time during their shifts. This enabled me to put these officers’ views in the
context of their daily work. Moreover, their acts provided the occasion to ask more
in-depth questions (cf. Agar, 2008). As such, observation in these two cases did not
only provide the chance to get a better understanding of the daily work of a spe‐
cific group of municipal officers, but also allowed a large number of walking,
improvised and informal interviews and conversations (Bernard, 2006). Talking to
municipal officers on a number of informal occasions – be it on the street, at the
coffee machine or during breaks – offered an opportunity to question them in a
completely unconstrained atmosphere. During all of these observations and con‐
versations – or shortly thereafter – I meticulously took notes of details and ideas
(Agar, 2008).
Analysis
Due to the mixed methodological strategies and goals mentioned above, the mate‐
rial was analysed by using both inductive and deductive coding (Decorte, 2010).
Although part of the codes followed directly from pre-given theoretical notions,
most of these codes were the result of inductive analysis – generating codes from
within the text (Glaser & Strauss, 2012). At times, this implied I was walking a
tightrope during the analytical process, as sticking too much to respondents’
7. Something also observed by Mein & Hartman (2013).
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accounts would not yield a great amount of analytical insights, whereas too much
labelling in terms of theoretical insights would mean a loss of detail (Silverman,
2011). I dealt with this issue by doing the initial coding – or open coding (Boeije,
2010) – partly by using a group of codes that was based on theoretical insights, but
expanding it constantly with codes that were generated from interview material. In
addition, writing memos during the coding process proved helpful to develop the
first contours of later, more or less theoretical or conceptual notions (Silverman,
2011). Thus, the analysis of material – both interviews and documents – was done
in several steps.
The first step was already taken during the periods of fieldwork. After each
interview, the recording of it was transcribed immediately, and analysed and
coded quickly thereafter by using the qualitative analytical Atlas programme
(Boeije, 2010). Thus interview material was divided in different sections, for
instance in parts about tasks, opinions, organisational embedding or collaboration
with the police. In addition, an important part of the coding was done inductively,
by using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2012). This analytical method was of
particular relevance since the overarching approach was mainly exploratory.
Documents were analysed in a similar vein, although the results of this document
analysis – obviously – concerned only formal policy.
The next steps in the analytical process followed quickly after each other. After
the initial (open) coding phase, material was further analysed through a process
called axial coding (Boeije, 2010). Axial coding refers to a more abstract analysis of
the different categories and (potential) subcategories (ibid.). Therefore, I considered
whether the initial codes covered the empirical data. Subsequently, I moved to a
phase of selective coding, in which the relations between different categories were
scrutinised (ibid.). This step was taken after most interviews were conducted. Next,
these categories formed the basis of extensive case reports that described the situa‐
tion in each of the six cities, the historical development of municipal disorder polic‐
ing, or the situation in the two case studies. By collecting themes in case reports
that took cities as a unit, I was equally able to compare cities and cases for similari‐
ties and differences. The last analytical step consisted of rereading these case
reports and collecting insights ‘horizontally’ to develop a “cross-case report” (Yin,
1984: 51). Thus, I was able to develop an overview of different patterns, occurring
in several cities. Lastly, by reassembling the material and involving the memos I
had written during the analytical process, I was able to lay the groundwork for
later chapters.
For the additional research in the second phase, I took a few steps back in the
analytical process by re-examining initial codes and underlying text fragments.
Some interviews were wholly re-analysed for this phase: these included all the
interviews with municipal officers and many of the interviews with coordinators
and municipal managers. New interviews that were conducted to obtain more
information about the history and development of municipal disorder policing
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were analysed as in step two and three. Finally, the interviews and participatory
observations for the two in-depth case studies were also analysed as described
above, leading to two extensive reports for the respective cases that were eventu‐
ally reread and combined to form chapter 8.
4 Reliability and validity
In comparison with quantitative approaches, doing qualitative research implies other
challenges have to be met to assure methodological quality. Whereas the former
relies on standardised procedures for the reliability and the validity of results,
these are lacking in qualitative research (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982).8 In this study,
several steps were taken to safeguard methodological quality, both in terms of val‐
idity (internal and external) and reliability (internal and external).9
Internal validity – in qualitative research the issue ‘whether I observe what I
think I am observing’ (cf. LeCompte & Goetz, 1982) – was firstly enhanced in this
research design by using multiple data sources to answer the research questions.
Hence, by using policy documents, interviews, and previous research insights,
data triangulation was pursued (Denzin, 1970, in: Maesschalck, 2010: 134). This
was further enhanced by the involvement of respondents with various organisa‐
tional affiliations and positions. Interviewing managers, coordinators, policy mak‐
ers or frontline professionals, and – in general – respondents from various organi‐
sations provides multiple perspectives on the same issues. For the document
study, I also involved various resources – policy plans, statements, organisational
schemes and evaluative reports. This array of written resources enriched insights
on formal policy and how it might evolve throughout time. Moreover, so-called
‘member checks’ formed a vital element during various moments of the study;
both during the first phase and the second phase, case reports or conclusions were
discussed with representatives of the city surveillance agencies (Seale, 1999). Sec‐
ondly, theoretical triangulation was attained by studying a number of possible
interpretative frames for disorder policing (Maesschalk, 2010: 135). This provided
various theoretical angles to interpret views and statements and prevented any
premature interpretation of interview material.
The chosen research format has important consequences for external validity.
External validity concerns the question whether insights can be generalised to
other cases and circumstances. Although the number of interviewees was too limi‐
8. In fact, as the notions of reliability and validity are derived from quantitative research, several
authors have suggested alternative indicators for methodological quality in qualitative research
(see also: Maesschalck 2010: 122).
9. It should be noted that this line of work in general, and the city surveillance agencies in particular,
is constantly changing. This means that some of the insights might have changed as soon as a case
study was closed. These changes concern mostly the organisational embedding, but also the
employment of officers for special projects or occasions. Therefore, many of the observations are
limited to the specific time span during which fieldwork was conducted.
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ted for statistically valid statements, the variety of views and perspectives did pro‐
vide an opportunity for theoretical generalisation (Maesschalk, 2010: 130). Through
a ‘thick description’ of cases (Geertz, 1973), these could be compared and catego‐
ries and patterns that were discovered in one case could be transferred to the next
(Simons, 2009; Yin, 1984). Hence, the variety of perspectives, views and develop‐
ments allowed for theoretical statements about the growth and development of
municipal disorder policing as such.
Striving for reliability provided an additional set of challenges, as is common
for all qualitative research (Seale, 1999). Claims about internal reliability – the issue
whether other researchers would arrive at the same conclusions based on the same
data (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982) – cannot be substantiated unequivocally, as this
research was done for a large part by me. However, the first part of the research
was done in consultation with a fellow researcher, and initial case reports and
interviews were also read by him (resembling ‘peer examination’, ibid.: 42). In some
cases, this researcher joined the interviews I conducted. Furthermore, intermediate
conclusions were discussed thoroughly and at several stages of both the first and
the second phase with other researchers as well.
External reliability concerns the question whether “independent researchers
would discover the same phenomena or generate the same constructs in the same
or similar settings” (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982: 32). This claim is harder to support.
Especially since this is the first time municipal disorder policing has been
approached from the perspective chosen here. Nevertheless, external reliability has
been approached (ibid.: 37), by being as reflexive as possible (Seale, 1999), by open‐
ing up on the choices I made concerning my informants, by explaining the social
context of data collection (see above) and by identifying the assumptions and theo‐
ries through which I approached this subject matter (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982: 37
ff.).
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5 Policy goals of municipal disorder
policing: past and present
1 Introduction
As the first of five empirical chapters, this chapter begins by exploring the develop‐
ment of municipal disorder policing, its policy goals and their backgrounds. The
main point here is that changes in policies are due only in part to changes in the
manner of thinking about actual disorder. Such changes are determined also by
managerial ambitions, police collaboration and the dynamics of an evolving occu‐
pational group.
This chapter primarily addresses local developments, although a complete
understanding of changes in public safety policy necessitates discussion of national
changes. In order to characterise initial developments, therefore, Section 2 starts
with a discussion of early concerns about disorder, the build-up to the Roethof
Committee and its thoughts on functional surveillance. Section 3 continues with
the first city warden projects, as well as their goals and how they gradually
changed throughout the 1990s. These first two sections are based largely on inter‐
views with early managers and researchers, as well as on policy documents and lit‐
erature. Section 4 serves as an interlude, addressing national developments in pub‐
lic safety policy. Section 5 addresses the first major change in municipal disorder
policing – the end of the city warden phase, a local ‘call for surveillance’ and the
growing pains of the newly established municipal departments for city surveil‐
lance. Section 6 describes the most recent phase by highlighting policy perspec‐
tives, as well as how and why they differ from previous phases, and by describing
the most prominent tasks of recent municipal officers. These two sections are based
on material from policy documents and interviews in the six cities that were intro‐
duced in chapter 4. Section 7 offers a conclusion.
2 Early Dutch concerns about disorder: the 1980s
The perception of a changed scene: norm erosion in the 1980s
The 1980s represent a watershed in Dutch thinking about disorder with the Roet‐
hof Committee appearing as a concrete manifestation of this change (see also chap‐
ter 1).
The establishment of this committee was preceded by the awareness of a
changed urban scene and the strong growth of what was referred to as ‘petty
crime’. This “acceleration of crime” – as one respondent describes it – concerned
relatively low-level offences (e.g. petty theft, shoplifting, bicycle theft), as well as
general forms of rule infringements (e.g. fare dodging on public transport, littering
or other ‘disorderly behaviour’). In retrospect, some respondents associate these
types of crime in part to the growth in drug-related crimes. Although such crimes
were limited to specific areas in the central districts of large cities, some respond‐
ents emphasise the notable impact of these changes on the collective perception of
disorder:
People really started to be bothered by bicycle theft, car burglaries, you name it. Basically, a lot
was being nicked. At that time, the use of heroin was increasing greatly. […] I remember
Amsterdam in the eighties, walking on the pillenbrug [the bridge of pills] or the Zeedijk. Every‐
where people were hustling, dealing drugs. And people considered it a normal situation. Kruis‐
kade, Rotterdam, the same, loads of drug trafficking.
In many accounts, the growing awareness of petty crimes and disorderly behav‐
iour are mentioned in one breath with generic changes in social cohesion and social
control. The decline of informal social control is thus mentioned as one of the most
important explanations for the rise in petty crimes: ‘Back in the day, people used to
correct each other’. As recounted by a manager who had been involved with early
surveillance by municipal wardens:
I used to get a slap on the wrist now and then by someone who knew me. That just happened.
But these forms of correction became a lot less common in the course of the seventies. People
retreated behind their front doors, and the streets became empty. That gap was filled by all
kinds of groups, like drug users. And eventually no one dared to intervene when someone
broke a car window or something.
Emancipation had gone too far, he adds, and the liberation from restrictive norms
and overt social control had led to an abundance of disorderly behaviour.
According to these accounts, Dutch society seemed to be in something of a tran‐
sition in the 1980s, both in terms of the factual growth of disorder and in the per‐
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ception of that disorder.1 A general consensus emerged that compliance to rules in
public space was eroding, petty crime was becoming widespread, and the informal
ways of correcting deviant behaviour had largely vanished. The perception of dis‐
order also changed through enhanced police registration and subsequently new
victim surveys that were created to measure crime, especially in terms of victimisa‐
tion (cf. Roethof, 1984; Boutellier, 2008: 122 ff).
These developments in awareness provided the backdrop for the Roethof commit‐
tee and the 1986 national policy plan entitled Society and Crime (in Dutch, Samen‐
leving en criminaliteit), as described in chapter 2.
As noted previously, this committee suggested that parties other than the police
and the public prosecution agency should be made responsible. Such thinking is
rooted in the acknowledgement that the police and the public prosecution agency
did not actually know how to address the plethora of these issues (Commissie Roet‐
hof, 1984; Van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014).2 To stimulate the involvement of non-
police actors, the Dutch national government decided to provide local govern‐
ments with funding for new projects. It led to an unprecedented number of
projects, “a period of let a thousand flowers bloom”, an early researcher remem‐
bers – the Roethof projects (cf. Polder & Van Vlaardingen, 1992; Terpstra, 2010b).
Most importantly, these projects approached issues of petty crime as societal prob‐
lems, and not exclusively as criminal problems. Consequently they addressed petty
crimes primarily by changing the behaviour of perpetrators and less so by punish‐
ing them, as an early researcher recalls. In addition, new solutions were to be
defined according to prevention instead of repression. Early researchers highlight
the undeniable influence of several well-known Dutch criminologists in this
respect, most notably Jan van Dijk and Josine Junger-Tas.
The projects supported by the Roethof subsidies included new forms of func‐
tional surveillance (Polder & van Vlaardingen, 1992). These projects were designed
primarily according to the philosophy of situational crime prevention, as discussed
in chapter 2. One of the projects for new functional surveillance included the first
forms of Dutch municipal disorder policing (ibid.; cf. Van Dijk & De Waard, 1991).
1. Vuysje captures this change in Lof der dwang (In praise of coercion, 1989), linking it to the advent of
the ‘calculating citizen’, the non-compliant citizen who took advantage of the lack of social control
to engage in fare dodging, shoplifting or other activities that Vuysje understatedly refers to as ‘pro‐
letarian shopping’.
2. This brings to mind the words of Garland (2001) with regard to the predicament of the judicial
apparatus (cf. Van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014).
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3 Early municipal disorder policing by city wardens: the 1990s
City wardens: a solution to two problems
Most of the Roethof undertakings ended as the result of a predefined project
length. Likewise, most projects for functional surveillance were temporary. For
example, there was the case of a project for surveillance officers in a shopping dis‐
trict in Utrecht (Colder & Nuijten-Edelbroek, 1987) and one involving surveillance
in several neighbourhoods in Amsterdam (Polder & Van Vlaardingen, 1992).
Schemes involving city wardens were granted a longer lifespan however, and they
continued long after the Roethof subsidies ended.
Reasons for the relative success of city warden projects are varied. Although
many of them were evaluated as effective in reducing the number of petty crimes
or as having a positive effect on decreasing feelings of insecurity (Hauber, 1994),3
their relative success was only partly related to these results. Another aspect that
appeared to be of at least equal importance was that these officers provided a solu‐
tion to the major problem of unemployment existing in the Netherlands at that
time. Without exception, city wardens were long-term unemployed individuals
who had been assigned surveillance tasks as part of a work reintegration trajectory.
As recounted by one researcher:
They made a plan for two problems, one a problem of criminal justice, the other one of employ‐
ment. We can give those unemployed people control tasks in the cities. Give them a suit so peo‐
ple can recognise them […] Then they were trained for a bit, so they knew what they were
allowed to do – no more than ordinary citizens. We can all stop someone and hand him over to
the police. Only their means to get in touch with the police were improved a bit.
After the first Roethof projects for functional surveillance, various unemployment
arrangements thus enabled municipalities to establish foundations for city war‐
dens (Hauber, 1994, Ministry of the Interior, 1996: 12). Initially, employment usu‐
ally took place through the Job Pool (in Dutch, Banenpool) arrangement (ibid.). From
1995 onwards, city warden projects received additional funding through the ‘Mel‐
kert arrangement’ (named after the initiator, Ad Melkert, the Minister of Social
Affairs and Employment at that time), which was another subsidy programme for
3. In the course of the 1990s feelings of insecurity came to play a greater role in public safety policy
(see below).
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long-term unemployed people.4 Therefore, from then on city wardens were also
called Melketiers.
The city of Dordrecht was the first to experiment with using long term-unem‐
ployed people for general surveillance tasks in 1989. Many more cities quickly fol‐
lowed this example. In addition, a national foundation was initiated in 1992 and
continued in 1993, with financial backing from the Ministry of Justice – the Dutch
City Warden Organisation (Stichting Stadswacht Nederland).5 After 1995 the Melkert
arrangements allowed ever more cities in the Netherlands to employ city wardens,
even those that had initially opposed ‘half-baked police officers’.6 In 1996 115
municipalities were involved with city warden projects, employing at least 2,000
officers in total, all with a background of long-term unemployment.7
City wardens: situational crime prevention or more?
The city warden foundations established in the 1990s show a lot of similarity in
policy and approach, irrespective of differences in organisation (Hauber, 1994).8
Nevertheless, these goals are rather multi-faceted.
Firstly, city wardens were meant to prevent crime by their sheer physical pres‐
ence. In Rotterdam for instance, this idea was first implemented in the Maas-tun‐
nel. This corridor was seen as a particular unsafe spot due to loitering drug dealers
and users. Rotterdam’s early city wardens, called ‘public safety assistants’ (Veilig‐
heidsassistenten), were supposed to help address this problem through a simple sol‐
ution, as an early manager explains:
4. This arrangement was formally known as the Arrangement for extra employment of long-term
unemployed people (In Dutch, Regeling extra werkgelegenheid voor langdurig werklozen; Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment, 1995). The actual scope of these Melkert jobs was even broader.
The jobs were intended to provide long-term unemployed people with additional work experience
in a relatively low-pressure environment, ranging from public garden maintenance and street
sweeping to positions as shop assistants and factory employees. The goals of the early city warden
projects were well-suited to these Melkert jobs, and the national subsidy for this new regulation
provided many municipalities with a good opportunity to continue their city warden projects. In
1999, these jobs were changed to ‘ID jobs’ (Dutch: Instroom/Doorstroom banen), referring to the wish
to have more output towards the job market. The latter variant of subsidised employment was dis‐
continued in 2004.
5. This organisation later changed its name to the Netherlands Interest Group for City Surveillance
(In Dutch, Belangengroep Stadstoezicht Nederland), and later to the Public Safety Sector Organisation
(In Dutch, Brancheorganisatie Publieke Veiligheid; Ministry of the Interior, 1996; Van Steden, 2011).
6. Pels, J. (2010) Stadstoezicht in de lift. Masterthesis. Retrieved from http://www.hetccv.nl/binaries/
content/assets/ccv/dossiers/boa/stadstoezicht_in_de_lift.pdf.
7. Not all of these officers were known as city wardens (in Dutch, stadswacht): a sizeable proportion
was known as surveillance officers (in Dutch, toezichthouder). Moreover, the total number of 2,000
city wardens/surveillance officers might be a low estimation, as this overview of the Ministry of
the Interior includes only those city warden foundations that were associated with the national
Dutch City Warden Organisation (Ministry of the Interior, 1996: 16).
8. Due to a lack of available policy documents on city warden foundations, this overview is largely
based on the spoken accounts of early managers and researchers.
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Those city wardens couldn’t do a thing, they didn’t do a thing. They didn’t want to do a thing.
They were just standing there like living dolls. But it certainly stopped the trouble. Things were
clean, intact, nothing happened.
These forms of functional surveillance were also developed in other cities. In rela‐
tively small areas, groups of surveillance officers walked around as guardians to
diminish the number of petty crimes (Hauber, 1994). ‘Being there’ and deterring
perpetrators of petty crimes was the main goal of these first wardens, a manager of
the early period states.
Secondly, some city wardens were expected to interfere in cases of misbeha‐
viour. “They could address people who were misbehaving, were messing around
with cars. People who threw garbage on the street were addressed,” a manager
explains. As such, city wardens had the task to reproach people who committed
offences, or more generally, disregarded the rules. Their powers however, were
limited to those of any citizen. In addition, it was believed that correcting unac‐
ceptable behaviour would be easier if it was done by officials who were known by
inhabitants. “They knew their area, and the area knew them,” said an early man‐
ager. However, the suggestion many city wardens were eventually supposed to be
led back to regular (other) work seems at odds with the expectation they would
familiarise themselves with particular neighbourhoods and its inhabitants.
Thirdly, city wardens were seen as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police. The police
would be informed when situations were considered too dangerous for wardens
(cf. Hauber, 1994; Ministry of the Interior, 1996). Sometimes the police had a more
prominent role and city wardens were even employed as police support officers. In
Utrecht for instance, the city wardens of Stichting Stadstoezicht were managed by
police constables, had a more thorough police training than their colleagues in
other cities and wore police uniforms. Hence, they were a “police extension”, the
“first point of reference on the streets”, and “eyes and ears” for noting offences,
informing the police, but also to make citizen arrests when individuals committed
offences, a manager in Utrecht recounts.
Lastly, surveillance by city wardens was expected to diminish feelings of insecu‐
rity. In some accounts of city wardens, this idea of reassurance even seemed to
have been more important than the actual fighting of petty crimes or anti-social
behaviour. An early manager points out:
Certainly, in some neighbourhoods there was quite a bit of trouble. But a large part of that
image [of insecurity – TE] was equally caused by old ladies that were peeking from behind their
[curtains] and only saw [black people] leaning against lamp posts. So, the experience of safety
was something new.
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In this respect, some municipalities highlighted the notion of ‘hosting’. These war‐
dens had a task to make visitors and residents feel at home in their city. A police
officer in Eindhoven remembers how this worked:
We used to say jokingly they were there to point the way to the local department store. […] But
for a citizen it’s clear, he sees a uniform and appreciates that. […] They didn’t have too much
know-how. They couldn’t do a lot more than have a chat, talk to some people. But for a citizen
that mattered. At least it gave a feeling of security.
In summary, city wardens were employed for divergent goals. These ranged from
rather passive goals, such as merely being present to deter possible perpetrators or
to diminish citizens’ feelings of insecurity, to more active interference with ‘disor‐
derly persons’ or reporting on issues.
Moreover, the general impression of their work is that their occupational goals
were but little elaborated. Not only are there but few policy documents or state‐
ments providing clarification, also many respondents brush aside the impact of
city wardens in terms of public safety. Thus, it remains unclear what behaviour
exactly might have to be dealt with, how this relates to goals of crime prevention,
in what cases the police should be informed, or if, and when reassurance is more
important than actual crime reduction. As such, goals concerning public safety
appear undefined and subordinate to other considerations.
Undefined goals
This lack of clear goals seems partly attributable to the primacy of other ideas. As
most respondents claim, ideas about situational crime prevention or correcting
behaviour were subordinate to the goal of gaining work experience for long term
unemployed people – the more important the social reintegration goals, the less
important policy goals in terms of surveillance or public safety, a manager states.
He explains:
Employment came first; it didn’t matter if it did any good for public safety. We gave those peo‐
ple a suit, and they were walking around in flocks of eight, with their hands behind their backs,
looking downward, continually smoking filter cigarettes, hundreds of them. Didn’t matter at
all.
In addition, there was widespread uncertainty about the competence of these sur‐
veillance officers being seriously occupied with public safety issues. “It was the
bottom end of the catalogue, psychiatric patients, criminals,” as a manager
explains. “We called those guys penny-seekers,” he adds, referring to city wardens’
alleged tendency to constantly look down.
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Yet, it was not only the primacy of social reintegration goals that caused vague‐
ness in their occupational goals. It was also the result of the reluctance of police
chiefs to manage them. In most cities these chiefs were provided with city wardens
and sometimes they were even housed in their station, as they were seen as a
police replacement for lower level surveillance. However, police chiefs were often
reluctant to adopt these new officers, as they were quite simply placed under their
command without their consent. As a result, many chiefs used wardens for the
chores that police officers were reluctant to do. “Why don’t you go walk around
for a bit, or do something,” a respondent from Eindhoven recalls the police’s gen‐
eral attitude towards these wardens. A respondent in Utrecht points out that city
wardens were often called “the police’s postmen”. This also impacted on tasks and
occupational goals of early municipal officers, leading to differences between cities,
depending on the willingness of local police constables to invest in these ‘new col‐
leagues’. Moreover, it led to difficulties in the relations between these new surveil‐
lance officers and the established police forces. Most police officers did not see long
term unemployed people as fit for any sort of surveillance task. Sometimes police
officers downright rejected their new colleagues. An early researcher recounts the
situation in Amsterdam: “The police vehemently opposed them. Even in the local
press, articles appeared [in which police representatives addressed citizens in
terms of], ‘you don’t have to bother about those city wardens’.”9
To sum up, the basic ideas that accounted for city wardens – inspired by notions of
functional surveillance and a growing attention to feelings of insecurity – can but
partly explain how these officers worked. A certain indefiniteness in their work, or
even ineffectiveness as many maintain, cannot be understood without taking into
account the primacy of work reintegration goals for unemployed people, their sub‐
ordination to local police forces, the widespread cynicism among police officers to
these new surveillance personnel and the image of an otiose group of ‘caretakers’.
Shifting public safety policies
Apart from these internal factors, the work of city wardens was also determined by
several shifts in the encompassing public safety policy in the 1990s. These changes
were already addressed briefly in previous chapters. Here they are discussed in
their relevance for municipal disorder policing.
First of all, municipal public safety policy, now called ‘integrated public safety
management’, grew in importance and changed considerably in the years after the
foundations for city wardens were established. During the 1990s, the perspective
on petty crime became broader, both semantically and practically (Cachet & Ringe‐
9. As such, the animosity of police towards municipal officers noted by Van Steden (2011) and Eike‐
naar & van Stokkom (2014) could be observed even in the 1990s; possibly it might even originate in
the police’s rejection of early city wardens.
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ling, 2004; Van de Bunt & Van Swaaningen, 2004). ‘Crime policy’ became ‘public
safety policy’ or ‘security policy’ and local governments broadened their scope
from prevention to pro-action (Ministry of the Interior, 1993). Van Steden (2011)
states safety became the “centrifugal force of our society”, a concept around which
different policy fields became organised: anti-social behaviour, neighbourhood
decline and crime all had to be fought with combined forces (2011: 45).
New concepts were also introduced in municipal safety policy. Petty crimes
became frequent crimes and eventually the notion of ‘minor annoyances’ (kleine
ergernissen) was staged, reflecting local governments’ care for the alleged minor,
but yet most vexatious issues. Another term reflecting this renewed orientation
was the stronger prominence of the heading overlast,10 a Dutch word referring to
various forms of incivilities and especially the annoyance and hindrance these
cause (Ministry of the Interior, 1993).11 Moreover, these terms were part of a more
moralising discourse, especially in government policy programme Law in Motion
(Recht in Beweging; Ministry of Justice, 1990) and the ensuing Integrated Public Safety
Report (Integrale Veiligheidsrapportage; Ministry of the Interior, 1993). The ‘moral tis‐
sue’ of society was for the first time explicitly diagnosed as being in decline, bring‐
ing about various incivilities. Instead of suffering from insufficient ties between
youngsters and society or a lack of functional surveillance, society was diagnosed
as struggling with a ‘blurring sense of values’ (vervagend normbesef, cf. Van Houdt
& Schinkel, 2014).
Other concepts reflect how certain fashions in criminology were ‘dutchified’ (cf.
Newburn & Jones, 2007). The broken windows theory for instance, is present in the
Dutch idea of schoon, heel en veilig (clean, intact and safe), as an early manager
states. The basic psychological assumption that one broken window that is left
unrepaired will lead to more serious crime informs these accounts. This manager
states,
Clean, intact and safe then became popular. The police too, said: make sure things are intact. If
one thing breaks down, more will follow.
In addition, citizens’ feelings of security gained prominence on local municipal
agendas. The popularity of this notion seemed to partly overlap with the broken
windows assumption that physical decline does have negative impacts on such
10. Although Hauber (1994) observes the term overlast also informed the first city wardens.
11. Overlast is a Dutch term that is usually translated as ‘a nuisance’. However, this English term has a
more limited meaning (mostly in singular form and referring to a temporary situation). In contrast,
overlast refers to a broader experience and is mostly related to various incivilities. It may be associ‐
ated with all kinds of annoyances, both caused by physical circumstances, such as poor mainte‐
nance of public roads, and social circumstances or anti-social behaviour. Municipal officers almost
exclusively concern themselves with the latter variant – the general discomfort caused by anti-
social behaviour. See further Devroe (2012) for a more extensive discussion of overlast and its vari‐
ous interpretations.
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feelings.12 This idea was further enhanced by new ways of measuring. A manager
recounts how the idea gained ground that in general people felt more insecure in
neighbourhoods with a low level of maintenance and a lot of rubbish (cf.
Bruinsma, Bernasco & Elffers, 2004; Maas-de Waal & Wittebrood, 2002; RMO 2004;
Van Stokkom, 2008; see further chapter 6). Feelings of insecurity grew in impor‐
tance as a policy issue through the introduction of the Police Monitor in 1993,
accentuating victim risks (Bruinsma, Bernasco & Elffers, 2004; RMO, 2004).
Lastly, the 1990s saw an increase in popularity of the comprehensive term leef‐
baarheid, mostly translated in English as ‘quality of life’ or ‘liveability’.13 Mostly
associated with what has been called the ‘neighbourhood approach’ (WRR, 2005;
Reijndorp, 2004), this term became popular during the 1970s, when urban welfare
policies were increasingly decentralised, with a greater focus on neighbourhoods,
urban renewal, opposition to anonymous ‘bricklaying’ and paying closer attention
to the correspondence between the experience of social quality and physical char‐
acteristics of a neighbourhood. Leefbaarheid became a term to capture this new
awareness (among many other things – De Hart, 2002) and grew in popularity
under the new large city policy of the 1990s (VROM, 2004: Grote Steden Beleid).14
On the one hand, these shifts and new terms seemed to change city wardens’ work
in the course of the 1990s. The goal of preventing petty crimes was gradually
replaced by more generally correcting behaviour that had gone astray. This is rep‐
resented by a change from targeting illegal acts to intolerable or in-civil acts (WRR,
2003, in: Van Stokkom, 2008), and by a transition from initial concerns about bicy‐
cle theft, purse snatching or shoplifters, to worries over a ‘clean and intact’ public
space that is liveable and free from incivilities (overlast). City wardens were meant
to play an important role in correcting people who breached these norms.15 More‐
over, several respondents state city wardens were assigned to a large number of
12. Although this was no new thought either, cf. Commissie Roethof, 1984: 20.
13. The most usual translation of leefbaarheid is ‘quality of life’, although this term seems to entail more
and other notions than its Dutch counterpart (cf. De Hart, 2002; Leidelmeijer & Van Kamp, 2003).
Chapter 9 will discuss the semantic indefiniteness of the notion of leefbaarheid that often enables
stakeholders to define and redefine the work of municipal officers, especially where it concerns the
distinction with police work. Leidelmeijer & Van Kamp (2003) provide a thorough overview of the
conceptual similarities and differences between leefbaarheid, liveability and quality of life.
14. Although terms in neighbourhood policy changed every few years, leefbaarheid would be persistent
and even develop into an important and measurable indicator in so called ‘quality of life’ monitor‐
ing (leefbaarheidsmonitoren, WRR, 2005). Increasingly it became defined in relation to the day to
day problems citizens experienced (WRR, 2005: 37). Bruinsma, Bernasco and Elffers (2004) state
that Dutch municipalities started measuring residents’ experience of public safety and quality of
life from 1996 onwards. According to a Dutch ministerial report leefbaarheid refers to at least three
different themes – the physical living environment, the social environment (interaction with other
residents) and last but not least, the impact of crime, incivilities and issues of public safety (VROM
2004: 15).
15. Although not the main focus here, the decrease in crime and disorder in itself obviously has a large
impact on these new officers (cf. Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta, 2006).
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areas, thus diluting the effect of ‘familiar faces’ patrolling confined areas. They
were a victim of their own success, as an early researcher states. Because they were
successful in preventing petty crimes in relatively small areas, other area managers
started demanding city wardens for their own neighbourhood, but spreading a
limited amount of officers over more neighbourhoods had a negative impact on
this effect.
On the other hand, this change in discourse and encompassing public safety
policy had but little effect on what city wardens were actually doing in practice. A
researcher recounts how new terms became fashionable. They were invented or
copied from other movements in a somewhat casual way, but had a relatively
small impact on practice. He recalls the term ‘social safety’, which was yet another
term to highlight citizens’ feelings of insecurity:
Social safety was more general. It had to do with the built environment, the relation between
environment and crime, urban planning, parks, tunnels. Social safety, it was also a term from
the feminist movement. It sounded good, you have to feel safe, yeah, why not? It used to be
called fear of crime. These things are conceptually mingled […] in our reports we added those
terms. Well alright, we thought, as long as something happens.16
As such, he states, it was mostly the discourse that changed. Others underscore
that the practice of city wardens remained the same in terms of their limited pow‐
ers, the prominence of social reintegration goals for unemployed people, subordi‐
nation to the police and alleged ineffectiveness. A larger change was yet to come.
4 Intermezzo: new legislation and changes in security policies
Summing up the previous sections, the first period in municipal disorder policing
was dominated by theories of situational crime prevention and social control,
growing concerns about feelings of insecurity, and a gradual shift to other terms
and concerns, at least in discourse. Likewise, the decision to appoint long-term
unemployed people as city wardens, the somewhat indefinite surveillance goals
and subordination to the police had great influence on the work of early city war‐
dens.
This first phase came to an end at the beginning of the 21st century. Since the
early 2000s municipalities started to develop professional municipal policing serv‐
ices and to transform city wardens into professional officers who were expected
eventually to actually fine for rule infringements. This process took several years,
but to understand this shift some important changes in Dutch legislation and
security policies in the 1990s and the 2000s need to be discussed. First, a national
‘call for strict law enforcement’ is addressed, together with the enlarged role for the
16. For a more extensive discussion of the roots of the Dutch focus on victims, see Boutellier, 2008.
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mayor in local safety policies and the introduction of new administrative fines and
penal orders. Next, the larger role of BOAs or enforcement officers (see also chapter
1) is discussed. Lastly, the trend of the police withdrawing from public spaces is
considered.
A call for strict law enforcement
As mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, the start of the 21st century was marked by a
nation-wide change in tone and approach concerning public safety issues, most
clearly visible in the 2002 national policy programme Towards a Safer Society (Naar
een veiliger samenleving).
In chapter 2 this programme was discussed as the most evident Dutch example
of zero tolerance thinking in policy. Apart from being a ‘deviation from the trend’
in terms of more and stricter law enforcement and the targeting of ‘notorious sour‐
ces’ of disorder and crime, it can also be seen as the result of the growing focus on
citizens’ feelings of insecurity.17 Hence the programme states “society will become
safer, at the latest in 2006, not only objectively as will be evident from statistics, but
mainly subjectively, where it concerns the feelings of citizens [de gevoelstemperatuur
voor de burgers]” (Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice, 2002: 11). As such,
this policy plan mainly nurtured ambitions to address those offences and incivili‐
ties that directly impact upon citizens.
This relatively harsh stance on incivilities and issues of public safety was later
continued in the 2008 action plan Disorder and Decline (actieplan Overlast en Verloede‐
ring), albeit with a more communitarian twist to it (Terpstra, 2010b; Van Houdt &
Schinkel, 2014). This plan is an elaboration of one of the main themes of the policy
programme of 2007s new government (Terpstra, 2010b), and part of the project
‘Public safety starts with prevention’ (Veiligheid begint bij voorkomen). This plan and
its predecessors resulted in a wide range of measures to further “regulate behav‐
iour in public space” (Terpstra, 2010b: 123), particularly granting police and local
government more powers.
These national changes had a large impact on local governments. Municipali‐
ties, and particularly mayors, were granted more powers to fight various kinds of
disorder and incivilities (Sackers, 2010). Mayors were granted the power, for
instance to introduce camera surveillance, to assign areas for preventative stop and
search actions by the police or to administer area restraining orders in case of drug
abuse (see also chapter 8; cf. Sackers, 2010). In addition, changes in administrative
law enabled governments to administer fines or penal orders for recurring incivili‐
ties. These are the administrative penal order (bestuurlijke strafbeschikking) and the
administrative fine (bestuurlijke boete; Terpstra & Havinga, 2005; Terpstra et al.,
17. It should be noted that this ‘breach’ seems partly rhetorical, as tendencies to strict enforcement
could already be observed in some of the policy plans of the preceding coalition (cf Terpstra,
2010b).
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2013). These legal inventions provided municipalities with means to fine people for
rule infringements that caused annoyance, such as dog excrement, anti-social
behaviour of street youth or household waste (cf. Flight et al., 2012).18
BOAs: Special Investigative Officers
A second development that is important in this respect is the increased use of
BOAs as municipal law enforcement officers (Buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaren:
Special Investigative Officers). Officers with more powers than city wardens were
needed to administer fines or penal orders.
Local governments have been able to appoint these BOAs since 1994.19 In close
relation to the major police reorganisation in 1993 involving the abolition of munic‐
ipal police forces, several police tasks such as controlling parking offences and the
policing of environmental offences were transferred to municipalities. This led to
the introduction of a new type of non-police enforcement officers. In Rotterdam for
instance, environmental control was planned as part of a municipal organisation
called Roteb, in addition to the parking wardens with their own agency. Likewise,
in most cities that were selected for this study, the municipality had its own inde‐
pendent agency for parking surveillance. The municipality of Utrecht for instance,
established an agency with environmental police (called ‘cleaning police’ – reini‐
gingspolitie) and a team of officers that addressed rule infringements associated
with dog owners, such as dog excrement or dogs that are left unleashed (called
‘dog wardens’ – hondenwachters).
The Decree on Special Investigative Officers was issued in 1994 to enable these
new municipal officers to issue fines for offences, something city wardens were
unable to do. This Decree followed an adaptation of article 142 of the new Police-
law of 1993 (cf. Brouwer & Van Rest, 1996). The new BOAs replaced two types of
investigative officers that were part of the municipal police forces (Roodzant, Van
Oosterhout & Bouwmeister, 1994). The 1994 decree determined their functions and
tasks, for instance in terms of the legal grounds of their special investigative pow‐
18. Dutch municipalities have been introducing administrative fines for a variety of offences since
halfway through the nineties. After 2009 specific administrative fines and administrative penal
orders for ‘incivilities in public spaces’ were introduced. Until recently two third of all Dutch
municipalities had chosen to introduce the administrative penal order. This seemed due to the fact
administrative penal orders involved a relatively low administrative burden, to the fixed amount
of money municipalities receive for every penal order they write (from the ‘Central Collecting
Agency of the Ministry of Security and Justice’ CJIB), and to the relative transparency of this sys‐
tem (Flight et al., 2012, Terpstra et al., 2013). This system however, has changed from January 2015:
the compensation for administrative penal orders was abolished. As a result, the municipalities of
The Hague and Amsterdam have decided to reintroduce the administrative fine from 1-1-2017 after
all.
19. The introduction of these officers was based on the ministerial decree on Special Investigative Offi‐
cers of 1994: Besluit buitengewoon opsporingsambtenaren (http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0007013/
geldigheidsdatum_19-02-2013).
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ers, as well as the requirements regarding capacity and reliability (Mein & Hart‐
man, 2013). Later the BOA-note (BOA circulaire) organised this system of non-
police enforcement officers further.20 Only after the turn of the millennium did
municipalities start to replace city wardens by BOAs.
Developments within the public police
A third national development that added to a more prominent role of municipali‐
ties in local enforcement is the redirection of the police to so-called ‘core tasks’,
resulting in less police attention to minor offences and disorder policing (see also
chapter 1).
After the police reorganisation in 1993, it still had ambitions to monopolise
enforcement in public spaces. This is reflected in the introduction of new police
surveillance officers for law enforcement in public spaces in 1993. In fact, this func‐
tion of politiesurveillant – a function that is similar to the English ‘Police Commu‐
nity Support Officers’ (PCSO’s, Terpstra et al., 2013) – can be seen partly as the
result of the police’s rejection of surveillance by city wardens and what they called
the fragmentation of policing. This may be seen as “a strategy for the police forces
to recover lost ground” (Terpstra et al., 2013: 27). The Amsterdam Streetwise pro‐
gramme, running from 1998 until 2005, provides a good example of the employ‐
ment of these officers, when large numbers of police officers were deployed to
address minor offences and rule infringements (Van Stokkom, 2005). In addition,
growing pressure on the police organisation for better results during the 1990s led
to the introduction of performance management. First raised in the 1999s Policy
Plan Police (Beleidsplan Politie), concrete indicators for performance were introduced
in 2003, as a result of the national policy programme Towards a Safer Society (Terp‐
stra & Trommel, 2006). Although these were received differently across police dis‐
tricts, this led to more enforcement efforts and a growth in fines for minor offences
– mostly traffic violations – in many districts (Sluis, Cachet, De Jong, Nieuwenhuy‐
zen & Ringeling, 2006: 70 ff.).
Although the police continued using the performance management indicators,
the fine quota were side-lined in 2006 by Minister Remkes (Van Stokkom, 2016). In
2010 these indicators were abolished altogether. The police role in the enforcement
of municipal bye-laws and traffic rules dropped dramatically in the 2010s (Van
Stokkom, 2016). Another indication for the police reorientation on core tasks is the
disappearance of the function of politiesurveillant. In the last decade these patrol
officers received more and more back-office tasks and there was no provision for
this function in the last police reorganisation in 2013.
20. By now BOAs can be found in various other sectors. There are six different legal spheres for BOAs.
This categorisation was developed in response to the fragmentation of surveillance and law
enforcement by non-police actors (Mein & Hartman, 2013). The number of BOAs in the public
domain (domain 1) – relevant for this study – is about 3,600 municipal officers.
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5 The advent of new municipal disorder policing: 2002 – 2007
These three national developments proved to be relevant for changes in municipal
disorder policing. They provided the conditions for the establishment of new city
surveillance agencies with new officers that were able to “make a difference”.
Local developments: A call for surveillance
On a local level, the start of the 21st century is characterised by a notable demand
for ‘more blue on the streets’, for more police or police-like officers. This is com‐
monly referred to as a ‘call for surveillance’. Although several respondents claim
this call was incited by the alleged retreat of the police, these demands reach
beyond changes in the police apparatus.21 Especially since, as described in the last
section, police developments have been somewhat ambiguous. As such, it is
mainly the clearer political urge of local city councils for ‘more blue’ that sets this
period apart from earlier phases.
In this section, first local developments are scrutinised, based on findings
derived from the six cities introduced in chapter 4. Next, the introduction and ini‐
tial growth of the new municipal city surveillance agencies (Toezicht en Handhaving)
is discussed.
The tougher national stance on disorder had a clear local echo. Mostly, this call for
more surveillance was voiced by political representatives in terms of the annoyan‐
ces and feelings of insecurity of neighbourhood residents, expressing a heightened
awareness of citizens’ concerns.
In Eindhoven for instance, the urge for more surveillance solidified in the coali‐
tion agreement following the 2006 municipal elections. In this agreement the politi‐
cal parties that would form the new coalition underscored they wanted more con‐
trol over local public safety issues. In the coalition agreement for 2006-2010 this is
connected with changing police priorities as follows:
Our city is in increasing need of general surveillance in neighbourhoods and at hotspots, not
least because the police are partly retreating from surveillance tasks as a result of the national
debate on their core tasks. We want a unit City Surveillance, under [our own] direction and
organisational management that will comprise seventy to eighty city wardens, from 2010, and
employed by the municipality.22
21. Some state this ‘call’ could already be noted during the early 1990s and especially in the country‐
side (Terpstra et al., 2013).
22. Eindhoven (2006), Coalitieakkoord 2006-2010: Eindhoven Eén. Slagvaardig op weg naar een sociaal, sterk
en betrokken Eindhoven.
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Likewise, the Tilburg city council increasingly started to take note of ‘minor annoy‐
ances’. Political debates on what bothered citizens the most, centred on alleged
minor issues of physical disorder.23 A manager in Tilburg said
There is a debate in the council on these minor annoyances. By their very nature, these are
minor environmental rule infringements, for instance dog litter, or incivilities that haven’t been
a police priority in recent years.
In some cases, this attention can be ascribed to the efforts of individual decision
makers. In Nijmegen for instance, one of the aldermen made a case for neighbour‐
hood residents and the feelings of abandonment they purportedly experienced.
According to a respondent who was a manager at the time, this alderman was “a
highly inspiring man, saying, ‘go into those neighbourhoods, have a look at what
is going on’, and [scolding] the police, ‘you don’t show up enough’. As local gov‐
ernment we are responsible for these neighbourhoods, and that includes public
safety’.”
Although the call for surveillance coincided with the withdrawal of the police,
according to these accounts, this urge for more blue on the streets is also related to
other developments; the extra police investment in the first years of the 21st century
contradict a simple explanation of municipal officers replacing police officers.
An additional explanation might be found in the fact that the concerns of citi‐
zens became more visible. In these years the means to measure citizens’ concerns
and feelings of insecurity improved greatly. Rotterdam for instance, started using
the safety index from 2002 onwards (cf. De Leeuw & Van Swaaningen, 2011). As
one manager states
Those safety indexes, they really were an issue back then. It was the only thing that transcended
the gut feeling […] What’s happening in those neighbourhoods. […] They really played a role at
that time as a point of reference.
Other cities were either inspired by Rotterdam’s example of measuring public
safety through such indexes (such as Tilburg), or came into focus as scoring partic‐
ularly badly on other indicators. The crime monitor of the national newspaper
Algemeen Dagblad (AD) for instance, indicated the cities of Tilburg and Eindhoven
were among the Dutch cities with the largest public safety issues (cf. Fijnaut et al.,
2008). Equally, quality of life monitors were growing in importance in these years
(cf. Van Dijk, Flight & Oppenhuis, 2000; Bruinsma, Bernasco & Elffers, 2004). As a
result, residents’ valuation of their living environment became more visible, as
23. Council debate Tilburg, 26th April, 2006; Tilburg (2006) Algemeen Beleidsplan College.
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well as their chief annoyances. Thus, for quite a few local political decision makers
“a call for surveillance” was supported by these indicators.
In The Hague for instance, this led to more attention for notable hotspots, which
were determined by analysing complaints about decline and public safety from
2003 onwards.24 In Rotterdam the physical deterioration and gradual downward
slide of neighbourhoods became a political item somewhat earlier. Due to Rotter‐
dam’s electoral landslide in 2001 and the ensuing period with Opstelten as the
mayor (see also chapter 2), a lot of political attention was paid to the quality of the
urban living environment. A manager points out
[New policies] concerned the decline of this city. Keeping it clean and intact. Then you’re talk‐
ing about household waste. Opstelten also made a stand against people throwing their chewing
gum on the pavement. These things were really characteristic for that time, because it needed
more surveillance, while the police were gradually moving to tougher crime fighting. So a gap
arose between those minor offences in the neighbourhood, leading to decline, frustration,
annoyance, that didn’t quite promote social cohesion. That’s what we were used for.
In summary, public safety policy developed in a similar fashion in large Dutch cit‐
ies in the first years of the 21st century. Influenced by a turn in the national debate
on incivilities and disorder and aided by a clearer image of what bothers citizens
the most, local political debates revolved around the ideas that more surveillance
would be needed and that the police were not willing to take this responsibility.
City wardens: unfit?
Simultaneously a broad consensus ensued that city wardens would be unable to
meet these demands. These officers were seen as incapable of “making a differ‐
ence”, as was commonly noted. Some say, not only because the lowest level of long
term unemployed people populated the ranks as the basis for city wardens, but
also because the foundations for city wardens had trouble to retain faithful
employees. As one researcher explains, the private security sector was emerging at
that time and also started offering surveillance services, luring away the better part
of the personnel.
Added to this combination of more demands and lack of trust in city warden’s
abilities, was the phased abolition of subsidies for unemployment arrangements
from 2004 onwards.25 This new situation forced municipalities to discuss whether
24. The Hague (2003) Veiligheidsplan.
25. From January 1, 2004, the national government decreed the ID jobs, the follow up to the previous
Melkert arrangements, were to be abolished.
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municipal disorder policing had a raison d’être.26 Most councils decided that they
wanted to continue a form of surveillance by municipal personnel: although pro‐
viding old city wardens with a new option for employment did play a role in this
decision, city councils noted that surveillance in itself also had to change for the
better.
New city surveillance agencies
Between roughly 2001 and 2007 new municipal city surveillance agencies were
established. In Dutch these new agencies had different names, mostly Stadstoezicht
(‘City Surveillance’; Rotterdam, Eindhoven, Tilburg), or related, such as Bureau
Toezicht (‘Bureau for Surveillance’; Nijmegen), Toezicht en Handhaving Openbare
Ruimte (‘Surveillance and Law Enforcement Public Spaces’; Utrecht), or Leefbaarheid
en Toezicht (‘Quality of life and Surveillance’; The Hague).
With these new agencies, municipalities generally put different officers into one
organisation, thus including both city wardens and other municipal enforcement
officers, such as parking wardens and environmental rule enforcement officers,
into one organisation. Moreover, they generally implemented a more robust policy
to tackle issues of disorder and annoyances. New municipal officers were expected
to act more resolutely and firmly to be able to “make a difference”, as opposed to
the allegedly ineffective, unprofessional and ‘soft’ city wardens. To this end, new
officers were expected to issue fines. As stated above, these powers were enabled
by further adapting the possibilities of the Dutch BOA-system that was introduced
with the police reforms of 1993, and later by new administrative penal orders and
fines.
Rotterdam provides the clearest example of such firmness, resulting in munici‐
pal officers with more powers (in the peculiar Rotterdam patois called doorzettings‐
macht), officers that would be able to interfere actively and fine people, equally
referred to in the hardly translatable term of doorpakken: “acting tenaciously”. Thus,
Rotterdam’s early Stadstoezicht was clearly informed by the new coalition’s pro‐
gramme Towards a New Engagement (Dutch: Naar een nieuw elan), as a manager
explains,
One of the things in that programme was we are going to enlarge the power (doorzettingsmacht)
of the city surveillance agency. We are going to hire 250 general law enforcement officers [brede
26. Some municipalities noted that the cut-backs on these unemployment arrangements were at odds
with the “proposed policy to improve safety in cities” (Policy plan Naar een veiliger Den Haag, 2003:
4).
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handhavers]. Basically that means, we have 550 [city wardens], but they’re worthless. We need
much tougher guys.27
Although Rotterdam seems to be the forerunner, the same ambition to achieve a
firmer approach to disorder can be found in other cities. In Utrecht for instance, the
coordinator who headed the newly established city surveillance agency in 2007,
“cleaned up the whole thing,” a municipal manager remembers. Moreover, under
municipal responsibility, they were assigned more public safety tasks. Approxi‐
mately 75% of their work would involve for instance addressing street youth, visit‐
ing victims of burglaries or fining cyclists in pedestrian zones. This also meant that
municipal officers would be held more accountable for how they contributed to the
goals of the municipal safety programme through what was then the new ‘enforce‐
ment plan’ (see further chapter 6).
In Nijmegen, a new prospect for new municipal officers was especially due to
the efforts of the aforementioned alderman in close cooperation with the coordina‐
tor of the city surveillance agency at the time. This coordinator recounts that in
2002 he was asked by the alderman for more investment in officers with public
safety tasks and authority to impose fines.
I asked this alderman back then ‘what is it you want?’ ‘Well, more blue on the streets’. He said,
‘more parking attendance, more environmental police. And more public safety tasks’.
Again, city wardens without powers were not seen as being capable of “making a
difference”, or “having a lot of meaning in public spaces,” as another senior man‐
ager recounts. Their replacements would be called surveillance officers. The same
manager states, “With sixty surveillance officers a lot more is possible than with
sixty city wardens […] they have more powers, another education, another level”.
Hence, most municipalities expressed the ambition for a new organisation with
“profound competences”.28
Nevertheless, not all municipalities saw their city wardens as instantly capable of
law enforcement, and some municipalities took several years to change their war‐
dens into enforcement officers. As a result, the first years of developing a new form
of municipal surveillance were characterised by profound growing pains. At the
very least, new municipal officers would have to be managed in a more task spe‐
cific way through clear assignments. “General tasks, such as general preventive
27. Rotterdam’s old municipal officers were called ‘surveillance officers’ and the new municipal offi‐
cers who do have powers for fining are called ‘city wardens’. These terms are used in reverse in
other cities, using the term city wardens to indicate previous, and alleged ineffective workers. To
prevent confusion, Rotterdam’s pre-2001 municipal officers are here also called ‘city wardens’.
28. Tilburg (2006) Professionalisering toezicht in het openbaar gebied, Tilburg (2006) Actief, buurtgericht en
creatief. The Hague (2003) Veiligheidsplan.
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surveillance, are no part of that,” as a policy document on professionalisation of
Tilburg’s city surveillance agency remarks, implying that only clearly circum‐
scribed tasks with a measurable output or outcome would count (see further chap‐
ter 6).29
Thus coordinators and managers gradually started to emphasise that their
human resources and organisation needed substantial re-working. Therefore, the
political call for more blue on the streets was countered by civil servants trying to
convince political decision makers of investing more in these agencies. A Rotter‐
dam manager recalls this moment.
At a certain point we had a meeting with the mayor and the alderman. […] We took them with
us [and showed them] not only the people, but also the equipment. It was terrible, the housing
too. We showed them how bad the organisation was […] Because we were dealing with an
employment project, but the city council was demanding things from us as if we were the Navy
Seals. And that really bothered us.
These deficits in professional standards in many cases were deepened by a lack of
occupational pride, according to some respondents. City wardens did not seem to
bother about their work.
Moreover, early managers had to create a new organisation out of a rather
diverse workforce. Different officers, all with their own visions and task descrip‐
tions, “different blood types,” as a manager in Eindhoven calls it, had to be merged
into one agency. Parking wardens or environmental rule enforcement officers were
accustomed to clearly defined tasks and to more powers, sometimes resulting in an
eagerness to highlight the difference with their new colleagues. As a manager
points out, this might be related to the fact that these officers were part of the
municipal police forces until the 1993 re-organisation (see chapter 1): “these men
saw their status as ex-police officers as highly important”. Therefore many of them
did not want to be merged into one agency with city wardens who allegedly had
no authority, no powers, and a bad image. “It caused problems, because, well, ‘we
are police officers’,” as an early manager replicates the ideas of these officers. It
was urgent to create one’s own municipal disorder policing identity, as one of the
first managers relates.
Both city wardens and parking attendants were talking about the municipality this and the
municipality that, as if they were no part of it. In their perception they were still part of the
police. And the municipality was something distant from them.30
29. Tilburg (2006) Professionalisering toezicht in het openbaar gebied.
30. This seems a somewhat peculiar vision, as the municipal police forces were equally part of the
municipalities until 1993. Apparently their status as ‘ex-municipal police officers’ nevertheless set
them apart emotionally from the encompassing municipal organisation.
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According to most respondents it took a lot of energy and frustration to develop
these officers into fully professional municipal officers who could meet political
demands. To this end, these managers generally took a clear stand on the previous
city warden phase and looked for a new and own ‘municipal identity’. Thus, work
reintegration as a goal was opposed and municipal officers were supposed to
become independent from the local police forces: “Not as much away from the
police, but towards a new identity,” a manager in Eindhoven explains. In some cit‐
ies, a lot depended on individual managers, who were ambitious and keen to
develop their agency to a top-of-the-bill municipal disorder policing apparatus.
In several cities new self-assertion for the city surveillance agencies and its offi‐
cers seemed to be an important part of these first years. Occupational pride for
instance, developed in a remarkably short period of time in some cities. This
applies especially to Rotterdam, as a senior manager explains,
They fixed it up really nicely, so they could be proud of it, something that was lacking with a lot
of these people. They were neither proud of themselves, nor of what they were doing. City war‐
dens were just softies. But that totally reversed.
Part of the effort to highlight the break with previous phases was the development
of a new vocabulary and name for the newly established agencies. The new munic‐
ipal city surveillance agency in Utrecht for example, chose to abolish the name
stadswacht (city warden), as that was seen as tainted by the association with
arrangements for long-term unemployed people. For similar reasons, several
municipalities chose to abolish the name Stadstoezicht (City Surveillance).
In the years following their initiation, the new agencies strove for a more pro‐
fessional image and more professional forms of disorder policing. In Utrecht new
officers and coordinators were employed after 2007; workers who were seen as
dysfunctional were encouraged to leave the organisation and all new officers were
supposed to have the BOA qualification. Also in Rotterdam a thorough reshuffling
of human resources occurred. Particularly in this city early managers took the
stage to establish their new organisation as a new unit that needed to be taken seri‐
ously. Although it took several years after the initiation of Rotterdam’s city surveil‐
lance agency in 2002, it became known as one of the best equipped and largest of
the Netherlands. A Rotterdam police officer states that the officers of the new
agency were even better equipped than the police: “Anything was possible. They’d
be walking around with I-pads, making us really jealous. In our eyes they were the
lesser ones, but they had material that was a whole lot better”. Equally typical for
that phase, according to another respondent, is that this new municipal agency
tended to take on more and heavier tasks, bordering on police work. As a conse‐
quence the Public Prosecution office and the Police (as official Supervising authori‐
ties) told them “to step on the brakes all of the time” (see also chapter 1). Hence,
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these ambitious developments also implied some city surveillance agencies ran up
against their limits.
6 Recent policy goals and tasks: 2007 – 2014
The previous section again showed that political ambitions to enhance public
safety might explain the outlook of municipal disorder policing, but only in part.
Ambitions that are related to the forging of new agencies and an orientation on
occupational pride equally define these new municipal agencies.
After this initial phase the city surveillance agencies further developed their
ideas of disorder policing. This most recent phase appears as one of professional
maturation – a more conscious application of newly attained law enforcement
powers and reflection on what means could serve the end of compliance with the
rules. As such, city surveillance agencies developed more pragmatic goals, as
opposed to (overt) ambitions to highlight the differences with city wardens. It
seems city surveillance agencies and their officers became more aware of what they
had to offer and how this would match the demands they met.
In Rotterdam for instance, this was informed by a critical report of the local
Audit office, which concluded that the enforcement activities of municipal officers
were not matched by sufficient professional standards.31 In The Hague and Til‐
burg, although their city surveillance agencies seemed less keen on new and ambi‐
tious tasks, (internal) reports and audits also targeted the professional level of local
municipal officers. In fact, many respondents state that these officers were unable
to use their discretionary autonomy in a satisfactory way. Hence, quite ironically,
new municipal officers that seem – at least partly – occupied with proving their
status as a viable municipal alternative to a withdrawing police force, were repri‐
manded for lacking in these vital professional competences. A Rotterdam coordi‐
nator recalls the complaints that abounded about this strict rule enforcement.
We were supposed to enforce the rules, so we did. But the thing is, our officers know how to be
nuanced only to a certain extent. You can tell them, ‘If you see someone in the park drinking
alcohol, he is done for’. You can’t say, ‘You can leave alone harmless, left wing, intellectual
types with a glass of rosé’. Things would get really complicated. Apparently, there was a prob‐
lem with drinking in that park; apparently there were bacchanalian orgies going on there, creat‐
ing a terrible nuisance. So the rules were enforced. But it didn’t last for another eighteen months
for the first debates in the city council: ‘You can’t even drink a glass of rosé in that park for
those stupid officers to fine you’.
Such criticism led to a ‘recalibration’ (Rotterdam: herijking), a ‘City surveillance
agency 3.0’ (Tilburg: Stadstoezicht 3.0) or a new plan for ‘Rule enforcement on a The
31. Rekenkamer Rotterdam, 2012.
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Hague level’ (The Hague: Handhaven op Haagse hoogte). Without exception, these
revisions highlighted a renewed orientation in terms of both tasks and approaches,
in general – a move away from unquestioningly adopting police-like work and
imprudent rule enforcement, and an emphasis on more conscious and professional
forms of policing.
Again, there are great similarities between the city surveillance agencies in
these most recent developments. In this last section before the conclusion, these
similarities in recent policy and tasks of municipal disorder policing are ana‐
lysed.32
Neighbourhood decline and physical disorder
Firstly, the recent policies of various city surveillance agencies are similar in their
emphasis on physical disorder, mostly referred to as ‘quality of life tasks’. The
Hague’s new plan provides a clear example of a stricter determination of tasks.
More than any other of the municipal agencies in this study The Hague’s Leefbaar‐
heid en Toezicht has been troubled by issues concerning organisation, vision, profes‐
sionalisation and the relation with the police. In 2011 this led to the policy plan
Handhaven op Haagse hoogte, written under direction of the alderman for City main‐
tenance (stadsbeheer) of the time. This document proves to be a clear example of a
focus on physical disorder and presents one of the most vivid examples of the halt‐
ing of neighbourhood decline through policing of physical disorder. The Hague
opts for a city “where inhabitants feel at home and comfortable,” and “where the
quality of life attracts new inhabitants, companies and visitors”.33 The introduction
provides some lively images of why disorder policing is relevant.
Unfortunately the people of The Hague do not feel safe all the time and everywhere, they are
terribly annoyed by discomforts such as dog litter and garbage bags that are torn apart and they
do not have a blind faith in local government in its battle against misbehaviour in public pla‐
ces.34
Whereas it is these public places, so it is stated, that are vital for a city where peo‐
ple can feel at home.
32. In the appendix a short overview of the differences between the six city surveillance agencies in
this study are presented.
33. Gemeente Den Haag (2011). Handhaven op Haagse hoogte. Beleidsplan voor de handhaving van de leef‐
baarheid van de openbare ruimte.
34. Ibid.
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The Hague strives for public places that are inviting to dwell in. Next to a high quality of the
design [inrichting] and good maintenance, this demands behavioural rules for the use of public
places.35
‘Minor annoyances’ [kleine ergernissen] have a disrupting effect, the plan maintains,
especially since signs of physical decline [verloedering] are an early warning of fur‐
ther deterioration of neighbourhoods. In fact it is stressed that addressing misbeha‐
viour by regulation should be combined with cleaning or repairing to show “dis‐
comfort and annoyances are taken seriously”. As such, this plan represents one of
the clearest examples of the influence of broken windows thinking (see also chap‐
ter 2).
This vision fully defined the priorities at the time of research. Handhaven op
Haagse hoogte culminated in a strict determination of the three aspects The Hague’s
municipal officers should focus on – litter, dog litter and parking issues. These sub‐
jects lie at the heart of what bothers The Hague’s residents most, and thus what
allegedly hinders an inviting public space.
A strict allegiance to a well-defined set of physical disorder issues can be noted
in other cities as well. However, this does not always mean officers were told to
refrain from fining. Enforcement of rules is still expected – something that seems at
odds with the next characteristic of recent policy.36
Behavioural compliance
The second corresponding characteristic of recent policy also seems to be influ‐
enced by the turn away from intensive enforcement. A term that came to define
this is ‘behavioural compliance’. This notion seems to imply that municipalities try
to be more aware of what can be done to let people obey the rules in public places.
Coordinators and municipal managers stress that the number of fines should be
less important than the idea of behavioural compliance and these should no longer
be a goal in itself. A municipal manager from the city of Tilburg, states they “really
shifted emphasis to the setting of normative standards and […] behavioural com‐
pliance”. In other municipalities too, behavioural compliance is deemed highly rel‐
evant. In Utrecht for example, municipal officers are meant to “stimulate and mon‐
itor desired conduct in public places” and “legislation in public places should be
complied with as much as possible”.37 Ideally municipal officers would issue a fine
only after other means have been tried, as can be read in a policy plan of the city of
Nijmegen.38 Equally, the city of The Hague highlights this basic principle in its
35. Ibid.
36. Moreover, not all cities were as devoted to these tasks related to physical disorder (see also the
appendix).
37. Gemeente Utrecht (2012). Afdelingsplan THOR.
38. Gemeente Nijmegen (2012). Handhaving fysieke leefomgeving. Beleidskader 2012-2016.
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year plan for the municipal officers. “Enforcing the law in public places by coer‐
cion is the final resort in a list of efforts to keep the city clean, intact and safe”.39
As not all city surveillance agencies were under scrutiny of audits or politically
initiated ‘recalibrations’, other reasons might equally well explain why intensive
and strict rule enforcement is opposed, at least in policy rhetoric.40 Tough rule
enforcement is not always seen as effective, for instance. The psychological ration‐
ale that people have a tendency to behave better under social control is still a key
idea for the later approaches of these agencies. The ideal municipal officer is a
‘behavioural influencer’ [gedragsbeïnvloeder], as depicted in a vision document of
the city of Rotterdam.41 In some cases managers have found inspiration in psycho‐
logical and criminological theories for guidance in this influencing of behaviour,
for example an enforcement cycle called ‘the big 8’, the tafel van elf (the table of
eleven) or the pyramid of Braithwaite, all meant to gain insight into why specific
types of citizens do not comply with the rules and what could ideally be the most
effective means to realise behavioural compliance.
Citizen oriented policing
A last recurring policy goal in recent municipal disorder policing concerns the rela‐
tion with citizens. Again, this goal seems to be a result of criticism of previous
approaches. Allegedly, the initial bureaucratic specialisation of city surveillance
agencies has led to the alienation of municipal officers from citizens. If some offi‐
cers deal only with parking offences, others only with stray litter and yet others
only with street youth, this does not contribute to ‘what the citizen is expecting’,
many respondents point out. A manager explains:
I’m only for this, I’m only for that. It’s inefficient as hell and it doesn’t match what the citizen is
expecting […] is there an overview of the neighbourhood? Do you know what that neighbour‐
hood needs?
In contrast, several agencies have started to develop their own ideas of what they
call “holistic municipal officers”.42 These are officers that are meant to address any
39. Gemeente Den Haag (2012). Jaarwerkplan 2013. Bedrijfsonderdeel: Leefbaarheid en Toezicht. Gemeente
Den Haag – Dienst Stadsbeheer.
40. Chapter 8 in particular discusses the policy emphasis on behavioural compliance and “enforce‐
ment as a last resort” forms a sharp contrast with the strict politics and practices of some municipal
officers.
41. Gemeente Rotterdam (2012). Visie stadswachten: Vertrouwd op straat. Positionering, aansturing en
inrichting van de Rotterdamse stadswachten van (voormalig) Stadstoezicht: p. 5.
42. In Dutch this is referred to with integrale handhaving (‘integrated law enforcement’). The word ‘inte‐
grated’ [integraal] is used interchangeably (and quite confusingly) for at least two different matters.
On the one hand to indicate the collaboration of different partners in public safety policy under the
nomenclature of ‘integrated public safety management’, on the other hand as it is used here for
officers with an all-encompassing task description.
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rule infringement they come across, and operate as neighbourhood wardens. The
city of Nijmegen for instance, has instituted such officers. Moreover, municipal
officers who are assigned to their own neighbourhood should generally know its
residents and should be known by most residents. Equally, Tilburg’s revision of
the city surveillance agency emphasises that employees should be visible, recognis‐
able and approachable. In the latter case, this is also seen as a way for residents to
feel more secure.43
More specifically, several city surveillance agencies purposefully aim at famili‐
arity in the neighbourhoods in which they are operating. A clear example of this
can be found again in Rotterdam. In its new vision document the agency not only
made the case for a renewed focus on behavioural compliance, but municipal offi‐
cers were also meant to become “well-known faces”, neighbourhood wardens,
enhancing both compliance with the rules and ‘trust in the neighbourhood’:
Citizens are constantly informed about the developments in their neighbourhood. Conversely,
municipal officers are easily contacted by citizens. Familiar officials add to the trust in the
neighbourhood. Likewise, their closeness stimulates people to address one another on the
streets in the case of undesirable behaviour. This is stimulated by indicating which behaviour is
the norm, by being alert for signs of anti-social behaviour and to have citizens take their respon‐
sibility.44
In other cities, policy dictates that citizens should be allowed to set the agenda in a
more direct way. This implies not only the predetermined lists of most common
annoyances are in use, but more directly, the issues on which citizens report. In Til‐
burg, it is worded as such:
To make sure the city is clean, intact and safe, citizens will take part in agenda setting more and
more. Their contribution to surveillance and enforcement will become more important and
complaints will weigh more heavily in determining the annual priorities.45
In Eindhoven this is even taken further. In a special project, citizens are invited to
determine directly what should be the tasks of Eindhoven’s municipal officers (see
also the next chapter).
The emphasis on residents’ concerns occasionally leads city surveillance agen‐
cies – literally – to define citizens as customers. In Eindhoven for instance, a policy
document states “customer friendliness” should be firmly upheld.46 Likewise in
43. Hence, reassurance still appears as a policy goal, albeit it seldom.
44. Gemeente Rotterdam (2012). Visie stadswachten: Vertrouwd op straat. Positionering, aansturing en
inrichting van de Rotterdamse stadswachten van (voormalig) Stadstoezicht. In fact this vision is loosely
inspired by certain criminological insights and reports that thematise the involvement of citizens in
policy making, such as the WRR report Vertrouwen in burgers (‘trust in citizens’; WRR, 2012).
45. Gemeente Tilburg (2013). Collegeadvies doorontwikkeling stadstoezicht.
46. Gemeente Eindhoven (2006). Uitwerking collegeakkoord.
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The Hague, the city surveillance agency aims at a better and more intensive rela‐
tion with neighbourhood residents, to be capable of addressing “the annoyances
and discomfort of The Hague’s inhabitants”,47 and ideally the city surveillance
agency is “serviceable to residents”.48 As such, something of a ‘customer orienta‐
tion’ can be noted – addressing the most important annoyances and trying to give
residents a feeling of more security.49
Prominent tasks
For a part these policy goals are commonly translated into a set of formal tasks.
Thus, upon asking municipal officers and their coordinators about formal require‐
ments, a specific list of tasks is often mentioned.
Most of these tasks can be regarded as addressing incivilities that are related to
‘physical disorder’. A category that might be best summarised as comprising all
(physical) objects that are left soiled, broken, obstructing or hindering, and in par‐
ticular involving disorder that is high on the municipal list of annoyances: ‘dogs
and household waste’, and a specific list of traffic offences (mainly parking).50 This
physical disorder should be man-made in order to attract their attention; officers
deal with the things that are intentionally left ‘disorderly’ by citizens. Thus, dis‐
comfort with physical causes, such as street lightning that has broken down due to
a short circuit, potholes or badly maintained public parks, are not considered to be
their tasks.
However this is not a strict category. It comprises forms of incivilities as diverse
as bad parking habits (double-parking, parking on the pavement, etc.), negligence
of car, caravan and bicycle wrecks, illegal dumping of household waste, littering in
general, reluctance to leash dogs or clean their excrement, cycling on the pavement
or in pedestrian zones. In some cities the enforcement of paid parking regulations
is added. In Nijmegen for example, this is the most important task. Also in Rotter‐
dam, patrolling paid parking zones is an important part of their tasks.51 In addi‐
47. Gemeente Den Haag (2011). Handhaven op Haagse hoogte, Beleidsplan voor de handhaving van de leef‐
baarheid van de openbare ruimte.
48. Gemeente Den Haag (2012). Jaarwerkplan 2013. Bedrijfsonderdeel: Leefbaarheid en Toezicht. Gemeente
Den Haag – Dienst Stadsbeheer.
49. These three characteristics might be presented here as separate entities, but in many explanations
they appear closely intertwined. It is thought for example, that in an ideal situation interaction
with neighbourhood residents and being well known in the neighbourhood increases behavioural
compliance.
50. Flight (2012) and Flight et al. (2012) use the comprehensive terms of ‘dogs’ and ‘waste’ to refer to
infringements for which most administrative orders for incivilities were issued (bestuurlijke straf‐
beschikking overlast). As their study concerned only such administrative penal orders and adminis‐
trative fines for incivilities (overlast), it did not encompass the administrative fines and penal orders
for traffic violations (see also chapter 1).
51. At the time of research several cities – such as Rotterdam and Utrecht – decided to have parking
attendance automated, making the use of municipal officers for this task largely redundant.
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tion, municipal officers have several extra administrative legal tasks and responsi‐
bilities. In some cities they have coercive means to have bicycle and car wrecks
removed. Often they also supervise shop displays and the pavement terrace size of
cafés and restaurants.52
For another part, these municipal core tasks in many cities are supplemented by
other tasks (see also chapter 9). A prominent example of this is the policing of ‘dis‐
orderly persons’. Instead of focusing primarily on disorderly physical circumstan‐
ces and subsequently addressing whoever might have caused them, the focus here
is on certain groups that are seen as most prone to causing (physical) disorder or
feelings of insecurity. Thus municipal officers are deemed to specifically police cer‐
tain categories of persons and sometimes have extra powers to address the incivili‐
ties caused by, for example homeless people, street youth or nightlife public, such
as alcohol consumption in public places, loitering in doorways and sleeping on the
streets.
In addition, some city surveillance agencies are prepared to fulfil tasks that
stretch the concept of disorder or disorder policing itself, sometimes even leaving
the initial focus on disorder policing aside altogether. In several cities municipal
officers are used for the prevention of criminal offences, such as burglaries or car‐
jacking. Sometimes this happens by situational prevention through walking beats
in neighbourhoods with high levels of such offences. In other cases, employees
visit the victims of carjacking and burglary to provide information on prevention,
assist the police with the preventive control of motorists for burglary tools or with
their ‘dark days offensive’ (during the days in autumn and winter when most bur‐
glaries are reported), running additional surveillance shifts.
Finally, there is quite a large category of other tasks and chores that are handed
to municipal officers, such as the managing of the bicycle depot in Eindhoven, the
removal of bicycle wrecks in Tilburg, noise measurement at events in Nijmegen or
market supervision in Rotterdam. In addition, in some cities municipal officers
have a role in CCTV rooms. For example, in Tilburg and Rotterdam specially
trained employees are responsible for camera surveillance. Lastly, municipal offi‐
cers are involved in community participation projects in a number of cities.
Although this remaining category depends on local preferences and agreements
between municipal management, police and mayor, it appears to be expanding.
From January 1st, 2013 for instance, municipalities also need to assign municipal
52. In this list are rule infringements that need some creativity to be called ‘physical disorder’, but nev‐
ertheless occupy municipal officers in many cities, such as dogs that are unleashed outside desig‐
nated areas or cycling on the pavement. With regard to the enforcement of traffic offences, munici‐
pal officers are qualified to enforce only a limited set of traffic laws, and in general these do not
involve moving traffic, such as speeding, ignoring one way traffic signs, or ignoring red lights by
pedestrians and cyclists. However, the fact that these lower level traffic violations are seen as caus‐
ing a lot of annoyance among citizens leads to debate in several cities. Sometimes law enforcement
in these cases is made a ‘passive power’, meaning offenders may be fined if they are ‘caught in the
act’, but not as part of a focused action.
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officers to enforce the laws on age restrictions in pubs and bars or permits of bar
owners.
7 Conclusions
This chapter dealt with the policies of Dutch municipal disorder policing and how
it developed throughout the years.
First of all, it described how thinking about crime and disorder changed in the
1980s. This shift can be associated both with a noted rise in petty crime and with
risks of victimisation. This renewed focus eventually led to the Roethof Committee
and its funding of preventative projects. Among these projects were the first forms
of municipal functional surveillance. Putting theoretical notions of prevention into
concrete forms of disorder policing, these projects mostly emphasised opportunity
reduction through uniformed surveillance.
The most popular of these projects were the first city warden projects. Many cit‐
ies established a city warden foundation in the first half of the 1990s. The city war‐
den projects for an important part should be placed against the background of the
widespread unemployment problem. City wardens were long term unemployed
people, and thus were paid through various unemployment benefit schemes. Their
work consisted of rather basic forms of situational crime prevention, in some cases
correcting behaviour, in any case serving as “eyes and ears” of the police and reas‐
suring citizens. However, the development of a professional habitus was hindered
by the prominence of social reintegration goals and wardens’ subordinate position
to (reluctant) police officers. In addition, the 1990s witnessed a gradual shift
towards a different terminology, with a more prominent role for municipal public
safety policy, an emphasis on minor annoyances, incivilities (overlast) and ideas
inspired by broken windows thinking, such as ‘clean, intact and safe’ or the notion
of leefbaarheid (quality of life). These terms also impacted on early city wardens.
The first big change in municipal disorder policing took place at the start of the
21st century. Both nationally and locally, a general tendency towards more tough‐
ness and stricter interventions to correct deviant behaviour can be noted – a call for
more surveillance and rule enforcement. Aided by emerging safety indexes and
quality of life monitors, this often translated into the urge to address citizens’ con‐
cerns more thoroughly. City wardens however, were not seen as adequate for this.
As ineffective ‘city strollers’ they would be unable to “make a difference”. Thus,
the idea that something had to change spread quickly, helped by the nation-wide
abolishment of subsidies for unemployment benefit schemes and increased pres‐
sure on municipalities to realise rule enforcement policies. It led to the establish‐
ment of city surveillance agencies and enforcement, gradually filled with new
municipal officers (known as BOAs), who have the power to fine. In addition, in
many municipalities they were given more public safety tasks. An important part
of this emphasis on firmness was also related to concerns about the development
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of new occupational pride and the building of an occupational identity from diver‐
gent types of municipal officers and city wardens.
In the last phase, the city surveillance agencies further professionalised and
seemed to reflect more consciously on tasks and approaches. In quite a few cities
the city surveillance agencies were either reprimanded by critical audits or manag‐
ers realised that professional disorder policing needed more than officers who
were capable of fining. As a result, several city surveillance agencies distanced
themselves – at least rhetorically – from imprudent rule enforcement so character‐
istic of the previous phase. It resulted in a renewed focus on tasks of physical dis‐
order, behavioural compliance and more attention for citizen oriented policing,
sometimes with consumerist tendencies.
Reflecting on this chapter, it seems that the working goals of municipal officers
have changed considerably and rather tortuously. Much of it was caused by factors
that are unrelated to disorder in itself. Most importantly, the initial decision to
appoint long-term unemployed people as city wardens has proven to be highly
influential, both in terms of the alleged lack of effect of these wardens in the 1990s,
and in terms of a reputation of unprofessional employees that continues to haunt
them to this day. Consequently, overt ambitions and the pursuance of tough
enforcement by the first managers of the city surveillance agencies have contrib‐
uted to the aim of ‘making a difference’.
As a result of different policy goals and starting points, municipal officers often
appear to have multiple roles at the same time. As such, they sometimes appear as
a vehicle for various ideas, expectations and ambitions, both related to public
safety policy and to wholly other motives. They are supposed to be officers that
address minor annoyances, they are meant to be ‘smart’ and efficient and know
how to induce citizens to behave in the proper way and they are supposed to be
‘familiar and trustworthy faces’. Simultaneously they should know how to enforce
the rules, in contrast to their allegedly ineffective predecessors.
In the following chapters I will address the question of what happens with such
multifarious goals in local decision making processes and the everyday practice of
municipal officers. In the next chapter it will become clear that the focus on effec‐
tiveness and measurement, and the proximity of municipal politicians are highly
influential, implying that some of the aforementioned policy goals will prove to be
more rhetorical than realistic.
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6 Deciding on disorder policing on a local
level
Chapter 5 dealt with the origins and development of municipal disorder policing
in the Netherlands. By discussing nation-wide changes in disorder policies – such
as the Roethof subsidies – and the similarities in municipal public safety policies,
that chapter addressed the subject of municipal disorder policing on a macro level.
Discussing such macro developments, however, does not reveal a great deal
about how policy is made within municipalities. Local policy does not depend only
on executive decisions made on a national or central level, but is the result of vari‐
ous players who try to influence decisions and put forward different claims. This
chapter discusses this ‘meso level’ of local stakeholders and addresses the questions
how and by whom disorder policing is decided upon (sub question C). It does so
in four sections. Section 1 introduces several concepts that will guide the enquiry
into local decision making on disorder policing. Section 2, the main part of this
chapter, deals with three different ‘logics’ through which local decisions on disor‐
der policing are made – political logic, managerial logic and frontline logic. In the
third section, two examples of conflicts in deciding on disorder policing are high‐
lighted. Section 4 presents conclusions.
1 Studying local decision making
In a classic model well-known in the field of public administration the creation of
policy is seen as the result of a rational, central and top-down decision making
process (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Kingdon, 2014; Rhodes, 1997). In this
model, public policy making and implementation are divided into two distinct
realms: a strong central actor (the ‘agent’) makes substantial choices on policy and
efficiently steers the objects for the implementation of that policy, “a non-political,
technical and potentially programmable activity” (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan,
1997: 7).
This linear model of decision making has been widely criticised and researchers
of public policy generally agree it is not suited for the study of public policy in
practice (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Laws & Hajer, 2006; Rhodes, 2006).
Rather than being a hierarchical top-down process of decision making and docile
implementation, policy is the result of various actors engaging in the implicit or
explicit exchanges of resources, interests, problems and solutions (Compston, 2009;
Rosenthal et al., 1996). Without wanting to claim the centre is fully hollowed out
(Rhodes, 2006), this chapter is largely based on these ideas of policy creation.
Three different theoretical notions guide the enquiry here – network theory, the
influence of street level bureaucracy, and the notion of decision making as organ‐
ised anarchy. These different theories are first briefly introduced before moving to
the empirical part of this chapter.
First, local decisions can be seen as the result of various policy networks. This
theory points out that public policy is the result of several organisational actors,
often depending on other actors in inter-organisational networks (Compston, 2009;
Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997). In this approach to decision making, the
capacity of central actors to steer policy processes is challenged, thereby seeing
government as one of multiple actors in policy creation and suggesting the replace‐
ment of government by governance (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Rhodes, 2000;
Rhodes, 2006). Among other things, this implies that the strife over goals, interests
and resources continues in the implementation of policy (Compston, 2009; Rosen‐
thal, 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2006). Likewise, this approach enables attention
to be given to the internal divisions of organisations. Instead of seeing organisa‐
tions as monoliths with uniform interests and an unambiguous relation with their
environment, they can be divided in numerous sub-groups with their respective
interests and diverging relations with actors outside the organisation (Rosenthal,
1996: 214). This idea of various networks with their own interests and resources
will inform all three ‘logics’ discussed below.
This network approach is supplemented with the notion that frontline profes‐
sionals have a particular influence on public policy. Loosely based on Michael Lip‐
sky’s seminal work on street-level bureaucracy (2010, [1980]), this second approach
takes the beliefs and routines of frontline professionals as a base for understanding
local decision making (Laws & Hajer, 2006). Here Lipsky’s basic observation that
professionals have a relatively large amount of “discretion and relative autonomy
from organizational authority” is a guide-line (Lipsky, 2010: 13). Hence, decisions
on disorder policing can only be understood if the way frontline professionals
adapt, implement and even make policy is taken into account (ibid.) and practice
must be seen as a “site of joint action and learning constituted around shared prob‐
lems” (Laws & Hajer, 2006: 412). Many studies have shown this applies equally to
policy implementation in public safety (see for instance: Moors & Bervoets, 2013).
This chapter will show that professionals form their own networks with associated
meaning making and policy creation.
A last theoretical notion refers to local decision-making as the result of a rela‐
tively chaotic and unstructured process, a result of ‘organised anarchy’. Most
insightfully worded by Kingdon (2014), decisions on local policy are the result of
the interaction of various problem definitions, solutions and political processes
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(Kingdon, 2014).1 Instead of seeing policy as the alleged best solution available after
a problem is identified, solutions (potential policy) could exist even before prob‐
lems are formulated. Various solutions lie in wait and problems could be formula‐
ted in different ways. Only when the ‘streams’ of solutions and problems meet and
interact with independent political processes, aided by policy entrepreneurs who
highlight certain problems or solutions over others, a window of opportunity for
specific policy opens, actual choices are made and policy changes (Kingdon, 2014).
Conceived as such, specific policies of municipal disorder policing may be seen as
a solution that had been waiting for an appropriate problem. This model will be of
use, both in describing part of political logic below, and in two case studies dis‐
cussed in chapter 8.2
2 Three ‘logics’ in deciding on municipal disorder policing
Before turning to a description of the ‘logics’ that influence decisions in municipal
disorder policing, a description of the formal bureaucratic organisation and the dif‐
ferent players is needed.
First of all, and as stated above, political decision making and implementation
may be seen formally as two separate realms, with municipal management subser‐
vient to the decisions of politicians. Hence first in line of the formal hierarchy are
political decision makers. Executive decisions on municipal disorder policing are
the responsibility of the mayor and aldermen and are subject to political (council)
debates.
Second in this formal, hierarchical line are senior municipal managers, mostly
from a Public Safety policy department. These senior officials draw up annual
plans and reports, thereby developing concrete policies for the decisions made by
the municipalities’ administrations. In addition, other policy departments such as
Public space or Mobility also develop a (mostly minor) part of the plans for munic‐
ipal officers.
Third in line are the city surveillance agencies themselves. These agencies do
not develop their own policy, but implement annual plans made by the aforemen‐
tioned policy departments. The city surveillance agencies are mostly clustered in a
1. Kingdon partly uses a theory first developed by Cohen, March & Olsen (1972), called the garbage
can model of decision making. In this model “choice opportunities” within an organisation are
seen as “a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by partici‐
pants as they are generated” (1972: 2). As Kingdon further elaborates this basic theory and adds
– among others things – the notions of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ and ‘window of opportunity’, his
theory is used here.
2. Kingdon’s theory has mainly explanatory power for a specific part of the decision making process.
Its rather instrumental and situational focus leaves it insensitive to more structural and cultural cir‐
cumstances that might equally influence decision making processes (a criticism expressed by Muc‐
ciaroni, 1992). Kingdon agreed with this criticism and later adapted his theory by stating certain
institutional frameworks define decisions on moments outside the aforementioned ‘policy win‐
dows’.
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municipal division that comprises other units that also have surveillance and
enforcement tasks – for instance the inspection agencies for the built environment
or of environmental permits.
Finally, teams of municipal officers are locally – at the level of neighbourhoods
and boroughs – embedded through contacts (and in many cases contracts, see
below) in neighbourhood management. This local management decides, in close
contact with the team coordinators of municipal officers, in which areas the munic‐
ipal officers should work.
As said, such formal hierarchical layers can explain only to a limited extent how
and why decisions are made in municipal disorder policing. More important is the
way these various players reason and make priorities, their rationale when it
comes to making decisions on disorder policing. In what follows three such ‘logics’
will be discussed. These are respectively political, managerial and frontline logic.3
2.1 Power to the big players: deciding on disorder policing through political logic
As pointed out in the previous chapter, decisions on disorder policing might start
with a council debate between various political representatives. From a democratic
perspective, one could also maintain that this is the way decisions should be made –
supreme authority should be granted to democratic political decision making by
the city council and the administration of mayor and aldermen (Rosenthal, 1996).
In practice however, political decisions on municipal disorder policing take this
classical form only to a limited extent. Despite the formal hierarchy described
above, particular interests and incidents often appear to dominate political deci‐
sion making. In this respect political logic takes several distinct forms.
Political attention
The more classical way of political decision making on municipal disorder policing
can be found particularly during a series of formative moments. As described in
chapter 5, the formation of city surveillance agencies was preceded by council
debates. In several cases these debates incited by the abolishment of unemploy‐
ment benefit schemes, centred on a ‘call for surveillance’ and the need for munici‐
pal officers who could ‘make a difference’. Another occasion on which politically
motivated decisions are made is with regard to issues of professionalisation. In the
case of Rotterdam for example, the local Audit office published a critical evaluative
report, stimulating important changes in the Rotterdam city surveillance agency
(Rekenkamer Rotterdam, 2012). Likewise in The Hague, concern regarding profes‐
sional standards and the way municipal officers collaborate with police officers led
3. Important to note is that these ‘logics’ pertain to a way of thinking about disorder policing, and not
to specific persons. Hence, managerial logic for instance is not limited to managers, but might also
be found among frontline professionals and politicians.
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to political attention and eventually spawned the formative policy plan Handhaven
op Haagse hoogte (‘Enforcement on a The Hague level’).
In some cities the ideas of particular political key-players, such as aldermen or
board members played a large role. Nijmegen provides an example of a city sur‐
veillance agency that draws a relatively large amount of political attention. Both in
a council debate and through the efforts of a dedicated alderman of this city, Nij‐
megen’s Bureau of Surveillance was established and its orientation qualified as
being connected to notions of ‘hosting’, an approach of disorder policing with rela‐
tively little emphasis on law enforcement and more on reassurance and service
provision (see also chapter 5).
In several cities this political attention for the city surveillance agencies contin‐
ues after such formative moments. In Nijmegen the initial emphasis on hosting had
to compete with subsequent political views. Municipal officers and their coordina‐
tors in Nijmegen point out that consecutive aldermen and mayors have different
ideas about the outlook of municipal disorder policing. Nijmegen’s frontline pro‐
fessionals and coordinators recount stories in which political interference can
directly impact upon their work. In one and the same case one alderman might
highlight strict enforcement, whereas the other sees things differently. Likewise,
diverging political preferences are manifest in daily prioritising. For instance,
when discussing whether citizens’ reports should be responded to immediately. As
one coordinator states,
The [alderman] of public spaces says, ‘take those reports seriously’. [The alderman] for mobility
would say, ‘Don’t go there, we have to make it clear that people can solve it themselves’.
Thus, political notice for disorder policing is dependent on the individual ideas of
one or a few of these political players, making this attention at times rather inci‐
dental, as it could probably change or disappear with the advent of other players.
Incident(al) policy
While such political interference could be seen as inherent in any policy process in
which decision makers are in office for a limited amount of time, ‘incidental con‐
cerns’ also have a second, more literal meaning. In this case policy creation is not
dependent on changing beliefs and views of the politicians involved, but of inci‐
dents in which specific problems come to the fore and specific policy is presented
as a solution. Political decisions here must be understood as the result of the meet‐
ing of different ‘streams’, especially where the solution of new municipal officers is
awaiting an appropriate problem, and this solution is pushed by specific policy
entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2014).
Crucial to understand the impact of incidents on the work of municipal officers
is the realisation that they can be used for a wider range of tasks. Thus in recent
years decision makers started regarding municipal officers as a proper solution to
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new problems. Often mayors play an important part in these decisions. As mayors
are responsible for public safety in Dutch municipal administration, some of them
see a large role in this respect for ‘their’ municipal enforcement officers. Conse‐
quently, these officers are seen as the ‘mayor’s tool’ by some. Here safety indexes
play a big role too. Eindhoven for instance, has long featured in the top-end of the
AD-crime monitor (see also chapter 5). This induced the mayor to invest more in
public safety measures, and likewise to ask more from the (his own – as some may
say) municipal city surveillance agency, hence – at least partly – explaining the rel‐
atively large portion of public safety tasks done by Eindhoven’s municipal officers.
However, in cities that feature less prominently in these indexes mayors are
also increasingly prone to see their own municipal officers as a suitable solution to
new issues and incidents, such as high incidences of burglaries or such divergent
problems as disturbance caused by fireworks, street youth or issues particular for
nightlife areas. Often lobbying by groups of residents and attention in local media
play a large role here (see also chapter 8). Furthermore, this tendency is strength‐
ened by the preferences of both municipal officers and police officers. Thus quite a
few municipal officers and coordinators are eager to subscribe to more public
safety tasks, keen on doing ‘new things’ and want to do more ‘police-like work’.
Such tasks give them a chance to prove they are a professional group that is capa‐
ble of serious work and to shake off their past as alleged dysfunctional employees.
In this respect, these players might be acting as specific policy entrepreneurs. At
the same time, the police are withdrawing from minor disorder issues. According
to many respondents in this study the police tend to extend the category of issues
they consider as ‘minor’, and thus not theirs to address. In this respect it is telling
that municipalities have kept the number of municipal officers on an equal level or
even expanded it since the police reorganisation of 2013, irrespective of the widely
felt urge for cutbacks (Terpstra, Foekens & Van Stokkom, 2015).
They say jump; you say how high
In network terms, the interests of decision makers, officers, officials and specific
groups of residents are of importance in understanding this form of decision mak‐
ing. In that respect, various players form their own implicit network. It results in a
precarious policy frame in which municipal officers are expected to respond to
changing wishes.
A clear example of this is provided by the city surveillance agency in Utrecht.
As a consequence of the large amount of incidental and changing assignments they
get from political decision makers, this agency has changed part of its organisation
into a flexible pool of municipal officers that is willing to live up to changing
demands. These range from running night shifts in what is called the Breedstraat
area (see chapter 8), to patrolling neighbourhoods to detect illegal fireworks, to pre‐
98 Municipal disorder policing
ventative surveillance in neighbourhoods with high incidences of burglaries, car
theft and car burglaries, bicycle theft or vandalism.4
According to some respondents, this political influence puts a lot of strain on
the daily work of municipal officers. A coordinator words his frustration at the
continuous pressure to respond to (political) requests – “they say jump; you say
how high”. In one particular case officers were requested to go to a recreational
lake that got a lot of negative media attention as a result of fisticuffs and the har‐
assment by a group of youngsters. The coordinator says,
Everybody freaks out and yells for solutions that are not supported by everybody. ‘Get it done!’
And we always did, because we thought it was really important and we wanted to make a good
impression. But after a while you can’t keep jumping up. You meet your limitations.
This emphasis on responding to changing wishes and assignments implies that
“choices have to be made,” in the words of many respondents; quite a few priori‐
ties succumb to the abovementioned ‘incidental policy’. An Eindhoven coordinator
explains, “our enforcement apparatus is limited, so we have to make choices”. In
other cities, managers and coordinators assert that an agency that is merely
allowed to implement changing demands and assignments – “running projects all
the time” – makes it difficult to set up a structural form of disorder policing. Others
say that these municipal officers are overwhelmed by the abundance of tasks – the
amount of requests, assignments and demands is just too much, as a respondent in
Utrecht states.
2.2 Power to the figures: deciding on disorder through managerial logic
Managerial thinking
It might first appear that political logic is the dominant rationale of decision mak‐
ing. When discussing local policy with managers and coordinators, they replicate
their position in the municipal hierarchy and maintain they merely implement the
policy made elsewhere.
However, on closer inspection these managers express a specific view of how
disorder policy should be decided upon, representing a second dominant rationale.
Managerial logic shows the influence of a set of specific views and practices, con‐
densed in the belief that efficient management of diverse actors provides the best
(most effective) solution to the problem of disorder (Pollitt, 1993). In fact, managers
in municipal disorder policing often oppose political decision making by tapping
into concepts that can be seen as part of the New Public Management wave. This
specific notion of managerialism appears as an alternative to the centralised state
model, lending bureaucrats technological self-governing capacity in the effective
4. Known as the ‘WAFV team’ (the abbreviation refers to the Dutch words for these offences).
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and efficient organisation of their tasks (Christensen, 2006). It uses terms derived
from business and commerce as a response to alleged ineffective and bureaucratic
public management. This has also permeated city surveillance agencies and
impacts upon the role description of team coordinators and municipal officers
themselves, albeit it in a specific interpretation. Instead of quasi markets, business
models and competition, this thinking here implies an emphasis on (performance)
measurement and the use of managerial tools.
Managerial thinking is not limited to senior managers of public safety depart‐
ments, but can also be found in the accounts of various coordinators and even
frontline professionals (see also chapter 7). Thus coordinators in city surveillance
agencies might speak of themselves as ‘contractors’ and of others as ‘clients’ (for
instance neighbourhood managers), of customers that ‘pay for a job to be done’, of
the ‘assignments’ they have, the ‘lists they have to keep to’, the ‘role they have
been given’, the ‘product surveillance and enforcement’ and the contracts they
have with, for instance neighbourhood management. Likewise, these same coordi‐
nators state for their part that they are clients of other municipal units, for instance
maintenance or street cleaning. A coordinator from Tilburg explains how he is in
touch with the ‘Agency for Public Maintenance’. He explains that a ‘tender’ had
been made, and ‘subcontractors’ have been ‘granted’ the contract to clear rubbish.
As such, the division of tasks is not limited to municipal officers executing assign‐
ments from others, but continues with their managers in their turn instructing oth‐
ers, being bound to others through ‘contracts’, or ‘outsourcing’ tasks to other agen‐
cies.
Managerial logic is most evident in the often heard reference to issues of ‘moni‐
toring’, ‘steering’ and ‘measuring’. Consequently, questions of how and where
municipal officers are needed and – to a lesser extent – how to measure effects of
municipal officers seem to preoccupy many managers and are mostly solved by
reference to standards that are meant to objectify incivilities and disorder. These
objective standards allow managers to control the work processes and the ‘produc‐
tion’ of their organisation (cf. Noordegraaf & Geuijen, 2011). The tendency to con‐
trol is most evident in the use of three different managerial tools – quality of life
scans, citizens’ reports and registration systems.
Quality of life scans: rating the neighbourhood
The first of these often used managerial tools are known as ‘quality of life scans’ or
‘neighbourhood monitors’. As the municipal city surveillance agencies legitimate
themselves through addressing the most common annoyances of residents, they
rely on these tools to manage their disorder policing efforts.
An important part of these scans and monitors are surveys. These are meant to
get a better understanding of how residents perceive their neighbourhoods. In Nij‐
megen for instance, neighbourhood monitors are used to question residents on
general issues of public safety and quality of life. Questions might entail “How do
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you value your neighbourhood?” but also: “Out of ten possible elements, what
annoys you the most?” Likewise, The Hague has quality of life scans to measure
residents’ view on littering and what are bottlenecks and issues that could hamper
their sense of well-being, providing residents with the possibility to rate their envi‐
ronment.
Although opinions on the efforts of municipal officers are not addressed
directly in the surveys underlying these scans and monitors, their outcome does
form an important input for decision making. As such, monitors and scans often
form part of a more encompassing model for planning and control. These are indi‐
cators for target measurement meant to constantly monitor and define results
(Noordegraaf & Geuijen, 2011). In Nijmegen for instance ‘The Enforcement Cycle’
is a managerial tool to ascertain the need for surveillance, and is informed by Nij‐
megen’s neighbourhood monitors. Likewise, The Hague’s scans are used as input
for public safety and quality of life meetings on the level of boroughs, meant to
supplement the citywide priorities for policing with local highlights. In yet other
cases these scans and monitors are used as input for the ‘enforcement meetings’
between local neighbourhood managers, team coordinators of municipal officers
and police officers.
In a few cases the professionalisation of scanning and monitoring has resulted
in specialised municipal intelligence departments. These departments are con‐
cerned mainly with what are seen as public safety issues, such as youth groups,
burglaries or carjacking, plotting maps with the highest levels of reports, com‐
plaints or the worst overall rating by residents. This is done by using, for instance
colour codes and signal lights. As a municipal manager in Eindhoven states, they
have “a sort of dashboard, with real time analyses,” and “reports are plotted on
maps”. Likewise, signal lights changing from green to red indicate more attention
is needed, the hottest areas being the hotspots where – among others things – the
most municipal officers would be needed.
In some cases the outcomes of scans and monitors result in ratings. Although
not each municipality commits itself exclusively to these figures, they do provide
an additional managerial standard used to create a measurable goal – a perform‐
ance target. The Hague for instance, has made it into a goal to upgrade the overall
citizen’s judgment for public space in the city from a 7 to an 8.5 Likewise, managers
in Nijmegen seem to commit themselves to the output of these monitors. “These
neighbourhood and safety monitors will lead the way from now on. These will
have to show if the approach works or not,” a team coordinator says.
It appears that these indicators are one of the prime means to decide where munici‐
pal officers should be deployed. However, these are used but seldom to evaluate
5. Gemeente Den Haag (2011). Handhaven op Haagse hoogte: Beleidsplan voor de handhaving van de leef‐
baarheid van de openbare ruimte. In the Netherlands report figures range from 1 to 10, with 1 being
the lowest rating and 10 the highest.
6 Deciding on disorder policing on a local level 101
the effect of municipal officers’ efforts. Many coordinators and municipal manag‐
ers highlight there are too many factors impacting upon these ratings to use them
as such. Therefore such indicators are not used to account for municipal officers’
actions afterwards, but merely as indications in advance of the areas where they
would be most useful. As such, they may be seen as pre-performance indicators to
determine targets and priorities.
Citizens’ reports and complaints: sorting out the hotspots
A second tool that is often used in decision making consists of citizens’ reports
about disorder issues in their neighbourhood. Municipalities increasingly profes‐
sionalised their information flow by setting up service agencies where citizens’
reports are registered and linked to the right municipal department, for instance
maintenance, traffic support or city surveillance.
Reporting has been further enabled by a nation-wide change in accessibility of
municipal organisations through the establishment of customer support centres.
These centres can be used by citizens to report their complaints and questions.
Since 2005, Dutch municipalities have started to implement a special telephone
number of 5 digits, starting with ‘14’, and followed by the 3 digits of the city’s area
code.6 The municipality of Rotterdam for instance, can thus be reached through
‘14010’, the municipality of Utrecht through ’14030’, and so on.7 In some cities it is
made even easier to file complaints by technological innovations, such as the ‘Bet‐
ter streets app’ [buiten beter app] in Rotterdam.
As these agencies present themselves as the guardians against ‘whatever
annoys citizens the most’, many managers state that residents’ reports are taken
highly seriously. Moreover, many (team) coordinators see these reports as impor‐
tant legitimation for the tasks of their officers. As a coordinator of the city surveil‐
lance agency in The Hague remarks,
We now mark the locations of the reports we received from residents and our own observa‐
tions; those are the [prime sources] for policy, those are the things we address the following
year. […] you can’t tackle it all, so you might as well say, I’ve got several problem areas, and I’ll
give those areas extra attention.
In this respect, rather than paying attention to every single citizen report, these are
collected and preferably used to get a better overview of those areas with the most
issues, the hotspots. Such overviews can then be used for the planning and alloca‐
tion of officers. Many coordinators appear to concentrate on patterns of reports,
more than on individual reports. This ideal of a planned approach, reminiscent of
6. Retrieved from: https://www.kinggemeenten.nl/sites/king/files/KING_factsheet_14.pdf.
7. In 2014 93% of Dutch municipalities had introduced this service line (Van de Wijngaert, Ten Tije &
Jansen 2014 “14+netnummer vanuit burgerperspectief” Centre for E-government studies Universi‐
teit Twente).
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problem oriented policing (see also chapter 2), is often contrasted with ticking off
the reports they receive from citizens (meldingen afhandelen) – the reactive form of
policing in which a municipal officer waits for new reports to which to react. “We
have to wonder whether it is the task of the municipal officer to run after every sin‐
gle report,” as one manager states.
Hence, municipal managers actively try to stimulate citizens to report more of
what is bothering them, thus trying to improve their ‘report-willingness’ (meldings‐
bereidheid). A municipal area manager in The Hague calls these reports their ‘man‐
tra’,
That is our mantra. You send your blue where it’s needed. If you make sure those residents
react only when something’s wrong, and you respond to that in the right way, then you antici‐
pate the demands of society. We do that here by emphasising, if there’s something wrong, call
14070, so every week I can see exactly who called about what.
In some cases, special neighbourhood meetings with residents are organised. This
can be done through projects, for instance through an increasingly popular citizen
participation project called ‘The neighbourhood governs’ (De buurt bestuurt, cf.
Schuilenburg, 2016).8 In this project, first developed in Rotterdam, citizens can
indicate what issues should be prioritised by police and municipal officers. In other
cases, meetings are limited to one evening, but also bring issues to the fore that
concern tasks for municipal officers. Although these meetings and participation
projects serve numerous goals, managers of city surveillance agencies usually see
them as means to collect more information from residents. In the short intermezzo
at the end of this section a particular citizen participation project in Eindhoven is
described (BOX 1).
Registration systems
A third managerial tool for decision making on the deployment of municipal offi‐
cers concerns the use of work registration systems. Scans and monitors are used to
indicate in advance what might be complaint hotspots or areas with a low overall
rating, but managers of municipal officers use these instruments to demonstrate
the effect afterwards.
Many team coordinators express uneasiness at the use of work registration and
target numbers because managers appear to realise that issues as ‘quality of life’ or
‘trust’ (see also chapter 5) cannot be related in an unambiguous way to the num‐
bers of fines and reports that are issued. Nevertheless, these function as a means to
control municipal officers’ activities. A coordinator at the Rotterdam city surveil‐
lance agency discusses his ambivalence,
8. These projects are reminiscent of the CAPS project in Chicago (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997).
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You indicate the domain of law enforcement, so I want to know how many fines have been
written. [Work registration in terms of] hours doesn’t say that much. But the number of fines
doesn’t say it all either. However, I find a whole shift without a single fine hard to believe.
Managers may have a love-hate relationship with target numbers, but in fact do
use these to account for their actions, to determine future investment of personnel
and tasks and to scrutinise individual employees’ actions. As such, tools that are
meant to account for municipal officers retrospectively also predetermine their
actions; often only those activities that can be measured and accounted for are seen
as relevant (Pollitt, 1993).
Summing up the insights of this section, the managerialism in municipal disorder
policing is not fundamentally different from that in other sectors of public policy
(Noordegraaf, 2008; Pollitt, 1993). Here too, municipal managers dominate local
policy and structure the planning of disorder policing by productivity systems of
measuring and accountability (Pollitt, 1993).
Nevertheless, quality of life scans, citizens’ reports and registration systems
function as means of retrospective performance management only to a limited
extent. They appear to have more relevance to providing managerial grip on future
disorder policing, as ‘pre-performance management’. As such, managers state it is
hard to measure the concrete outcome of officers’ activities. ‘Quality of life’ or resi‐
dents’ feelings of security are complex phenomena to which municipal officers can
only contribute in a limited way, and municipal managers grapple with making
sense of the outcome of officers’ activities. Instead, they tend to focus on what can
be measured and what provides a grip on their human resources, even though the
relation between those indicators and the use of municipal officers is far from
unambiguous.
This eagerness to control has at least two effects. On the one hand, municipal
officers are allocated to those areas with low ratings by residents and many citizen
reports without a clear idea of the effect of their activities. On the other hand, man‐
agers seem to prefer output to outcome. Hence, as numbers of reports and fines are
measurable, work forms and activities that are related to these are given prece‐
dence over activities that are less measurable. It leads to a prominence of hotspot
thinking and target numbers over general preventative surveillance or contacts
with neighbourhood residents. In yet other words, the actions of municipal officers
are not evaluated on their outcome in terms of enhanced quality of life or better
ratings, but mostly on their output in terms of work registration and (sometimes)
the number of fines.
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BOX 1: Eindhoven’s citizen participation as managerial tool for extra reports
Some cities actively design policy to enhance the willingness of residents to make
reports. In Eindhoven for instance, residents of ‘action neighbourhoods’ are given a
say in how municipal officers should be deployed by indicating at a neighbourhood
community centre what should be the focus of these professionals. Eindhoven’s
municipal officers participating in this project have been dubbed ‘attention fielders’
(aandachtsvelders).
Professionals and managers both state this approach differs from reactive response to
citizens’ reports. “These people are wearing a uniform and are in touch with the pub‐
lic; they provide service,” a neighbourhood manager states. Equally, professionals
highlight their function as a ‘contact point’ in the neighbourhood, with an emphasis on
‘service provision’. Because these officers are connected to these neighbourhoods they
claim that it becomes easier to have a structural bond with residents. “You are bond‐
ing with those groups. You visit [neighbourhoods] regularly,” an officer says. Resi‐
dents know who these municipal officers are and know they can contact them to share
their complaints with them, others claim. Conversely, municipal officers are satisfied
with the possibility of making agreements with residents.
On closer inspection however, the initiative has also been encapsulated in managerial
logic of planning and control. Residents’ complaints that are collected at the neigh‐
bourhood centre are sent to the city surveillance agency where they are used to plan
personnel deployment. As a result, municipal officers have a confined and fixed num‐
ber of hours to respond to residents’ reports and are but seldom present in their neigh‐
bourhood for more than one or a few hours; they are allowed to address these reports
and then have to move on to their next chore. In addition, various workers are sent to
the same neighbourhood to deal with the reported issues. This appears to have a nega‐
tive impact on their (preventive) presence and the actual contact with residents. More‐
over, according to several respondents the participation projects attract mostly only
the small group of residents that already knows how to approach the municipality and
do so regularly. Although many respondents state this project does enhance contact
between municipal officers and neighbourhood residents, the officers are in the neigh‐
bourhood less than before and only a group of residents already known is involved.
As such, a project that claims to enhance the contact between individual citizens and
municipal officers results in a more controlled work form with employees having to
act more efficiently. “Now you have a couple of hours, whereas you used to have
entire daily periods. And the citizen notices that,” a municipal officer claims. A munic‐
ipal neighbourhood manager expresses his criticism in the same fashion,
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What they should do when they are in the neighbourhood is address anything they come
across […] so go out without any predefined assignments, go to the community centre,
pick up the signals and work on it. They shouldn’t take them to the office, where these
reports are planned into a schedule and are then dealt with four weeks later. It’s hard to
explain that to the residents.
Hence this project appears to have goals reminiscent of community policing, in which
the officers are strongly embedded in their neighbourhood and residents are involved
in local decision making (see also chapter 2). In practice however, officers are still
under a managerial grip. Here the resulting focus on reports as a means to predeter‐
mine the work of municipal officers becomes a goal in itself and clouds other, less
measurable goals.
2.3 Power to the professional: deciding on disorder through frontline logic
The third and last rationale of decision making opposes the alleged objective
means of measurement and reporting so typical of managerial logic. In ‘frontline
logic’ municipal officers (and team coordinators) might even frustrate the designs
of senior managers. They have their own way of defining disorder policing, closely
in line with personal observations and experiences of disorder. Professionals of
various organisations come together and agree on how disorder should be policed,
thereby showing practice can also be a site of joint action, where decisions on
shared problems are made in close coordination between frontline professionals
and based on their own resources (Laws & Hajer, 2006).
From managerial to frontline logic
Many coordinators of municipal officers point out that instruments such as quality
of life monitors provide a limited perspective on “street reality”. A respondent in
Rotterdam states there are all kinds of objective measurements to indicate the effect
of these officers, “you’ve got your absolute figures, you’ve got the public safety
monitor, and you’ve even got the AD crime monitor”.9 However, in his opinion
these indicators do not do justice to “what happens on the street”, to the observa‐
tions and experiences of municipal officers and to the various ways of policing that
might be effective but not measurable, he states.
In addition, respondents claim that residents’ experiences of quality of life are
determined by a wide variety of factors; as a Utrecht respondent remarks, munici‐
pal officers are but one factor among many that could impact upon how residents
rate their neighbourhood. Moreover, local interests distort these scans, as a coordi‐
9. See also chapter 5.
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nator of municipal officers in The Hague says when speaking of residents’ desire to
get rid of a ‘coffeeshop’ (soft drug outlet) in their neighbourhood,
The only thing neighbours want is to get rid of that coffeeshop. That’s their aim. So they’ll ha‐
rass the municipality [with reports]. And if you ask them using a quality of life scan, ‘what do
you think of your living environment?’ Those figures don’t say that much.
Likewise, hesitations about the value of citizens’ reports can be heard. A coordina‐
tor in Nijmegen for instance, states he is expected to send his officers to the neigh‐
bourhoods with the most reports: but in his opinion, those areas do not necessarily
have the most problems. While talking about a relatively well-to-do neighbour‐
hood, he remarks,
Those are the areas with the real nags. In general highly educated people. So when they see an
empty can on the street, they’ll call us, saying, ‘I’m paying taxes for this, come clean it’. […] But
don’t you think there’s too much capacity going to this area? If you compare that with […] the
really deprived neighbourhoods, what are you doing [in that other area]? Do we really have to
respond to every report? Or could we say: ‘why don’t you pick up that empty can yourself?’10
Thus quite a few of these coordinators express unease about the ratio of these fig‐
ures and performance indicators. If they are to decide where to send their officers,
they prefer to use other indicators of disorder. In contrast with these tools for
objective measurement, these team coordinators show more affinity with frontline
work and the observations made there.
Prominence of observations and ad hoc plans
A first prominent characteristic of frontline logic, as opposed to managerial logic, is
that decisions on disorder policing are based on professionals’ observations. When
it comes to issues that need to be addressed, those working on the street know best,
many team coordinators maintain. Disorder and incivilities need to be determined
by their information and contacts in the neighbourhood. Moreover, many of these
coordinators have a background as frontline professionals themselves as municipal
officers or police officers, and at times are eager to ‘go out into the streets’ them‐
selves. The affinity with daily street work leads them to put a lot of confidence in
the street knowledge of their workers, and letting those observations help define
tasks and goals of municipal officers.
Sometimes this is supported by formal policy. The policy emphasis on holistic
policing discussed in the previous chapter is an example of formal policy that
10. Although this quote illustrates an aversion of basing decisions on reports, it might equally be inter‐
preted in other terms. The coordinator quoted here also points out how he ideally pictures the
tasks of his municipal officers or the ‘responsiblisation’ of citizens, a theme that will be discussed
more extensively in chapter 7 and the conclusions.
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acknowledges frontline observations. Thus, in some municipalities officers are spe‐
cifically asked to ‘keep their eyes open’ and to work ‘holistically’, implying officers
are expected to address issues that reach beyond the chores they are assigned that
day.11 A coordinator says about his workers,
So they’re doing parking control and they see some rubbish, dumped illegally, or a lamp post
that’s broken, then they dealt with that right away. In that sense it’s a holistic way of working.
In many cases however, there is but little policy to support this prominence of
observations by frontline professionals.
Secondly, this often implies plans – hardly to be called ‘policy’ – are made prag‐
matically and locally, often in collaboration (or networks) with local coordinators
of different organisations involved. In these cases, different coordinators agree on
their pragmatic approach of local issues and collaboratively develop an idea of
what needs to be done – “creating solutions together,” as a coordinator in Tilburg
puts it. By contacts, based on personal acquaintance, decisions are made. As such,
they speak of “the things they can do for each other”, of “communication” and
“short lines” (direct relations), sometimes because professionals and coordinators
have known each other for a long time, and ‘speak the same language’. These are
specific networks of professionals who decide among themselves how they should
deal with disorder policing. Moreover, in several cases senior managers validate
their yearly plans with the local neighbourhood managers, even though these man‐
agers formally contract municipal officers for specific tasks and numbers of hours.
A team coordinator in Rotterdam for instance, explains the central department of
Public Safety merely “steers on a meta-level,” whereas “the real tuning of opera‐
tional activities is [done] by the area coordinator as link between [requests from
the] borough and the execution by municipal officers”.
These team coordinators usually refrain from making statements about what
would be the overarching goal or the legitimacy of disorder policing. We are “mak‐
ing happen what needs to happen,” as one of them expresses it. Yet they have a
large amount of influence on local decisions on disorder policing. A team coordi‐
nator from Utrecht explains how plans are made in practice,
I am the pivot of [those plans]. I receive input from 15 different stakeholders. And that’s how I
decide on my policy and the employment of my officers. My people deliver input, residents’
reports, housing corporations, the agency of maintenance, the Public Safety department, the
neighbourhood community centre, the police, the neighbourhood police officer, youth work,
street coaches. Those are all partners and I refer to them in my daily employment of workers.
11. Hence, apart from being policy that is geared at citizens’ expectation (as discussed in the previous
chapter), policy that emphasises ‘holistic policing’ may equally be seen as a valuation of frontline
logic discussed here.
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As such, coordinators do not rule out scans and monitors, but merely use them as
input for their meetings with other frontline coordinators and as a supplement to
the observations and signals of their own workers.
Again, municipal policy in some cases is especially designed to support these
networks. In Eindhoven for example, the municipality designed a position entitled
‘attention fielder’ – municipal officers who are assigned to certain neighbourhoods,
and are meant to stay in close contact with designated areas, their residents and
local partners. Likewise, in Utrecht some of the municipal officers are ‘neighbour‐
hood municipal officers’ who have the responsibility for their own specific neigh‐
bourhood. In Nijmegen the function of ‘networker’ has been developed to stay in
close contact with residents and shop owners, and in Rotterdam new policy is also
aimed at the local embedding of municipal officers. In most cases however, it
seems up to frontline workers themselves whether they invest in their network or
see it as their responsibility to stay in touch with other professionals (see also the
next chapter for their views on this matter). In the next box an example of such
frontline logic and the ensuing close collaboration between municipal officers and
police officers is discussed.
BOX 2: Collaboration in Nijmegen city centre
An obvious case of how frontline logic works can be found in Nijmegen’s city centre.
In this area police officers and municipal officers work closely together. Two elements
characterise their collaboration. First of all, the cooperation between municipal officers
and police officers in Nijmegen’s centre area is characterized by the large number of
requests for municipal officers submitted by the local police team. Put simply, this
team lacks the capacity to deal with all issues in this area. This leads some police offi‐
cers to see the Nijmegen city surveillance agency as a ‘police extension’. Municipal
officers in the Nijmegen centre assist the police with issues such as reporting shoplift‐
ers or incivilities caused by loitering youth. Most notably these municipal officers also
address, fine and arrest certain ‘notorious disorderly persons’, a group of homeless
people that stay in a nearby shelter. A municipal officer speaks about these tasks,
Previously, if I were to find someone passed out with a beer, I’d think, ‘Am I qualified,
can I do something?’ I would have called the police. Now, I say, this behaviour is disturb‐
ing, I don’t want it here. And I know this guy, I know why he does this, I can help him
get on his feet. That is something we worked on the last couple of years.
The involvement of municipal officers causes a large ‘grey area’ of tasks between
police and municipal officers, and difficulty in indicating what are the boundaries of
their work, as indicated by a coordinator – “you might run into this or that,” but, he
continues, the assistance of the Nijmegen city surveillance agency happens in a “self-
evident” way,
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It’s not a conscious choice that we fill up some kind of gap. It just happens self-evidently.
And that’s what we work for, so the citizens get the feeling this is a nice place to reside,
work and live.
“Common sense,” he states, “helps do the right thing in coordination with the police”.
A second characteristic of their cooperation is the support of municipal officers by the
police. This is based both on practical preconditions and on personal acquaintance.
Municipal officers have their own room in the police station for making reports after
arrests and police officers brief them three times a week. Thus both occupational
groups are well aware of their respective activities in the centre. To a certain extent,
privacy sensitive information is shared as well. However, these agreements are not the
result of top-down or managerial interference. Likewise legal arrangements appear to
play a minor role. These agreements have a pragmatic character in which personal
acquaintance seems to play an important role. A constable states he generally sends an
email with questions or warnings, for example the description of a shop lifter. “It’s all
public order, and public safety,” he states, “nothing inferior”. Thus for him coopera‐
tion is highly satisfactory,
If I ask them, can you go see if Johnny is sleeping somewhere on a porch, I wouldn’t have
to check it, because they will do it. Also because they find it important themselves. And
the boys in our team would do the same thing.
A Nijmegen neighbourhood manager adds that “the police and city surveillance
agency have found each other” in the centre of Nijmegen, and that most police officers
in the centre would see a municipal officer as “one of them”. Another policeman
defines them as “pals”, “colleagues” and additional “hands and feet”. As such, these
frontline police officers’ clear and vocal need for support and the willingness of the
municipal officers to grant the police’s requests, appear to be very important. The
facilities provided and the smooth handling in the event of an arrest all contribute to
positive cooperation.
3 Tensions and conflicts
Having discussed the three different ‘logics’ that define local decision making on
disorder policing, it might appear these relate to neatly distinguishable realms,
each with its own particular network. However, ‘logics’ do not operate in isolation
and multiple tensions and conflicts can be observed between them. As already
briefly noted, managerial tendencies to objectify disorder could clash with profes‐
sionals’ preferences based on their daily observations. Conversely, senior manag‐
ers in central policy departments at times express frustration at the headstrong
local coordinators and professionals that go about their own business, and make
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their own policy plans. Likewise, the incidental political interference with the work
of municipal officers could cause strain and frustration.
Thus this chapter underscores that conflicts and tensions are not limited to the
formal decision making process in the political arena (Compston, 2009; Rhodes,
1997; Rhodes, 2006; Rosenthal, 1996). Before moving to the conclusions of this
chapter, the two most prominent conflicts are highlighted here – the complaint that
municipal officers are acting too much as managerial extensions, and the difficulty
of policing under political pressure.
Policing the figures?
A regular complaint about municipal officers by partners such as neighbourhood
managers or police officers is that they are focused too much on their own tasks
and merely address those issues they are asked to by their own management.12
They are too much ‘inward’ oriented and apparently have a narrow model of the
resident/consumer as “a bundle of preferences waiting to be satisfied” (Pollitt,
1993: 125). In the opinion of these partners, municipal officers are basically just
‘policing the figures’.
This is partly due to the fact that tasks are split up and divided over numerous
organisations. This leads to a problem that is often referred to as ‘compartmentali‐
sation’ (Dutch: verkokering). Dealing with disorder is not the responsibility of
municipal officers alone. A civil servant in Utrecht for instance, observes this is a
common problem in the area where she works. Various professionals work within
the confines of their own organisation and are reluctant or unable to share their
experiences with other professionals. “We collect loads of information. The city
surveillance agency collects information, street coaches collect information, youth
work, housing corporations,” she states, “but little to nothing happens with it”.
This could lead to a situation in which frontline professionals appear to be locked
up in the goals of their own respective organisations. Thus often municipal officers
work in isolation, without using the opportunities to “deliver their street informa‐
tion,” as a respondent in Tilburg words it.13
Another reason is that the focus of municipal officers on their own assignments
and their lack of interaction with other professionals is strengthened by specific
12. This reproach shows the ‘logics’ discussed here are not connected to specific persons, but indicate a
way of deciding. As such, managerial logic might also be embraced by frontline professionals, and
– conversely – frontline logic might be subscribed to by coordinators or managers.
13. In this respect, the fruitful collaborations described under frontline logic are but one side of the
story. As networks have become essential aspects of the implementation and creation of policy, col‐
laboration between various actors is of vital importance. As indicated by the examples given here
such cooperation might involve professionals from “widely differing backgrounds, with markedly
distinct value preferences” (Laws & Hajer, 2006: 414). Hence, cooperation might become vulnera‐
ble, where “[e]xpectations of reciprocity suddenly seem thin in the face of conflicts rooted in dis‐
tinct histories and organizational identities that must continually be adapted to one another and a
volatile environment” (ibid.).
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characteristics of municipal officers and their agencies. One of these is the apparent
tendency of some city surveillance agencies to increasingly work on a flexible
basis. Through the flexible use of work force, sending municipal officers to various
neighbourhoods depending on changing wishes and reports, the embedding of
municipal officers in neighbourhoods is further hampered (as discussed under
political logic). In addition, many respondents maintain municipal officers’ unwill‐
ingness to look beyond the confines of their reports and figures, is exacerbated by
what may be called their ‘trained incapacity’: “that state of affairs whereby one’s
very abilities can function as blindnesses” (Burke, 1984: 7). Thus often complaints
about municipal officers merely ‘policing the figures’ directly involve their profes‐
sional standards. Uncritically embracing assignments and a narrow approach are
seen as aspects of a profession that is still in progress (see also chapters 7, 9 and
10). As an example, a neighbourhood manager recounts the interaction between
municipal officers and residents during neighbourhood meetings, pointing out that
municipal officers often think and talk about their work in strict bureaucratic divi‐
sions that do not match residents’ experiences,
It’s kind of funny [when they talk about their work], they put it in formal terms […] And then
you see some people look [puzzled], Often [these officers] speak in internal language […] every‐
thing is covered in this formal sauce. You see that people don’t understand it ‘And then he
reports it in the system…and that’s transferred’. And then you get an explanation of the whole
procedure. It makes us laugh sometimes […] Residents just don’t understand who is responsi‐
ble for what in public spaces.
Thus, the tendency to follow up on requests and orders often causes frustration of
partners. They claim many municipal officers are stuck in managerial logic, are
focussed too much on their own assignments and are alienated from actual neigh‐
bourhood problems.
This conflict points out that the managerialist tendencies of some city surveil‐
lance agencies lead to a remarkable paradox. Although these managers and officers
claim they structure processes in such a way as to live up to residents’ wishes effi‐
ciently, in practice they are seen by many as alienated from neighbourhood resi‐
dents because of their managerial view of reality. This is a criticism that is found
more often with regard to managerialism (Pollitt, 1993).
Hotspots and special interests: municipal disorder policing under political pressure
A second recurring conflict is related to the unease with political decisions.
Although some officers might be eager to show themselves as serious officers in
particular problem-ridden areas, many other coordinators and officers state that
the political demands for continually changing and increasing tasks hamper their
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regular work, so that many managers prefer political decision makers to be kept at
a distance (see also: Self, 2000, in: Christensen, 2006).
Neighbourhood managers for instance, sometimes point out that politically
motivated deployment of municipal officers is not in accordance with their percep‐
tion of neighbourhood issues. Political decisions appear to be preoccupied with the
popular images of certain areas, for instance ‘priority neighbourhoods’ or other
areas with a longstanding image of being problem ridden. Thus some hotspots are
determined as structurally needing a lot of investment, whereas in reality those
areas have changed for the better. As an illustration, a neighbourhood manager
points out how political decision makers perceive street youth in his area,
In the past there have been a couple of serious incidents that remain at the centre of attention, a
continuous political pressure to deal with it, involving the police, youth services, whereas
things have really changed for the better. It became a lot safer and not only because there are
fewer incidents, also in the perception of safety by residents. But you still have to deal with the
after effects, the image of this area […] and political decision makers are still guided by that
image.
This is most notable in the case of particular ‘hot’ public safety issues. Street youth
hanging around for instance, is one of those hotly debated political issues, “there is
an administrative ambition breathing down our neck,” a central municipal man‐
ager admits, pushing them to demand more investment of municipal officers on
those issues, away from physical disorder issues. Conversely, this disproportional
focus on those neighbourhoods with a bad image might entail these neighbour‐
hoods are being “cosseted to death,” as a Nijmegen neighbourhood manager
remarks, and areas that are in need of more attention are neglected.
This appears to be an issue that is typical of local governments. Due to the prox‐
imity of city surveillance agencies to political decision making, plans for surveil‐
lance and law enforcement could change according to political preferences, with‐
out the previous plans being sufficiently implemented. Therefore, some notice that
political interference makes the work of municipal officers a lot more difficult
when compared to that of police officers. A police officer in The Hague for
instance, claims the police “are less dependent on how politicians regard us,”
whereas the municipal organisation “needs to weigh everything carefully” (cf. Van
Stokkom & Foekens, 2015). Therefore, these respondents claim political attention in
itself is not the problem, but rather the lack of consistency, the divergent visions of
subsequent politicians, and – sometimes – the tendency to uncritically pay atten‐
tion to whatever annoys residents the most.
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4 Conclusion
In this chapter local decision making on disorder policing was scrutinised. First of
all, the general approach to local decision making was introduced. This chapter
and the chapters that follow are informed by theories of policy networks, street
level bureaucracy and policy as the result of ‘organised anarchy’. In section 2, three
‘logics’ were unfolded through which decisions on disorder policing are realised.
Through describing political, managerial and frontline logic, it was shown that
many different actors have influence, but none of them has decisive power in
deciding on disorder policing in practice.
In the description of the first, political logic, it was observed that decision mak‐
ing might be determined by political interests. In part, this concerns a process in
which decisions on disorder policing are made during council debates and by may‐
ors and aldermen. However, in many cases politically based decisions on disorder
policing are made in more precarious ways, depending on the preferences of par‐
ticular aldermen or mayors. In other cases political interference with municipal
officers might be fairly direct, stimulated by acute problems and incidents. Impor‐
tant to understand this interference is the discovery of municipal officers as a solu‐
tion to problems of public safety. Often the term ‘mayor’s tool’ is used to under‐
stand this top-down interference with local policy. This process is strengthened by
municipal officers’ and coordinators’ eagerness to prove themselves as policing
professionals and the withdrawal of the traditional police from minor disorder
issues. It turns city surveillance agencies into flexibly employable pools of officers
that ‘jump’ at any request coming from the top. This change is looked upon criti‐
cally by some, not least by managers who see their control of municipal officers
overruled by the whims of political decision makers.
In the second, managerial logic, senior municipal managers determine what
kinds of disorder problems should be addressed and how this should be done,
using various means of measurement. Managerial logic shows the influence of a
new public management discourse of contracting and performance management
and the eagerness to control production. It leads to an emphasis on hotspots and
reports. Nevertheless, managers are hesitant to use these means of measurement to
hold municipal officers accountable. As such, quality of life indexes and citizens’
reports are merely the dominant managerial tools through which disorder is com‐
prehended. However, the use of these tools could imply less measurable goals dis‐
appear in the eagerness to ‘police the figures’. Moreover, the complaints of profes‐
sionals of other organisations about some municipal officers being caught up in
managerial logic point to a remarkable paradox. In their eagerness to respond effi‐
ciently to residents’ reports and ratings, in practice municipal officers appear to be
alienated from the very residents they hold in such high regard.
The third, professional logic can be contrasted with this logic as one in which
disorder is actively defined as the result of pragmatic frontline considerations in
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local networks. In this case the most important decision makers are team coordina‐
tors, frontline professionals and partners – such as neighbourhood managers and
police officers. These frontline decision makers often determine disorder policing,
irrespective of what senior managers have indicated. Hence performance is not a
mechanical application of rules and standards, but a continuous response to posi‐
tions and relations as one would find these in concrete situations (Hartman &
Tops, 2005). In this respect, it is also logic that is hard to pin down. Considerations
of higher goals are hard to find among frontline professionals and coordinators
who ‘have found each other’ and ‘do what needs to be done’ in a more pragmatic
way.
These three ‘logics’ of decision making, as well as the tensions between them will
provide the groundwork for the following two chapters. In the next chapter it will
be shown that these ways of decision-making have a notable impact on the views
of frontline professionals. Chapter 8 will further elaborate how these different ‘log‐
ics’ interact in practice by discussing two case studies.
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7 Municipal officers on disorder policing
Introduction
One of the most prominent ideas informing the previous chapter was the notion
that practitioners’ views are unlikely to represent formal policy goals. Chapter 6
showed that frontline professionals often form their own sort of network with
other practitioners, decide on disorder policing in their own manner and often
oppose managerial framings of disorder. The ensuing frontline logic was character‐
ised as a pragmatic and ad hoc way of making decisions. This rationale depends on
the quality of contacts within networks, the direct and personal relations with
other frontline professionals who speak the ‘same language’.
This ‘meso level’ description of frontline logic was meant to specify the struc‐
ture of local policy making. As such, it did not go into detail on the specific inter‐
ests, views and routines of municipal officers themselves. Like many frontline
workers in policing professions, municipal officers have a high degree of discre‐
tionary autonomy – a large say in their everyday work (Bervoets, 2013; Eikenaar &
Van Stokkom, 2014; Moors & Bervoets, 2013). They can and must decide in individ‐
ual cases when they issue a fine, when they merely report or intervene, in what
way they approach citizens. Likewise, they have to consider how to cope with
demands, how to report on their tasks or when and how to consult other frontline
professionals. In this respect, frontline professionals’ views could be in accordance
with frontline logic described before, but municipal officers might equally sub‐
scribe to a managerial or political logic.
This chapter deals with these micro-level views of municipal officers (sub ques‐
tion D). It does so by taking their views as a point of departure and scrutinising
what frontline professionals value the most in their work. Hence sections 1 and 2
discuss their ideas about responsibilities on the one hand (section 1) and contact
with non-compliant citizens in practice on the other (section 2). These sections
show that municipal officers’ views vary widely, even within the accounts of indi‐
vidual municipal officers. The third section will be reserved for a reflection on
these variations, showing that some views bring to mind how police officers
approach their work, but that certain contrasts and dilemmas are characteristic for
this occupational group. Section 4 concludes this chapter.
1 Municipal officers on their responsibilities
The ideas of municipal officers show much similarity with those of regular police
officers (cf. Muir, 1977; Reiner, 2010; see further section 3 below). This might be
related to the fact that municipal officers have a role in society that partly resem‐
bles that of the police. Municipal officers are also subject to demands for law
enforcement, even though they lack the police’s status as the ultimate authority
that can be called upon when force is needed (cf. Bittner, 1970). Moreover, like the
police, municipal officers have a range of options to deal with these demands; they
have various options for supplying policing services and enforcement is but one of
these.
Although this basic distinction in demand and supply is too rigid to capture all
ideas of municipal officers, it does lie at the basis of this and the next section.1
Hence for an important part, this first section deals with how officers look upon
the demands that are made on them. However, instead of merely discussing
municipal officers’ ideas about explicit demands, this section discusses how profes‐
sionals’ view their responsibilities in general. The second section zooms in on their
views on the contact with non-compliant citizens, thereby providing more insight
into what they see as the appropriate ‘supply’ to problems of disorder.
1.1 Addressing annoyances
In the interviews with municipal officers’ the responsibility of dealing with citi‐
zens’ ‘minor annoyances’ plays a prominent role. Hence, this notion runs from pol‐
icy goals (chapter 5), to managerial decisions (chapter 6), to the practice of frontline
professionals.2
A municipal officer for instance, states the same issues are “a thorn in the eye
everywhere,” such as illegally parked trailers, dog litter and household waste.
Likewise, many of his colleagues take it for granted that citizens call the municipal‐
ity about what annoys them most, especially because the police are reluctant to
address these issues. These professionals state that annoyances are reported to the
municipality, not to the police and that they are the authority that has to respond
to them. A municipal officer from Eindhoven summarises residents’ vision of his
work,
1. This distinction is made by Bittner in his analysis of the police’s role in society (Bittner, 1970; Bro‐
deur, 2007).
2. The term ‘minor annoyances’ has a somewhat controversial nature. It is used repeatedly by both
policymakers and professionals as an umbrella term for all those rule infringements that seem to
bother citizens most and that largely define their work (as will become clear in this section). How‐
ever, the addition ‘minor’ suggests these are trivialities that do not deserve too much attention.
This is in contrast to their position at the top of neighbourhoods’ lists of annoyances. Hence, trivial
as they might be on first inspection, they are leading in what bothers neighbourhood residents the
most.
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These residents say […] ‘We don’t see the police anymore, […] but we don’t need to call them.
Those guys from the municipal department are here too and they work at it too. […] they’re not
a bad choice’.
Likewise, a Nijmegen municipal officer pats himself on the back: “citizens say
you’d better call the municipal department, they’ll make sure it’s done”. An officer
from Eindhoven states municipal officers “have more time to dedicate to citizens”
(see also chapter 9). Thus the concept of ‘minor annoyances’ (kleine ergernissen) is
very much part of these professionals’ language, appearing as the prime legitima‐
tion for their efforts. Even more strongly, some municipal officers regard them‐
selves as the extension of citizens’ wishes. “The citizen wants more surveillance
[…] that can never be enough, so it’s good we are here,” an officer from Nijmegen
remarks. “It is important to deliver a good service,” as one of his colleagues from
Utrecht states. In that respect, not only reported annoyances determine their orien‐
tation: some municipal officers think that all residents’ complaints should get their
attention.
As a result, the notion of ‘service provision’ is often heard in professionals’
accounts of their work. Here this appears to imply citizens are depicted as ‘con‐
sumers’. “First and foremost we are there for the people, we are service providers,”
a municipal enforcement officer from Eindhoven states. In some accounts this is
mixed with the new public management concepts introduced in the previous chap‐
ter, as is shown by another officer in Eindhoven,
So you have a little chat and after a while you’ll ask them, ‘Is there any news, are there any com‐
plaints’. And also, ‘How can we do things better?’ That’s the surveillance product, a little piece
of quality; we all have to contribute to that. Quality is also about asking people how we can
make things better.
Many of these municipal officers proudly claim they are more visible than police
officers. They know how to deal with issues of disorder in such ways that citizens
see that something is done about it and that disorder is dealt with swiftly (see also
chapter 9). As in the case of the managers discussed in chapter 6, ‘annoyances’
function as a mantra for many municipal officers.
Between acting as confidants and responding to reports
On closer inspection it appears that this discourse of minor annoyances and ‘serv‐
ice provision’ provides a lot of room for interpretation. For a part, municipal offi‐
cers see it as their task to get in touch with neighbourhood residents, actively try‐
ing to find out what might be bothering them. Officers sometimes leave their
phone number behind with those citizens who report most frequently, or visit
neighbourhood meetings and citizens’ participation projects to make sure residents
know who they are and where to file their reports. Some professionals even see
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themselves as confidants, officials who can be entrusted with reports without hav‐
ing to fear repercussions. They see it as their task to be approachable for residents,
People know they can trust me. If a man at number 8 says something about a man at number 20,
then that stays between the man at number 8 and me. I wouldn’t go to number 20 to tell them
what they are saying about him. You are also a confidant, you have a bond with these people,
and you have to be discrete.
Occasionally, these officers state that they are also there to give people a safer feel‐
ing: “people like it when they see a uniform,” a municipal officer states – although
most municipal officers do not seem to be too enamoured by this type of reassur‐
ance policing (see also chapter 8).
Other officers are equally focused on minor annoyances, but see themselves less
obliged to have direct contact with residents: residents’ wishes are reflected in the
tasks they get from their management. Thus, as opposed to the municipal officers
who see themselves as confidants, others attach more value to the managerial sys‐
tems discussed in the previous chapter. These municipal officers put a fairly strong
emphasis on the implementation of assignments they get from their management:
they do what they are told to and attend those areas from which the numbers of
reports are highest. In that respect, municipal officers highlight they respond to
clear expectations.
These officers emphasise the importance of responding adequately, and some
even tend to compare their agencies with emergency services, even though they do
not receive emergency calls. “Citizens call the municipality for minor annoyances,
as they would call the fire brigade in case of fire,” as one officer puts it. Conse‐
quently, professionals define their work primarily as reactively responding to
reports – albeit with less urgency than the police. A municipal officer points out
how this works in practice,
On the west side of town you have a lot of reports, but on the North side next to none. […] This
afternoon I’ll be in that North part, but after half an hour or so I’ll go back to the West side
again, to tackle the reports there.
Although this does not mean municipal officers tick of their reports uncritically
– on occasion they point out they get in touch with the complainant – the initial
complaint report seems to weigh heavily: “we are a municipal authority, and
everything is reported and we have to respond to those reports constantly,” a
municipal officer in Tilburg claims.
This attitude is most notable in the reference to ‘hotspots’ by municipal officers:
those areas (blocks or neighbourhoods) that show a pattern with a high rate of
complaint reports are the areas that receive most attention. Although these hot‐
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spots are determined by coordinators and managers, municipal officers also seem
inclined to prioritise those areas. “We send our people to the hotspots with most
complaints,” a Utrecht officer says.
In this respect, municipal officers’ views on responsibilities are in line with the
managerial assignments they get. Making plans, consulting others in the neigh‐
bourhood might draw the attention away from these complaint hotspots. Many
municipal officers show themselves loyal to the assignments they get. As a munici‐
pal officer from Tilburg states, they should not make too many complicated plans:
“we don’t need a plan, just get it done”. A Rotterdam municipal officer simply
states, after being asked about newly developed policy on establishing networks,
“I don’t know anything about those things, they are lost on me. You know, I’m
alright with things as they are, as long as I’ve got my job”.
1.2 Expanding responsibilities
Evidently residents’ reports largely dictate professional ideas about what is
demanded of them. However, that does not exclude other notions of responsibili‐
ties.
Criticising citizens’ demands
On occasion – and contrary to the adherence to minor annoyances and complaints
described earlier – in practice municipal officers experience various reasons to
nuance the reports to which they are asked to respond. Sometimes there is quite a
simple reason to do so, a professional from Eindhoven explains,
You would be surprised of what people are reporting, for instance a pile of sand. The weirdest
things. Some bricks that are lying around. You know, the thing is, citizens don’t talk to each
other anymore. If my neighbour leaves her dustbin on our drive for two days, then I ring her
bell, ‘hey neighbour, we put the bin back around the house, ok?’ But people stopped doing that,
so now they call us for all these things.
These municipal officers consider citizens to be highly demanding. Irrespective of
the present efforts by authorities, they keep claiming more investment by both
police and municipality. Like the municipal officer from Eindhoven quoted above,
more of his colleagues point to an ever-growing range of complaints that are filed
with the municipality, and like this officer, other professionals also observe citizens
are increasingly reluctant to address each other.
In response to these demanding citizens, officers point out there is a clear dis‐
tinction between realistic and unrealistic complaints. Some of these insistent citi‐
zens are felt to be unreasonable by municipal officers. Consequently, officers try to
counter citizens’ demands, even to inform neighbourhood residents of what can be
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seen as ‘real incivilities’. Sometimes they address complaining citizens directly and
confront them with their ‘irrational’ wishes.
Moreover, officers lament the lack of willingness among citizens to address one
another and the lack of respect shown to them by citizens. These residents merely
want their complaint to be addressed, and refuse to speak to others themselves. An
officer from Eindhoven expresses her frustration at the thought that she and her
colleagues are complying with citizens’ wishes, but barely receive any gratitude for
their efforts,
We used to be scared when the police drove through our street. But that’s bygone times. It
doesn’t matter if they’re small or behind a walking frame […] Citizens just want their problems
to be solved, from small to large, they report them and they want them to be solved.
This entails a core dilemma in the work of these municipal officers. They have to
find a balance between the focus on annoyances and the irrationality of residents’
wishes they experience in practice. This points to the limits of complying with resi‐
dents’ demands. Although in many respects the work of municipal officers appears
to revolve around a near consumerist vision of citizens (see also chapter 5), and
officers claim they are there to address any and all reports, they also appear to get
tired of constantly responding to these reports. This dilemma will be addressed
more extensively at the end of this chapter.
Broader perspectives: ‘co-creational policing’ and ‘street policing’
Officers who refuse to embrace the reports and demands of citizens uncritically
often air alternative views on responsibilities. Instead of defining their work in
terms of top-down assignments and reports, these officers attach more value to
what was in the previous chapter called their own frontline logic. This generally
takes two different forms.
First of all, some municipal officers are convinced of the need to solve problems
jointly with other professionals. As described in the previous chapter, these officers
form an occupational group that is surrounded by other governmental and non-
governmental partners who are in some way equally focussed on residents’ con‐
cerns – municipal maintenance personnel, community police officers, social work‐
ers, municipal neighbourhood managers and partners from welfare and educa‐
tional institutions.
On occasion, municipal officers state it is of vital importance to collaborate with
these other professionals. “It is not only reports,” a municipal officer from Tilburg
states, “but networking as well”. For example, because their work starts where oth‐
ers stop, as a municipal officer in Eindhoven explains,
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An example is parking issues. The police ignore those, and citizen are increasingly annoyed,
because people have two or three cars these days, so it gets fuller and people start parking on
the pavement. Then we are asked to do something about it. But keep in mind it has been toler‐
ated for years by the police. We can’t just rigorously wipe the streets clean of cars, so we are
always in touch with the community police officer about these things, how we should do this.
In other cases this tendency to ‘co-creation’ might prevail because these professio‐
nals experience a certain level of ownership of their neighbourhood, deem them‐
selves to be responsible because they know the neighbourhood, its residents, and
their problems,
We are the points of reference. If something goes wrong, I’ve got the feeling I can be held per‐
sonally accountable. That may sound heavy, but it is my neighbourhood, my hood, and employ‐
ees working in that hood have to keep it running.
To get things done, they emphasise it is of importance to approach these partners,
to stay in close contact with them, not least because the range of local network
partners in many cases is quite large. Municipal officers state that they only have a
small ‘piece of the pie’ and that it takes a lot of coordinative investment to make
sure all these different partners do not work in their own bubble (see also the criti‐
cism expressed at the end of chapter 6). Thus sometimes municipal officers see
their responsibilities as part of a network of partners, working together to address
issues of disorder.
Second, narrowly defined demands might also be opposed by officers due to an
emphasis on their own observations. Resembling the policy for holistic approaches
described in chapters 5 and 6, the officers who are convinced of this broader per‐
spective state it is of importance ‘to take everything into account’ in their everyday
work. They consider themselves to be “street rats,” as a municipal officer from
Eindhoven puts it. Some even emphasise they are on the streets much more than
police officers (see also chapter 9). These professionals advocate a routine that may
be called ‘street policing’ – an approach of disorder that emphasises what happens
‘on the street’, in the interactions with residents, non-compliant citizens and other
professionals.
Although some cities might develop particular policies for this form of policing
(see chapter 5), the question whether municipal officers work in this way largely
depends on their personal views. In this respect, many municipal officers claim it is
their responsibility to address any and all disorder. “If I drive along the Schubert
street, and I see a big pile of rubbish bags next to the container, I can’t just ignore
that,” an officer in Eindhoven states.
Remarkably, the question whether or not municipal officers have a broad view
of disorder again gives rise to reflections on professional standards. In section 3 of
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the previous chapter it was pointed out that many partners believe that municipal
officers have a narrow view of their work and that this is related to their lack of
professional skills. In contrast, municipal officers themselves stress that they have
evolved from less professional city wardens in the 1990s. These former city war‐
dens here seem to fulfil the function of a chimera, of the unprofessional predeces‐
sors that gave present-day municipal officers their reputation of ‘good-for-noth‐
ings’, having little understanding of what needs to be done to address quality of
life and public safety issues. Many municipal officers emphasise that now they
have a ‘broad view’, that they are capable of dealing with a wide range of enforce‐
ment tasks. Sometimes they say their tasks have expanded and thus became more
interesting. More often however they rationalise their broad view as a result of
their presence on the streets. “You should not look too narrowly,” a municipal offi‐
cer expresses this view, not least because of the image of them held by ‘the citizen’.
“They should see we are dedicated,” an officer from Nijmegen states. “Show that
we address everything and that you can deal with anything”.
To sum up, this section about municipal officers’ ideas of responsibilities shows
that their views are rich in diversity and contradictions. ‘Minor annoyances’ might
largely determine their work, but the generic nature of that concept generates
many different interpretations – contact with residents, focusing on top-down
assignments, coordinating action with professional partners, or an opinion that
should involve any form of disorder in the everyday line of work. Evidently some
of these differences are a result of differences in policy. However, more often they
seem grounded in views that are characteristic for street-level bureaucrats, and
should be seen as the personal allegiance, for instance to managerial assignments
(managerial logic), or conversely, the belief in the direct relations with partners or
the preference for street level signalling and addressing any issue they come across
(frontline logic). This interpretation in terms of street-level routines will be
addressed in section 3.
2 Municipal officers on non-compliant citizens
As said before, municipal officers’ accounts of their work are characterised by a
recurrent (implicit) distinction between views about responsibilities on the one
hand and the approach to non-compliant citizens on the other hand. After having
discussed officers’ views on their responsibilities, this section now deals with their
approach to disorder and disorderly behaviour itself – the non-compliant citizens.
2.1 Decent treatment
If minor annoyances dominate much of municipal officers’ accounts of their
responsibilities, then the word bejegening is one of the recurring terms in their view
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of how to deal with non-compliant citizens. This notion refers to how municipal
officers approach offenders, somewhat unsatisfactorily translated in English as
‘decent treatment’.
In Dutch, bejegening can have different explanations. It can refer to the (formal)
requirements of interaction between officers and non-compliant residents, convey‐
ing the demand offenders should in any case be addressed in a respectable and
reasonable manner. The ‘decent treatment’ in the accounts of these officers appears
to combine this requirement of reasonable interaction with citizens, with subtle, yet
allegedly vital aspects of person to person interaction. Many officers even see this
as the core of their work.
The municipal department of Eindhoven provides a good example of employ‐
ees highlighting this form of ‘decent treatment’ of offenders. One of them explains
bejegening in these terms,
I have learned to [make myself small] in certain circumstances. Anybody can fan the flames, but
[making yourself small] to get someone to your level, so a decent conversation is possible isn’t
all that easy.
Officers repeatedly state that “fining is a last resort”. They keep saying, “our
mouth is our only weapon”, or “we have to solve problems by talking”. They seem
very aware of their limited powers, but also stress the necessity of approaching
every situation through their conversational skills and often with the intention of
solving problems by talking. One of these Eindhoven officers points this out,
You can only do this job if you like people. In fact, we are communication experts; we are busy
communicating all day. Our work consists for eighty percent of psychology, constantly interact‐
ing. So you could march through the city like a bunch of tough guys, [or] just go into those
neighbourhoods in a relaxed way and do what you have to. And that occasionally involves
being strict, but I prefer that other side.
Key in this emphasis on bejegening is the ability to explain the reasons why some‐
one is wrong. Thus, the capability to explain the situation or knowing “how to sell
the fine,” as one officer has it, is vital. The interviews with frontline professionals
are rich with anecdotes of how they managed to solve issues by explaining to peo‐
ple they were crossing a line, and thereby preventing escalation.
The reasons that these professionals emphasise verbal abilities are partly caused by
their limited coercive means (see chapter 1). However, this is but part of the
explanation. More often, municipal officers stress various forms of what in chap‐
ter 5 was called ‘behavioural compliance’; the officers that highlight this approach
claim to regulate behaviour in public space by explaining what those addressed are
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doing that is wrong. Enforcement, so they claim, can and should be done by many
more means than just issuing fines if it is to have a structural effect.
Thus, these officers believe behaviour can be changed for the better with ‘decent
treatment’. Professionals describe their work in terms of basic normative correc‐
tion: they explain why a rule is there, why dog litter annoys people, or why cycling
in pedestrian areas is not appreciated, for the simple reason nobody else does. An
officer in Eindhoven points this out,
You can fine a 14 year old, but you can also ask him, ‘Why are you doing that, do you think
that’s smart? Look at those people’ […] ‘Oh, I’ve been kind of stupid’. Then I say, ‘See, I think
it’s more important that you get it.’ So this way you get more things done than with a fine.
In addition, some of them claim, people are simply ignorant: you cannot blame
them for violating the rules.
Many of the officers who emphasise ‘decent treatment’ of offenders, also claim
it is of importance to be familiar in a neighbourhood. In this case these officers
want to be able to stay in touch with those who cause incivilities, such as residents
who repeatedly place their trailer on the pavement, who refuse to put their dog on
a leash or youngsters who keep coming back to spots where they were asked to
stay away. They want to be able to act conditionally in respect to these ‘uncivil
characters’, by warning first before fining. An approach that is only possible when
they are known in neighbourhoods, they claim.
2.2 Contextual judgment
The emphasis on verbal skills results in a view of disorder policing as a personal‐
ised interaction with a strong emphasis on ‘decent treatment’, seen here as effective
communication between officer and non-compliant citizen. The chief reason for
this emphasis seems to be that the goal of a change of behaviour is deemed to be
more important than strict enforcement of these rules.
In the narratives of municipal officers, this accent is often related to another
notion – an understanding of the circumstances of an offence. Municipal officers
seem to infer that any structural change of behaviour demands a certain level of
empathy. As such, many municipal officers who stress behavioural change note
the importance of the context of a rule infringement.
Obvious as it might be for any policing profession, it is remarkable how often this
basic notion of contextual judgment is highlighted by municipal officers. Even
more, its most common denominator ‘discretionary autonomy’ has also gained a
firm foothold in the language of these professionals. “Every minute is another
case,” a municipal officer in Eindhoven states.
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Officers legitimate this idea of contextual judging in different ways. The type of
neighbourhood might dictate their approach, they claim. A residential neighbour‐
hood is in need of a different approach than the city centre, a municipal officer in
Eindhoven explains: with neighbourhood residents one can make an agreement,
whereas the temporary visitors deserve a stricter approach. Often the need for con‐
textual judgment and an emphasis on being consistent and thorough in fining are
combined in one account. Many professionals experience this as the core dilemma
of their profession.
An additional reason for taking context into consideration might be that some
municipal officers see themselves as “the city’s business card”; municipal officers
claim they are less “brief in discussions”, “less harsh than the police” and are able
to “cool things down,” for instance because they claim they want people “to have a
pleasant feeling”. On several occasions they express reluctance to fine in the reali‐
sation this might scare people off. “The police are much stricter, but we are also the
city’s business card. People need to enjoy their stay here, you want them to come
back,” a municipal officer in Utrecht explains.
Thus these officers are willing to take into account a wide array of reasons why
a fine is not suitable, for empathic reasons (a non-compliant citizen might have dif‐
ferent reasons for not following the rules), pragmatic reasons (a fine does not
always provide the best solution in a given situation) or for the reason these offi‐
cers do not see themselves as mere enforcement officers, but as ‘hosts’, as the wel‐
coming committee of the city centre.
2.3 Consistent enforcement
A final commonly heard view of disorder policing among municipal officers
appears to stand in stark contrast to this last approach: the tendency to focus on
consistent enforcement. Again there appear to be several reasons why municipal
officers embrace such an approach.
First, the urge to fine consistently for rule infringements often directly follows
from an unconditional adherence to the complaint hotspots in municipal officers’
beats. Put simply, municipal officers see reports on minor annoyances as their
prime responsibility, and as these minor annoyances are structured in a pattern of
hotspots, it seems evident to employ a consistently repressive approach in these
areas. Thus, officers respond to demands by offering what they can in terms of fin‐
ing. A municipal officer from Tilburg for instance, even expands the concept of
‘hotspot’ to mean more than just a location. “A hotspot means we really focus on
some infringements. […] some things are really not allowed, we fine for those
things right away”.3 In this respect, a strict approach to rule infringements is the
3. This professional probably mistakenly expands ‘hotspot’ to mean more than a geographically
defined area designated for intensified policing. Nevertheless, this quotation is illustrative for the
embrace of strict enforcement that follows a close allegiance to assignments.
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simple result of adhering to demands, adapting policing responses directly to the
demands these officers receive (see also chapter 10).
A second frequently heard legitimation for consistent fining is rooted in behav‐
ioural assumptions about the effect of fining. Zero tolerance policing allegedly con‐
veys a symbolical message. It helps to convince other residents they should not lit‐
ter, put their rubbish outside too early or should put their dog on a leash. Munici‐
pal officers assume their actions will not go unnoticed and residents tell each other
about them. Repression in terms of consistently fining would have a general pre‐
ventative, psychological effect of deterring others from showing the same disor‐
derly behaviour. “You can tell that fining has an effect, people talk about it,” as a
municipal officer says.
Third, embracing strict law enforcement might again be rooted in a somewhat
resigned and cynical worldview, albeit here in terms of a loss of respect for basic
norms. Officers often think the only way to prevent people from disregarding
these norms, is by deterrence: conveying the message disorderly behaviour will
not be tolerated. A municipal officer from Utrecht speaks of a structural normative
decline, in Dutch commonly referred to with the peculiar term verhuftering, the
‘loutisation of society’,
The other day one of the fines we issued was for a pub-crawler who kicked and tore a rubbish
bag. On purpose […]. This loutisation of society is a normal thing. I said, ‘What if they do this
on your doorstep?’ ‘Yeh, that stuff happens, it happens daily, will be cleaned the next day,’ [he
responded].
What these municipal officers indicate here is that people are incorrigible, but their
behaviour can be controlled by influencing their choices: if the chance of a fine
increases – for example for not cleaning your dog’s litter – people might do it by
themselves. In some cases this idea of incorrigibility is attached to specific ‘target
groups’ and municipal officers make an explicit division between honest, compli‐
ant citizens on the one hand and those groups needing policing on the other hand
(this target group policing is addressed in the box below and in the next chapter).
Finally, tendencies to consistent enforcement are strengthened by (implicit) con‐
siderations about municipal officer’s authority and the wish to be ‘taken seriously’.
As a municipal officer, so they state, you want to project a consistent attitude. It
would impact negatively upon your image if leniency in one case is alternated with
strictness in the other. Thus many municipal officers are content with a strict
approach for reasons of clarity. Members of a specific group of municipal officers
for instance, who oppose lenient approaches to street youth (see chapter 8), empha‐
sise that consistent enforcement of street youth is a lot clearer,
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I like it. At the beginning we were really searching. […] Are we supposed to get in touch with
these youngsters, or do we just go out to observe? Now I can say, we are youth enforcement
officers; we have to go the repressive way.
As a result, municipal officers can often be heard wishing for more powers, so they
can enforce rules consistently and do not lose credibility in the eyes of neighbour‐
hood residents. Also, some maintain, the citizens want it. “You are in uniform, it is
expected of you,” an officer states (see further chapter 9 for officers’ considerations
on their powers).
In summary, frontline professionals defend consistent enforcement on varying
grounds, ranging from a focus on hotspot areas, the assumption that it would con‐
vince other residents to comply, to the wish to be taken seriously.
Although the contrast to the previous approach with its emphasis on explaining
rules and trying to structurally change behaviour for the better seems great, the
overlap in these two ideas is in fact quite large. Both approaches to rule infringe‐
ments are basically about situational control of misbehaviour. The difference lies
merely in what is seen as the most effective way to do so: by trying to influence the
reasoning of offenders or by giving disincentives. As an officer from Nijmegen
states, “it’s all about behaviour. And behaviour becomes a habit, and we want to
curb those habits”.
BOX 3: Target group policing
An example of consistent fining by municipal officers is provided by the growing role
these officers have with regard to ‘disorderly persons’. Municipal officers in an
increasing number of cases are assigned the policing of designated target groups.
These are groups of repeat offenders (or ‘repeat rule infringers’) whose presence
and/or behaviour appear to distress residents and for which the regular police cannot
realise sufficient capacity.
Although municipal officers were previously merely allowed to report to the police
about the whereabouts of these groups, they are getting increasingly more responsibil‐
ities in target group policing, such as fining, deterring or even arresting them so they
can be subjected to restraining orders. Examples in this study are a group of municipal
officers in the centre of Nijmegen who deal with clients from a nearby shelter for
homeless people (see also the box in the previous section), the night-time policing of
drug related issues in the city centre of Utrecht and youth enforcement officers in Rot‐
terdam.
Especially in the latter cases, officers ground their approach in ideas about ‘deviant
characters’. These ‘characters’ – mostly street youth, homeless people, drug users and
drug dealers – by their appearance and their function in the street scene are defined as
targets, as ‘police property’ (Reiner, 2010). Here too professionals evince a somewhat
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cynical view as they are convinced of the incorrigible nature of this group of perpetra‐
tors. Thus, although there are gradations, the basic view of these groups is evident:
these are ‘junkies and drunkies’, street youth who hang around, incorrigible characters
that bother innocent bystanders and neighbourhood residents and need to be fined or
deterred. A municipal officer who operates on nightshifts in the city centre of Utrecht
words it as such,
Those folks from the nuthouse, they all hang around here. They also walk through my
street, walking around like zombies. Then I wonder, why do you set these folks free?
Others really think it’s bad the way we deal with them. They think they should be
allowed to be like this. Until they pee over their front door. Or that they drop their pants,
[showing it] to people, women, children, whatever.
Again the somewhat cynical stance on incorrigibility can be heard among these profes‐
sionals. Most youth enforcement officers, for instance, are convinced of this harsh
stance. Preventive action, support, ‘giving youngsters chances’: it does not work. They
had their chance, this youth enforcement officer tells me about street youth in his
neighbourhood,
Those kids don’t accept a thing. [Previously] we used to send them to others if we saw
any issues. And we were putting a lot of energy in one group. But after a while you find
out they don’t take their chances. Then we were told to go repressive. […] Those kids get
crazier too. I had a 12-year old with a sexual offence the other day.
The next chapter deals more extensively with two of the cases briefly mentioned here,
showing there is more to these views than the personal opinions of the officers
involved.
3 Municipal officers and police officers
The findings in this chapter show that municipal officers are subject to a large vari‐
ety of demands and incentives, resulting in various tensions, contradictions and
even dilemmas. The most prominent of these is the contrast between an emphasis
on the wishes of citizens on the one hand and expectations of consistent law
enforcement on the other hand. As a result, municipal officers for instance, might
see it as their responsibility to be present for the citizen (so that they can address
their annoyances), but it is this same citizen who might be prone to parking his car
on the pavement or unleashing his dog where he is not allowed to do so. Another
tension concerns that between a demand to take assignments seriously and the
context of specific rule infringements. Thus, officers might be dedicated to consis‐
tent enforcement in hotspots, whereas in practice they might experience a moral
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conflict when they notice someone who broke the rules within the confines of this
hotspot can hardly be blamed for this.
Neither these tensions, nor officers’ responses to them are wholly unique to the
frontline practice of municipal disorder policing. In fact, all street-level bureaucrats
experience dilemmas in their work and develop routines and coping mechanisms
to deal with them (Lipsky, 2010). In this respect, the views described here might be
a way of legitimating the street-level routines that municipal officers have devel‐
oped to deal with high demands (Lipsky, 2010). An emphasis on assignments and
work rules for instance, might be a defence against a plethora of demands coming
from citizens, partners, colleagues and coordinators. Defining work as merely
‘responding to reports’ in this respect could actually be meant to limit responsibili‐
ties, and protect municipal officers from other demands (Lipsky, 2010: 149).
Opposed to this, other views expressed by municipal officers may be seen as forms
of non-compliance with assignments and managerial expectations (ibid.: 17).
Hence, the emphasis on ‘street policing’ and ‘co-creational policing’ might be seen
as the way municipal officers legitimate a routine that gives prominence to their
own observations and to the requests from other professionals.
In addition, the similarities between the beliefs of municipal officers and those
of police officers are particularly striking. Many of the descriptions here resemble
the various types of professionals described in classic ethnographic studies on
police. Hence, some of the core characteristics of police culture described by Reiner
(2010) can be found in the accounts of municipal officers described above. For
instance, the way many police officers appear to look upon their work with a
“sense of a mission” (Reiner, 2010: 119) somewhat resembles how municipal offi‐
cers see themselves as the last professionals who are willing to pay attention to citi‐
zens’ complaints about annoyances. Likewise, the closely connected cynicism –
“the despair felt that the morality which the police officer adheres to is being ero‐
ded on all sides” (ibid.: 120) – appears to be in accordance with the resigned and
cynical views held by some of the municipal officers quoted above. In addition, the
emphasis on consistent enforcement echoes with what Reiner calls ‘the new centu‐
rion’, ‘responding to reports’ may be compared to the ‘uniform carrier’ and ‘co-cre‐
ational policing’ has aspects of what Reiner calls the ‘professional’ (and what Muir
calls ‘the reciprocator’; cf. Muir, 1977; Reiner, 2010).4
Likewise, the categories used by municipal officers seem in accordance with
previous police research. Although “simplifying their clientele and environment”
(Lipsky, 2010: xii) is again a common trait of street-level bureaucrats in general,
these categories also have a remarkable resemblance to those used by police offi‐
cers. The idea of ‘police property’ – “low-status, powerless groups whom the dom‐
inant majority see as problematic or distasteful” (Reiner, 2010: 123) – for instance
4. As well as the divisions of numerous other authors, as Reiner himself remarks in his comprehen‐
sive work on police culture (Reiner, 2010).
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seems to coincide with what was observed here in the case of ‘target group polic‐
ing’. Equally, municipal officers often subscribe to a rather pragmatic or even
opportunistic standpoint, for instance in addressing whatever they come across
during their beats (as described under ‘street policing’). This stance resembles the
“conceptual conservatism”, notable among police officers, with their “pragmatic
short-termism” and aversion to “analytic approaches” (ibid: 132).5
Nevertheless, the range of views of municipal officers is not strictly comparable to
those of police officers. In fact, and as stated above, municipal officers tend to high‐
light notable differences with the police and consciously create an image of their
own occupational group, while contrasting this with a ‘police culture’.6 For
instance, unlike what Reiner (2010) says about American police officers and Terp‐
stra & Schaap (2013) about Dutch police officers, municipal officers claim to be less
prone to action, thrill and sensation.7 Furthermore, seeing complaining citizens as
‘rubbish’, as some police officers appear to do (Reiner, 2010) is at odds with munic‐
ipal officers’ alleged dedication to residents’ annoyances. Also, they claim to be
less macho than police officers and the often heard emphasis on ‘decent treatment’
also seems to contrast with the “sexual boasting and horseplay” that characterises
the views of some police officers (Reiner, 2010: 128).8 In contrast to the police,
municipal officers would say, they are more patient.
Furthermore, the specific combination of being utterly dedicated to citizens’
reports (at least, allegedly more than the police) and being focused on law enforce‐
ment in other cases, seems to entail more of a contradiction for municipal officers
than it does for police officers. Municipal officers’ uncritical ways of addressing
citizens’ annoyances might lead to conflicts with professional standards, as has
been noted above. Moreover, there are additional reasons why municipal officers
might emphasise strict law enforcement more than the police do. Among these are
the dominance of hotspot thinking, the lack of options for more structural solutions
to disorder due to their limited powers, and the fact consistent enforcement in their
case adds self-efficacy to their vulnerable occupational pride and the ‘proof’ they
have developed into a type of officer that needs to be taken seriously.9 These points
will be addressed more extensively in chapters 9 and 10.
5. This standpoint appears to be more typical for American police officers, than for Dutch police offi‐
cers. Terpstra & Schaap (2013) note that Dutch police officers tend less to such ‘anti-intellectual
pragmatism’.
6. This will be addressed more extensively in chapter 9.
7. In chapter 8 it is shown that the views of some municipal officers are at odds with this self-image.
8. Again Terpstra & Schaap (2013) observe such machismo might be of less relevance for the culture
of Dutch police officers.
9. See also Thumala, Goold and Loader (2011) for a comparable quest for legitimating strategies
found among private security officers.
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4 Conclusion
This chapter discussed how municipal officers look upon their work. By discussing
their views on responsibilities and on non-compliant citizens it showed the prac‐
tice of municipal officers is highly diverse, containing strongly contrasting beliefs
and perspectives. Nevertheless, several characteristics appear to be dominant.
The first section showed the notion of ‘annoyances’ has found its way into the
discourse of municipal officers. Having the status of a guiding principle through
which they legitimate their work, it also proves to be a principle with a number of
differences in interpretation. Some officers maintain these annoyances are best
ascertained in close contact with neighbourhood residents, actively getting in
touch to find out what is bothering them. Others see the objective complaint
reports that are processed by their municipal colleagues as proper reflection of
these annoyances: they prefer to keep close to these reports, ticking off the hotspots
with the most complaints.
Although this orientation on citizens’ wishes is the predominant concept in offi‐
cers’ accounts, other officers deem their tasks to consist of more than these annoy‐
ances and put demands in a broader frame. They actively oppose what they see as
nagging residents and loathe citizens’ reluctance to solve issues themselves.
Instead, these professionals might see themselves as part of a more encompassing
group of professionals who are occupied with neighbourhood problems and
annoyances – ‘co-creational policing’. Others highlight a more pragmatic stance on
responsibilities: they see themselves as frontline professionals who are confronted
with a wide range of violations in their daily work on the streets. Any and all of
these they see as part of their responsibilities. Thus, their view of responsibilities
may best be described as ‘street policing’.
In the second section of this chapter, the views of municipal officers were fur‐
ther scrutinised in their approach to non-compliant citizens. Again, the differences
seem great. Most officers highlighted the importance of ‘decent treatment’ [bejege‐
ning] in their day to day contacts with people who do not comply with the rules.
They express an almost psychological take on interaction and the assets of devel‐
oping subtle and nuanced verbal abilities. Mostly these officers do this as it will
enlarge the chances for more structural behavioural compliance. Closely related to
this, these professionals note the importance of taking the context of rule infringe‐
ment into consideration. Acting conditionally is the consequence of this idea: fin‐
ing happens only when agreements made earlier or warnings are disregarded.
Again, whatever could promote behavioural compliance seems to determine their
interventions. Lastly, a sizeable group of officers highlights consistent enforce‐
ment. On the surface this approach seems to contrast with the other approaches,
but although they do so for different reasons – including a dedication to hotspots
and an eagerness to project authority – considerations about the behavioural effect
of consistently fining also plays a large role. In box 3, consistent enforcement was
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equally associated with ‘target group policing’. Officers who are occupied with
such forms of policing deem consistent enforcement suitable when it comes to des‐
ignated groups of regular perpetrators.
The chapter ended by comparing municipal officers’ work views with those of
police officers. This section started by observing that municipal officers’ beliefs
might be meant to support their street-level routines. In addition, similarities with
police officers’ views were described. Like police officers, many municipal officers
seem to imbue their work with something of a mission, at times hold cynical views
and appear to use categorisations, often with a sense of pragmatism. Nevertheless,
despite these similarities, municipal officers emphasize views that are unique for
their profession. Moreover, the tension between ‘service provision’ and ‘law
enforcement’ appears to be more apparent for these officers.
Looking back upon this analysis, this chapter is at odds with the image of this
occupational group as it is sketched elsewhere.10 Instead of insecure and hesitant
wardens with few powers and a lack of professional standards – as some still seem
to believe is the case – these municipal officers show a remarkable self-conscious‐
ness when it comes to their work. Put simply, they clearly claim to know what they
are doing.
Diverse as their views might be, they are still clearly defined by two prominent
characteristics. One is the tendency to highlight citizens’ minor annoyances as
legitimation for their work. A specific, almost consumerist view of citizens as cus‐
tomers defines many of the opinions of municipal officers.11 The second prominent
characteristic is the pragmatism of these officers, focusing on those spots with most
complaints and preferring any approach that might be effective in regulating anti-
social behaviour. These characteristics might well be strengthened by managerial
thinking discussed in the previous chapter. In the concluding chapter these aspects
are reflected on more extensively.
10. See for instance the reports of local Audit offices mentioned in chapter 1.
11. Although this emphasis on citizens’ concerns may also be partly rhetorical. In this respect, this
chapter did not deal with the question to what extent officers’ daily work is in accordance with ide‐
als about ‘citizen oriented policing’. The next chapter discusses some tensions between different
views of officers as they express them in interviews or on the streets.
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8 Municipal disorder policing in hotspots
In the preceding chapters various dimensions of municipal disorder policing have
been discussed – national developments in chapter 5, local decisions on disorder
policing in chapter 6 and the beliefs of individual municipal officers in chapter 7. In
this chapter these dimensions recur in the study of two specific cases of municipal
disorder policing.
A general reason to single out two cases is that the dimensions discussed so far
influence each other in practice. The tasks and activities of municipal officers are
often influenced by both political preferences and managerial aspirations. For
instance, a political urge to address specific forms of disorder might lead to more
emphasis on target group policing. Likewise, if political decision makers have indi‐
cated residents’ estimation of some neighbourhoods has to go up from a 7 to an 8,
managers attach more value to quality of life monitors in deciding where to send
their officers. Hence the various dimensions discussed separately earlier, mutually
influence each other. Therefore to better understand how different actors on differ‐
ent levels might interact, a more comprehensive approach is needed, for which
case studies provide the best opportunity (Swanborn, 2010).
In addition, this chapter deals with two specific forms of municipal disorder
policing – a team of youth enforcement officers in Rotterdam and municipal offi‐
cers in Utrecht who are policing issues that are related to drug trading and home‐
lessness. These cases were selected for various reasons. First these policies provide
an opportunity to study the practice of hotspot policing, one of the dominant forms
of municipal disorder policing, as should be clear from the preceding chapters.
Another reason to select these cases is that they show how political logic works in
this domain. This political decision making deserves greater research focus, all the
more because the previous chapters dealt predominantly with managerial and
frontline ‘logics’. Lastly, studying these cases provides an opportunity to scrutinise
target group policing, a form of disorder policing that borders on police work and
as such provides an insight into how municipal disorder policing might develop in
the near future.
This chapter is structured in five sections. In the first section the two cases are
described, as well as the impetus to policy changes, showing how changes in local
political decision making, residents’ reporting and incidents play a large role in
defining the problem. Next, section 2 shows the importance of managerial interfer‐
ence. Policy changes are also the result of managerial ambitions and wishes. Fol‐
lowing Cohen, March & Olsen (1972) and Kingdon (2014), these sections under‐
score that a new policy will be viable only when certain problem definitions corre‐
spond with proposed, often already existing, solutions. In addition, this section
discusses how managerial control over local policy has increased. In section 3, the
effects of policy changes on the daily work of municipal officers are discussed,
pointing to an increased emphasis on information gathering and on deterring ‘tar‐
get groups’. Section 4 discusses professionals’ experiences and views, indicating
several tensions between these experiences and strict assignments. In the final sec‐
tion, the findings of this chapter are summed up.
1 Policy changes: incidents, politics and angry residents
Chapter 5 showed that municipal officers in general have a limited set of tasks that
mostly concern physical disorder issues, such as littering or parking violations. The
cases in this chapter show that municipal officers deal with different tasks. In par‐
ticular circumstances municipal officers are given responsibility for particular hot
issues, involving heavier tasks with more responsibilities, more risks and (often)
involving more powers. In these cases the impetus for these new policies cannot be
understood without taking the context of civic unrest and political interests into
account.
Policing street youth: street coaches and youth enforcement officers in Rotterdam
The first of these hot issues discussed here are incivilities caused by street youth. In
recent years the Netherlands has seen an increasing concern over anti-social behav‐
iour of youth in public spaces and many interventions and new professions have
been developed to deal with this issue of ‘youth hanging around’ (Dutch: hangjon‐
geren). Likewise, city surveillance agencies are increasingly willing to accept tasks
that are related to street youth, even though these issues were initially seen as phe‐
nomena too complex and even dangerous for municipal officers to deal with.1
The municipality of Rotterdam is one of the forerunners in using its municipal offi‐
cers for street youth. In 2011 this municipality saw the introduction of a project
entitled street coaches in which municipal officers were given special tasks regard‐
1. For more extensive discussions on national developments in thinking about street youth, see for
instance Koemans (2011) and Martineau (2006).
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ing street youth.2 Remarkably, this project was established long after problems
with street youth had been recognised by the city council. Hence the reasons for
introducing these street coaches initially had little to do with political attention, but
more with available funding and managerial opportunism.
Following a continuous (national) debate on anti-social behaviour by Moroccan
street youth, the national government provided new grants for local governments
to address these issues. These funding opportunities were warmly welcomed espe‐
cially by the staff of the city surveillance agency. These grants provided this agency
with an opportunity to counter a negative image sparked by the critical conclu‐
sions of an Audit report about municipal officers and their lack of professional
standards (see chapter 5). New street coaches could function as images for a new
type of professional, locally embedded and capable of nuanced judgment. The
police’s reluctance to become further involved with street youth and heavy cut‐
backs for local youth work provided further incentive for the Rotterdam city sur‐
veillance agency to bolster this role. Furthermore, installing municipal workers
(instead of private contractors) for the specific goal of addressing the trouble
caused by street youth would enable the Rotterdam administration to manage and
steer their own officers.
Thus these street coaches would assume an in-between-position as ‘extra hands
and feet’, between the purely preventative approach of youth workers and strict
enforcement by the police. Moreover, the efforts of the Rotterdam city surveillance
agency to change their image triggered a particular approach, highlighting group
behaviour, youth culture and the specific circumstances of street youth.
Although the conditions for these new street coaches seemed to be good, their
function description as ‘street pedagogues’ did not last long. In fact, the involve‐
ment of Rotterdam’s city surveillance agency with youth did increase, but their
approach changed considerably. At the end of 2014 it was decided that the number
of municipal officers allocated for dealing with street youth would be increased to
25. Their names however, changed from ‘street coaches’ to ‘youth enforcement offi‐
cers’.
On the surface this change seems to be political. With a newly elected city coun‐
cil the approach to street youth became more focused on strict enforcement, reflec‐
ted in the title of the recent youth policy programme, loosely translated as The
threatening stick.3 In addition, the most recent alderman responsible for Public
Safety made dealing with anti-social youth a more prominent goal. As a senior
manager states,
2. The term ‘street coach’ is originally an intervention designed in Amsterdam. In recent years this
professional has been introduced in many other Dutch municipalities, often with different goals
and tasks. As opposed to the case discussed here, mostly private contractors are hired for this func‐
tion (Loef, Schaafsma & Hilhorst, 2012).
3. Gemeente Rotterdam (2015). Stok achter de deur.
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[The alderman] is keen on repression. ‘Care? Assistance? Whatever. I want to make those neigh‐
bourhoods safer again. All that trouble experienced by residents, I don’t want it,’[he says]. So
it’s seen much more from the residents’ perspectives and less so from what youngsters might
think.
In addition, public safety issues as such appear to have a large electoral draw, as
several respondents emphasise. Thus council members would probably be more
eager to pay attention to residents’ reports that concern such issues. In Rotterdam
this seems connected to the popularity of one particular political party – Leefbaar
Rotterdam. This party, holding the most seats in the city council and part of the coa‐
lition at the time of research, is mentioned by many as an example of a political
party that is susceptible to neighbourhood residents that directly report their wor‐
ries to them. It was this party that seems to have been responsible for a new
approach to street youth.
Moreover, mayor and aldermen in Rotterdam are prone to address public
safety issues with special attention for the experiences of residents. In Rotterdam it
seems something of a tradition to address public safety issues quickly and ‘hands
on’ (even before the much discussed ‘regime change’; cf. Tops, 2007). More
recently, political decision makers tend to ‘descend into neighbourhoods’; in
staged meetings the mayor or the alderman for Public Safety meet residents of
those areas considered to be ‘hot’, to listen to their grievances and to address
alleged dysfunctional professionals on the spot. Rotterdam has invented several
means to improve the connection between mayor/aldermen and neighbourhoods
with pressing issues, such as a ‘Core team’ (Dutch: kernteam) and the ‘Steering
group safety in the neighbourhood’ (Dutch: stuurgroep veilig in de wijk). A senior
municipal manager tells about these innovations,
The alderman wants to feel the problems in the neighbourhood better, really to descend on the
neighbourhood, talk to people, what is your problem and how can we solve it. Then a lot of
different interests start to play a role.
In the ‘Steering group public safety in the neighbourhood’ residents meet the
mayor, the chief prosecutor, the police chief, an alderman and the head of the
municipal department of Public Safety. These officials then address the most press‐
ing issues more quickly and without the alleged slowness of the bureaucratic sys‐
tem.
These interventions tend to speed up the pace of measures being taken,
respondents state. Some would go as far as saying this is a typical change in politi‐
cal prioritising these days. A municipal manager sees it as the Pavlov reaction of
modern day decision makers. “It is always assumed that what a resident says is
true, and needs to be taken seriously”. This shift in prioritising, he adds, seems
irrespective of political beliefs of the mayor himself, but is characteristic for the
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change in decision making as such. Most importantly, by putting residents’ con‐
cerns at the centre of attention the policy concerning street youth changed. As
such, it provided one of the circumstances that contributed to the shift from street
coaches to youth enforcement officers.
Dealing with drug related issues, homelessness and nightlife in Utrecht
The impetus for the policy changes in Rotterdam shows a lot of similarity with the
changes elsewhere. The second case in this chapter is drawn from the city centre of
Utrecht. In the Breedstraat neighbourhood a group of municipal officers has been
dealing with issues of drug trade, homelessness and nightlife in the centre of that
city.
This area is particularly problem ridden. It contains a street with prostitution,
several coffeeshops (soft drugs outlets), a shelter for homeless people and a high
concentration of bars and nightlife locations. Many disorder issues had been
mounting in this area for several years. A civil servant characterises this neigh‐
bourhood.
Why did things in the Breedstraat area appear to get out of hand? Not because we had most
trouble, but because it was all concentrated in a very small area. Utrecht has a very fragile and
small inner city centre. The Breedstraat area became some sort of a meeting point [of problems].
Also because the area around the central station, another meeting point, was redeveloped. So all
of it ended up in this area. And it is a hard neighbourhood due to all the nooks and crannies.
Most of these issues were related to the use and trade of drugs. In response the
municipality had been taking measures since 2008, measures such as street man‐
agement to stimulate economic development and physical adaptations of public
places to make the area less attractive for loitering drug dealers and users. In 2010
the mayor of Utrecht introduced area restraining orders for the individuals causing
most trouble in this part of the city.
However, these measures were deemed to be insufficient. Distress among resi‐
dents kept mounting. Despite earlier interventions, residents’ complaints grew
dramatically between 2009 and 2011. In the course of 2012, and under great pres‐
sure from the city council and mayor, a set of additional measures was introduced.
These ranged from the involvement of municipal officers for extra surveillance,
extra camera surveillance, closer surveillance by the police of drug dealers and
users and the involvement of public health partners for closer monitoring of inhab‐
itants of the hostels for homeless people. In addition, in 2012 the mayor appointed
the area as a ‘public safety risk area’, enabling organised stop-and-search actions
by the police.
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Thus the involvement of Utrecht’s city surveillance agency in the course of 2012
should be seen as part of a wider municipal effort to restore order in this part of
town, through intensified surveillance, contributing to the fining of a group of
repeat offenders (referred to as ‘target group members’) to help issue area restrain‐
ing orders and (eventually) to walk night shifts.
Like Rotterdam, the influence of a group of neighbourhood residents is vital to
understand these changes in policy. This group had been reporting on incivilities
since around the turn of the century, trying to increase pressure on Utrecht’s
mayor, aldermen and council. A plethora of letters, signed petitions, manifestos
and even problem analyses sent to the city council conveyed the message that the
measures being taken by the municipality were not satisfactory, stating politicians
and city council were merely fighting the symptoms. Hence the same group of resi‐
dents kept asking for more measures to address the troubles in this area. Eventu‐
ally this continued pressure led to the staging of a ‘Council information evening’
(Raadsinformatie Avond), initiated by council members to obtain more information
from neighbourhood residents.
During that evening a sense of political urgency developed. A neighbourhood
manager recounts that evening as something of a turning point. “Very heavy, with
residents and shop owners standing up on the benches, yelling how bad things
were”. It provided a clear occasion for upset neighbourhood residents to voice
their frustrations. This made members of the city council acknowledge the sense of
urgency that residents were experiencing, as a police constable recounts.
Someone from the childcare was there, telling stories about parents and kids being confronted
with junkies. Entrepreneurs made their point about junkies hanging around in front of their
doors. Residents who were not amused about the junkies on their doorsteps. These things never
got priority before.
The worries of residents voiced (or shouted) on this particular evening caught the
attention. A few days later all representatives of Utrecht’s political parties signed a
resolution asking the mayor and aldermen to intervene with extra measures.
Hence, this case can also be seen as an illustration of policy established through
the close contact between neighbourhood residents and the city council. “These
residents are in close contact with the city council […] personal acquaintance
works best,” a municipal manager states. These ‘shorter lines’ might also be estab‐
lished by the ability of residents to organise themselves. Utrecht has ‘neighbour‐
hood councils’ for instance. In the case of the Breedstraat area this council seems
highly active, well-organised and well-acquainted with both political representa‐
tives and civil servants. A civil servant tells about his contact with one of these
neighbourhood residents, Mr. Z.
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It happened quite often, on our department someone would say now and then, ‘guys, we need
to look this and that up, Mr. Z. has rung again’. He was a bit the pain in the neck for the munici‐
pality. But he did know how to get his point across. He knows how to do that, is educated, and
doesn’t accept simple answers. He keeps asking questions, in a charming, but in a nagging way
[…] He also asked me to help him. So I advised him […] I spoke openly with these people,
because I think a citizen has a right to that. […] I told him you can defend yourself as a neigh‐
bourhood, to meet your opponent legally well-founded, for instance by setting up a foundation.
So they did.
In addition, as in Rotterdam, the proximity between mayor, aldermen and these
neighbourhood residents has changed. The same respondent explains the mayor of
that time was keen on visiting neighbourhoods to become informed about the
issues there: “We went there to ask, what is going on, what do you think should
happen to improve things here”. As in Rotterdam, Utrecht’s respective mayors
seemed increasingly willing to listen to ‘the citizens’ and take their concerns seri‐
ously.
2 Managerial interests
Both cases suggest that a combination of incidents, increased pressure by residents
and the willingness of politicians to respond to them are the main contributors to
policy change. However, these new initiatives cannot be understood without the
role of municipal managers; those players appear to be the ones who truly enabled
and initiated these new approaches of disorder.
Managerial interests and ambitions
In the case of the street coaches, initial plans were largely drafted and implemented
by a local manager for the policies on street youth. These local managers were part
of Rotterdam’s boroughs, administrative units with their own elected council. Thus
the initial projects for street coaches were the responsibility of local managers,
largely independent of political interference. Civil servants decided how and
where to develop this project, in close accordance with the designated borough for
this pilot scheme, Delfshaven.4 As a result, this first borough had ample room to
experiment with the new approach, whereas other boroughs had no street coaches.
However, senior (and central) municipal managers increasingly considered the
differences between boroughs as undesirable. They had little insight in how the
issues with street youth were tackled and what exactly worked in these local poli‐
cies. Put simply, the city central department of Public Safety wanted to have more
4. Delfshaven was an area that was qualified as one of the ‘Focus neighbourhoods Moroccans’, one of
the ‘Youth attention neighbourhoods’, one of the ‘focus neighbourhoods with Safety issues’, and
one of the ‘focus neighbourhoods with Social issues’ (Bouziane & El Hadioui, 2012).
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grip on how street youth was dealt with.5 This demand was obviously increased by
political pressure, but a vital moment in achieving this came from outside Rotter‐
dam when boroughs as administrative units were abolished by the national gov‐
ernment in 2014.6 This change in organisational structure provided a chance to
strengthen the grip on local policy. In the case of local youth policy it implied a
more direct link between central senior managers and local managers dealing with
youth issues. Consequently, the local managers in youth approach became ‘experts
on neighbourhood safety’ who were directly accountable to the central department
of Public Safety. A manager points out that this led to a better overview and more
hold on what was happening in Rotterdam’s boroughs with regard to youth,
The mayor, the head of police and the public prosecutor now know exactly what youth groups
we have […] and with the disappearance of the boroughs, the central Directorate is responsible.
We have a better overview, and we report more often to the city council.
In addition, the larger role for central management contributed to the shift to youth
enforcement officers. These new officers would get a stricter task description, and
their role in helping to downscale the city’s youth hotspots would have to become
clearer. This led to a more distinct and more controllable division of tasks among
frontline professionals, in which the municipal officers would get the piece of the
pie that merely concerns law enforcement, whereas the elements of youth policy
concerning ‘risk factors’ such as early school drop-outs or domestic violence were
defined as belonging to other professional domains. The same manager says,
We tried to make the policy programme more repressive and to get rid of care and assistance.
Now it’s only about surveillance in public places […] Locally it might be a bit more complicated
now, but I think it’s more pure.
Some respondents state that a street coach who is also enforcing rules would cause
“confusion with the audience”. It is easier to “draw one line,” as a senior manager
points out.7
Several changes coincided and combined for this change in policy, for another
solution for the same problem to surface. As a result, new youth enforcement offi‐
5. As such, the street coach projects may well have ended due to a lack of insight into their effect. See
also Eikenaar & Van Stokkom (2014) for a more extensive discussion of this criticism on street
coaches.
6. Apart from Rotterdam, the city of Amsterdam also had boroughs. From 2014 these are no longer
political entities, but merely administrative commissions (bestuurscommissies; cf. Van Ostaaijen,
2013).
7. Another development that might have also influenced the decision to discard the term ‘street
coach’ – although hard to actually prove – is the influential criticism of street coaches in a study of
municipal quality of life policy (Lub, 2013). Hence, the change to the term ‘youth enforcement offi‐
cers’ might also have a semantic ground.
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cers are less in touch with residents, fine more often and are less keen on getting in
touch with youngsters preventively. The changed approach will be discussed more
thoroughly in sections 3 and 4 below.
In Utrecht the convergence of political and managerial ‘logics’ also played a large
role, as the political urge was also augmented by managerial ambitions and
wishes.
Acknowledging the sense of urgency among a group of residents of the Breed‐
straat area, Utrecht’s mayor at the time seemed inclined to look for a manageable
group of officers that would be willing to run extra surveillance shifts. Especially
since – as in Rotterdam – the police refused to be the sole party responsible for
intensified surveillance. Going even further, claiming to have insufficient capacity,
the police demanded extra effort from the municipality. This support was provi‐
ded by Utrecht’s municipal officers.
Most importantly however, the ambitions of the city surveillance agency itself
pushed for the involvement of municipal officers. In fact, the management of
Utrecht’s city surveillance agency took the initiative. One of their managers was
quite vocal about his ambitions. “I said, mayor, if you think we won’t be able to
pull this off. Well, I will only try harder”. This agency did not merely execute the
mayor’s decision, but showed assertiveness in the design, establishment and
implementation of the new approach.
These developments resulted in a tougher profile for Utrecht’s municipal offi‐
cers’ involvement in this project. More ‘firm’ officers were attracted from other
teams. “You need people who know how to do these things,” a team coordinator
states. At first, this involvement of workers happened on a voluntary basis, but
eventually all officers with a ‘BOA – qualification’ were supposed to be involved
with these shifts.8 The extra surveillance of this area started with dayshifts. Gradu‐
ally, after resolving several organisational hindrances, shifts on Thursday and Fri‐
day night were introduced. Tasks mainly concerned uniformed presence, fining
alcohol possession and consumption, dealing with street prostitution and report‐
ing on issues for which they were not allowed to fine, such as dealing drugs. This
implied that municipal officers were mainly policing ‘target group members’, such
as drug dealers, homeless people and/or drug addicts. In addition, these officers
were supposed to assist with the area restraining orders by consistently fining tar‐
get group members.
The two cases – the youth enforcement officers and the municipal officers in the
Breedstraat – area show how several ‘logics’ interact in the decision to involve
municipal officers for new tasks; both political priorities and managerial ambitions
play a large role. Thus in Rotterdam the general changes in youth policy were as
8. See chapter 1 for an explanation of this qualification.
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much a result of the (partly) self-imposed proximity of mayor and aldermen to
specific neighbourhoods / residents, as of a wish for stricter management and con‐
trol. In Utrecht such factors likewise contributed to new policy for municipal offi‐
cers: pressure by a group of residents, municipal officers’ willingness to take on
new tasks, the high ambitions of the city surveillance agency and the reluctance on
the side of the police to be the sole party responsible. In the words of Kingdon
(2014), political priorities and new problem definitions provided a window of
opportunity for specific civil servants to launch their solutions. Most notably, in
both cases it led to stricter enforcement, an emphasis on ‘target group policing’ and
a tough approach of (potential) offenders.
It is important to note that the coalition between political and managerial actors
does not mean that they necessarily agree. Bearing in mind what has been said in
chapter 6, some (local) managers could feel overruled and frustrated when other
solutions are side-lined. Likewise, they might see these processes as implying
unfair outcomes. “There is at least as much trouble [in another neighbourhood],
and maybe even more. I can’t explain the amount of energy for this neighbour‐
hood, only because it’s a political wish,” a local manager points out. In this respect,
the influence of reports of a specific group of residents plays too large a role in the
eyes of some civil servants: other areas would deserve at least the same amount of
policing. Due to, for instance a lack of fruitful contacts with the city council or less
willingness to report on behalf of residents, these areas do not get the same amount
of attention and lack the intensive approach. As one senior manager puts it, refer‐
ring to a specific square,
[This square] has been designated as a problem area for years, but in our analysis of statistics
and in our contact with our colleagues it always had a low score. However, a lot of people who
live there are [well acquainted with] political players and know how to get their problem on the
agenda. And it was one of these locations with a lot of Leefbaar Rotterdam voters, who had those
contacts […], and who know how to get their point across.
Here the clash of managerial logic with an eagerness to control and measure pro‐
cesses (and products) with political short-term and emotional thinking is evident.
Nevertheless, the general tendency to embrace strategic thinking in terms of hot‐
spots is undeniable. This has a great impact on the organisation of these projects in
general and frontline work in particular.
Tightening control
A notable effect of the enhanced role of managers is more control: a greater empha‐
sis on general measurement, more top-down control of frontline professionals and
the introduction of local safety managers who need to account to their senior man‐
agers.
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First of all, the heightened attention for the issues described above has led to
tighter control and measurement of local policy. In Rotterdam senior managers
introduced clearer and more measurable goals, for instance to diminish the num‐
ber of so called ‘youth hotspots’ from 15 to 4, and the number of citizens’ com‐
plaint reports by 25%.9 In Utrecht extra measurements have been introduced to
assess the level of incivilities in the Breedstraat area. In 2009 a baseline survey was
held, followed by extensive surveys in 2011, 2012 and 2014, and the involvement of
a consultancy bureau in 2013, evaluating the measures taken until that time,
mainly by interviews with professionals. In the municipalities’ own surveys resi‐
dents, shop owners and passers-by were questioned, the traffic monitored and
police reports scrutinised.
Second, tighter control has led to a stricter role for professionals. In Rotterdam’s
case various organisations have long since been involved.10 Previously, these pro‐
fessionals were all coordinated by the borough’s own manager youth approach.11
With the introduction of a special model, called the ‘cappuccino model’, the
department of Public Safety tried to specify and divide the respective roles of these
partners more strictly in several consecutive steps. These steps go from mild and
benevolent approaches to stricter enforcement (referred to as opplussen, ‘scaling
up’), representing the different layers of a ‘cappuccino’. Local youth work, organis‐
ing leisure activities, can be scaled up to the flexible and ambulatory urban team of
youth workers for hotspots [Stedelijk Team Jongerenwerk] focusing exclusively on
incivilities. Next, youth enforcement officers can be sent in if the powers of youth
workers are seen as insufficient, especially if the groups involved are classified as
‘anti-social’ or ‘causing hindrance’. The last step consists of the police, mostly if
youth groups are classified as criminal. Although the Directorate Public Safety
already introduced this model before street coaches were replaced by youth
enforcement officers, the emphasis on this approach became stronger. The respec‐
tive tasks of the different partners involved have been distributed more distinctly,
with a clear role for each partner to play. Contact with reporting citizens for
instance, is now a responsibility for youth workers, and youth enforcement officers
are merely allowed to deal with the incivilities themselves, not with those who
report it. In comparison, the collaboration in Utrecht’s Breedstraat area seems less
9. Policy programme Stok achter de deur. The department of Public Safety appoints hotspots by consid‐
ering the answers to questions in the safety index that address local residents’ feelings of insecur‐
ity, and by grouping three categories of figures on objective public safety derived from the police
registration system: residency of juvenile suspects for various offences, locations of offences com‐
mitted by juvenile offenders and ‘incidents youth incivilities’ as reported to or observed by the
police.
10. Different types of youth workers, ‘square coaches’, the police’s youth sergeant, the neighbourhood
police officer, ‘neighbourhood fathers’, regular municipal officers, street coaches / youth enforce‐
ment officers, at times professionals from housing corporations and ‘city marines’.
11. This municipal manager was responsible for assembling reports from partners and for the so-called
Beke list. Together with a local police officer and youth worker this manager assessed the youth
groups in the borough as to whether they are ‘anti-social’, ‘causing hindrance’ or ‘criminal’.
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strictly structured, although control also became tighter. Regular briefings of
municipal officers by the police and meetings between police, municipal officers,
public health professionals and the neighbourhood manager were introduced. To
monitor and develop the new approach a policy team of various partners held reg‐
ular meetings during part of the project’s running time.
A third element showing that senior managers exert more grip is the introduc‐
tion of local managers who are directly accountable to their central managers. In
Utrecht a municipal safety manager has the predominant role among all partners
involved. This manager is in touch with all relevant partners, and is the lynchpin
between decision makers, the police, the department Public Safety, professionals
who have to follow these orders and a consultative group of neighbourhood resi‐
dents. In the case of the Breedstraat area it is partly to the credit of this manager
that the preconditions for the involvement of municipal officers were met (cf. Eike‐
naar & Van Stokkom, 2014). In Rotterdam the relatively new function of the ‘neigh‐
bourhood safety expert’ fulfils this role, albeit mainly through closer steering of
frontline professionals.12 These new managers develop strategic plans, specify the
roles of all the professionals involved, chair meetings where partners share infor‐
mation on individual youngsters, evaluate several goals and sub-goals in that plan
and – most importantly – have to account directly to the senior managers of the
Directorate Public Safety using their strategic plans as “the guideline we have to
account to,” as a public safety manager states, “followed by an evaluation to see
what we accomplished and what are the bottlenecks”. As such, these public safety
managers seem to have more influence on what the municipal officers do than
their own team coordinators.
With a characteristic example of NPM speech, one of these team coordinators
emphasises that the city surveillance agency merely implements the policy made
elsewhere,
The market demands it, the department of Public Safety. There are more and more situations
where rules are broken, where other ways of approaching, de-escalating, the preventive
approaches apparently are not seen as effective anymore, and then we are sent in.
As such, political and managerial ‘logics’ seem to strengthen each other: council,
mayor and/or aldermen might demand more central control and municipal man‐
agers provide the means for control. As those politically involved tend to grant
senior managers a more prominent role, they tighten control: all frontline profes‐
12. As opposed to Utrecht, contact with political decision makers is a responsibility of senior managers
in Rotterdam.
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sionals are mainly meant to play a well-defined role and to show that public safety
issues are addressed by the municipality.13
3 Daily work: strict role definitions
In the cases described here, expectations are fairly clearly defined. With quite a lot
of political pressure, a strong, top-down emphasis on hotspots and the eagerness to
address these, municipal officers get strict assignments and know what is expected
of them. This raises questions about the impact on their daily work.
In this section it is first pointed out that municipal officers’ daily work is
defined by a strict task description. This results in a particular focus on information
and on an emphasis on deterring ‘target group members’. In the next section, sec‐
tion 4, municipal officers’ own ideas are analysed.
Collecting and sharing information
A first characteristic of municipal officers’ clearly defined role is a particular focus
on information, underscoring their specific position in the network of partners. In
Rotterdam for instance, youth enforcement officers spend a lot of time collecting
information about youngsters and sharing it with partners. Whereas the street
coaches were often seen as falling short in this respect (cf. Eikenaar & Van Stok‐
kom, 2014), youth enforcement officers spend a great deal of time with what they
call ‘drawing youngsters out of anonymity’. This means mainly obtaining informa‐
tion about individual youngsters at the hotspots, asking for their IDs and docu‐
menting their whereabouts and possible misbehaviour.
Moreover, the youth enforcement officers use this information in a different
way than the former street coaches. Whereas street coaches emphasised the cir‐
cumstances of a youngster and tried to gain their confidence, youth enforcement
officers are less interested in such matters. Background information is generally
not collected to know more about the youngsters’ circumstances, or to show them
opportunities for care or assistance. These officers stress they are only interested in
such information to ‘use’ it: to reprimand them when they are on the streets when
they should be in school, or to be able to threaten them with exclusion from the
activities of youth work when they cause trouble. A youth enforcement officer
points out how he sees his role in this respect,
13. As noted in the first section, political and managerial logic are not always in line. In Rotterdam for
instance, second thoughts can be heard when it concerns the distribution of scarce resources.
Although managers state they have been able to identify the most troubled areas, some of them
particularly find it hard to draw full attention to what they see as the real objective hotspots, espe‐
cially in the case of a hotly debated subject as incivilities caused by street youth. The requests for
enforcement officers are seldom totally unjustified, a senior manager says, but youth is not the
main problem in every case.
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To get to know a [youngster’s] background story, you need to gain his confidence. That’s a task
for youth work, not for us. If you get into a situation that demands a fine, you’ll lose that confi‐
dence again. So it’s no use to gain it in the first place. […] On an individual level, we don’t [get
really acquainted]
Also in the case of Utrecht’s Breedstraat area the focus on information seems to
have become stronger. Here too, the role of municipal officers with regard to this
information is predefined. Initially, these officers met the police in their briefings to
share information on the ‘target group members’, for example about who has an
area restraining order. Utrecht’s municipal officers had access to a police file with
all ‘suspects’ and relevant information.
This sharing of information happens mainly with one thing in mind – to rid the
streets of these target group members. Moreover, professionals from public health
care and the shelters for homeless people were also involved for this reason. Thus
at the height of the coordinated efforts, police, municipal officers and field workers
in healthcare met every two weeks coordinated by the neighbourhood safety man‐
ager, exchanged more information about who causes trouble so that this could be
transferred from ‘blue’ to ‘white’. This gave a better overview of the ‘target groups’
and how to control them better. As a civil servant states, “you can also limit trouble
by taking people out of that situation, confine them and place them in halfway
houses”. When the issues caused by these target group members diminished after
several years, the various organisations involved stopped their close collaboration.
The absence of issues in public spaces meant information collection and sharing
was no longer seen as important.
Thus the frontline work of municipal officers is for an important part about col‐
lecting information and using it for fighting the anti-social behaviour of street
youth or removing target groups from the streets.14 Whether youngsters or home‐
less people were referred to care or social assistance by officers “totally depends on
[individual professionals],” in the words of a Utrecht municipal officer. In general
however, they do not appear to see it as their assignment to think of ways to
address the problem other than by law enforcement. An officer in Rotterdam indi‐
cates their assignments leave no room for doubt, “Our task is just to monitor anti-
social behaviour in the hotspot-areas”.
Deterring target group members
This leads to the second aspect of the work of municipal officers. On their shifts
these officers focus largely on hotspots, as these are the areas where most target
14. There was insufficient room to investigate whether the approach to ‘target group members’
changed all together. It would have required a more thorough study of the approach of – for
instance – youth work or health care.
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group members are likely to be found.15 Patrolling these hotspots, officers deter
and fine their target groups, following them around, almost in a game-like manner.
Municipal officers compare the relation with their ‘target groups’ to a ‘cat-and-
mouse’ game or a ‘harassing contest’. An observation in Rotterdam –
We approach four Moroccan boys. It is a windy and cool evening. The officers told me in
advance that the streets might well be empty on days like these, but we encounter plenty of
youths hanging around. This is the third hotspot we visit; a secluded, small courtyard, surroun‐
ded by three and four story residential buildings. The boys are standing on the other side of the
park, among a broken garbage can and some litter. We approach them peddling on our bicy‐
cles. Three immediately walk away upon seeing us, one stays put. He responds snappily, with‐
out being addressed. “I can stand here, I am waiting for my sister,” he says, looking grimly at
the officers. He loiters around the bench. One of the officers waits until the boy saunters away.
As this is a hotspot, the officer tells me later, he would certainly have fined him if they had
more back-up. With just two enforcement officers and no idea as to whether the police could be
here soon, he decided to avoid the risk of a fight and to send the boys off.
In each of the hotspots certain areas are prioritised – hotspot locations. During
their shifts the youth enforcement officers constantly visit these streets, squares or
parks, travelling around, mostly by bicycle if the weather permits it.
Although some respondents want youth enforcement officers to use their pow‐
ers more often, these officers themselves claim they fine a lot more than their pred‐
ecessors, the street coaches. They state that loitering in doorways, urinating in pub‐
lic or smoking weed are frequently fined. In this respect, their limited powers do
not stop them from addressing youths for more offences than those for which they
are authorized, such as the use of soft drugs. In these cases an officer points out,
they look for ways to express it as ‘anti-social behaviour’ (overlast),
Smoking weed is tolerated in the Netherlands, but not in a shopping centre or close to a play‐
ground. Then it’s anti-social behaviour [overlast]. Especially when residents reported it. Such
things are mostly known to us and the police, but you have to delineate it clearly, or it will be
dismissed.
This application of their limited mandate is not uncommon. Officers also stretch
their mandate to address loitering in other, non-public places, such as the hallways
of flats where some youngsters take refuge during bad weather. Although not a
public space, officers scan and visit these spots using keys provided for them by
the housing associations.
15. For the case of Rotterdam it must be noted there might be considerable differences between neigh‐
bourhoods, depending on the preferences of Experts Neighbourhood Safety or individual youth
enforcement officers. For these case studies I have only been able to join shifts in two boroughs.
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As a result youngsters are constantly deterred, and youth enforcement officers
follow them, for instance in the staircases of these flats, “It’s hard to catch those
youngsters in those flats. They know them really well and might escape through
the fire-escape on the other side”.
This idea of hotspot policing and deterring target groups, can also be noted in
Utrecht’s Breedstraat area. Although Utrecht’s city centre and its problems with
drug dealers and drug users are of a different nature, there are important similari‐
ties in the ways that these problems are addressed by municipal officers in both cit‐
ies. While talking to two municipal officers about their work, they assure me they
know how to deal with these target groups,
“It works just by being present”. He points at one side of the table. “If these guys walk here, I
would stand there,” moving his finger to the other side. “If they proceed, you cycle along with
them. Nice and easy. They will go crazy”.
As in Rotterdam, deterring and sometimes fining target group members are the
dominant approaches at hotspots. Here too, their presence seems largely dictated
by these target groups. Put simply, they follow them around. As an officer states,
“We’ll see who wins the harassment contest”.
Utrecht’s municipal officers also have limited powers. Like their colleagues in
Rotterdam, they look for other ways to address, deter or fine target groups. Again,
the most notable example is their approach to drug use. Although these officers are
not mandated to fine for violations of the Opium Act, they have found innovative
ways of dealing with loitering drug dealers and users. Two officers explain how
this works,
A: If you are a dealer, and I can’t fine you for your drugs, but you are cycling on the pavement,
I’ll give you one for that. Just don’t hang around here. Get out of here. [And] if you’re annoying
enough, I’ll give you one [at night too]. I can decide for myself when to write a fine. But I can’t
do anything that concerns the Opium Act. I can’t confiscate a spliff. A police officer can.
B: We look for the right way of fixing them up with a fine.
A: We can make it really hard for them, so it won’t be interesting for them to loiter around.
The repeat offenders – “our little friends,” as some officers call them – appear to be
well acquainted with the municipal officers. One officer even claims that they
know when officers are on patrol and when they are inside for a break, “they don’t
take any risks”. One of the effects is the moving of ‘target groups’ to other areas.
Municipal officers speak of a displacement effect. On their shifts officers can be
seen to adapt to the changed situation and the Breedstraat area is now a minor part
of a much larger area in the city centre where these enforcement officers are asked
to patrol.
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4 Views and experiences of frontline workers
Approving of tough strategies?
As is apparent from the previous section, both in the Breedstraat case and in the
case of the youth enforcement officers in Rotterdam the work of municipal officers
is dominated by close monitoring of target groups and a strict approach to these
people. Especially the approach by youth enforcement officers is a far cry from the
street coach approach. It raises the question of how officers themselves qualify and
experience this stricter approach.
At first sight, municipal officers seem satisfied with a more repressive, and in
their opinion, clearer approach. In Utrecht for instance, most municipal officers are
convinced that a tough zero tolerance approach works, both with regard to the tar‐
get groups and the designated area. An officer says that area restraining orders
were needed to keep things ‘liveable’. “Increasing numbers of those people were
coming, it was piling up”. They are also keen to apply the rules decreed as ‘zero
tolerance’ in designated areas concerning, for example alcohol, even when some‐
one is not necessarily seen as part of the target group. The ‘public safety risk area’
appointed by the mayor is sufficient legitimation in these cases, for example to
drive any sleeping individuals out of the station hall or to fine anyone with an
opened beer bottle, target group or not, as was apparent during observations.
However, on closer observation professionals do express doubts and even dis‐
content with the demands made by their management or political decision makers,
for example because their assignments do not provide them with enough work to
do, they do not see their activities as meaningful, or they experience unease with
the strict approach of target groups. As noted in chapter 6, their ideas may be anti‐
thetic to the wishes of politicians or managers. Again, the two cases provide useful
opportunities for studying such conflicts.
Bored with their work
In both cases, the strong emphasis on hotspots and target group members entails
municipal officers having to patrol these areas and look for designated individuals,
even when the chances are slim that there is “anything to be found,” in the words
of an officer.
During observations at times these officers appear somewhat purposeless. In
Rotterdam, due to a fixed work schedule municipal officers also have to go out
when youngsters are not or scarcely on the streets, for instance during winter or
during day time. Although the officers occupy themselves during these shifts with
asking around about possible issues at local businesses, at times they are actively
searching for extra work. In Utrecht confrontations with the original target group
have diminished considerably. Dealers, users and homeless people have largely
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disappeared from the streets, according to municipal officers’ stories and what can
be observed during their shifts.
As a result, in both cases municipal officers sometimes have trouble filling their
shifts satisfactorily. This apparent idleness causes discontent among some of them,
especially since they say they are prone to action, preferring confrontations, some‐
times even in different neighbourhoods – “always being in the same neighbour‐
hood causes boredom, it becomes a drag,” as one of the youth enforcement officers
says. In Utrecht new hotspots and new tasks are not always considered to be too
interesting either. During one of the shifts for instance, officers have to observe
whether eating places without a permit have customers inside
We hold still at the end of the street. We meet the other couple here. They have checked the
other side of this street. Officer A. sighs, looks from under his helmet at the other municipal
officers. “Any news on your side?” he asks. “Nothing,” officer B. responds. “It’s dead as a door‐
nail here,” A. says. “Let’s go back to the city centre, there’s a funfair there and a lot more to do”.
Thus with each other these officers express action-eagerness, highlighting their
quest for confrontations and lamenting the lack of activity.16 It would be too easy
however, to see these officers as purely action-prone.
Unease
In fact, and as opposed to being keen on action and chasing target groups, at times
officers also express unease with their strict assignments. Many officers combine
opposing views in their work. Apart from the apparent urge for action, they seem
to approach their assignments with more than mere zero tolerance thinking or cyn‐
icism about the alleged malevolence of their target group members, sometimes
showing sincere involvement (cf. Björk, 2008). The same applies to their stories of
fining. Although many of the officers highlight that they fine more, in the shifts
with municipal officers I seldom saw them actually use these powers. Their inter‐
action with target groups or with residents might have a different tone than what
they say that they do, illustrating the difference between a canteen culture and a
street culture, in which the latter shows more nuances and less bragging (cf. Wad‐
dington, 1999).
This also causes conflict with assignments that tell them merely to deter and
fine their target groups. In Rotterdam some of the youth enforcement officers
acknowledge many youngsters do not have a lot of room to go to in this neigh‐
bourhood. They also voice nuanced and relatively compassionate ideas about these
youngsters,
16. Terpstra (2012) noticed comparable sentiments amongst municipal officers in his study of private
security officers who are employed as municipal officers in two Dutch municipalities.
152 Municipal disorder policing
Often it’s minor, cheeky behaviour of older boys. They often come from large families and they
have nowhere to go. So we don’t really want to remove them, we just want them to cause no
trouble. No littering, no noise, no urinating in public.
In some cases this leads to observations by enforcement officers themselves about
their work being mainly about the symptom and less so about what could help
these youngsters.
The municipal officers in Utrecht’s Breedstraat area also have more nuanced
ideas than their harsh approach would suggest. When joining them on their shifts,
it turned out municipal officers often oscillate between different views. Convinced
of the strict approach to regular perpetrators as they seem to be, they also question
the relevance of the approach to these people, especially when it comes to the area
restraining orders. A lot of the target group members, such as the homeless people,
cannot afford to pay the fines, they state, and will only be chased into nearby
neighbourhoods. An officer adds, “and sometimes you have the troublemakers
who live in those neighbourhoods. What do you do with those? You can’t send
them away everywhere”.
Nevertheless, these relatively nuanced perspectives are often overshadowed by
their assignments. Consequently, some lament there is so little use made of the
frontline knowledge these professionals could provide. Something that is also
hampered by systems of accounting, so it seems: everything revolves around the
question whether contacts yield enough information and this information can be
used for close tracking and policing of individuals.
Enlarging responsibilities
In other cases the criticism of limited assignments is expressed in deeds instead of
verbal discontent: some municipal officers actively stretch the limits of their work.
Not only by creatively applying their powers for a wider array of offences, but also
by looking for new tasks. Youth enforcement officers for instance, can be seen to
enter shopping centres to watch out for shoplifters, or to get in touch with the
police to ask if they can assist them. In Utrecht municipal officers now actively deal
with pub-crawlers and have started to regulate the taxi area at night.
It is hard to determine what causes such assertiveness. Part of it might be rela‐
ted to the action eagerness described above. However, a form of ‘professional
imperialism’ could also have explanatory power here: officers tend to expand their
work outside their designated assignments, incorporating more and more work in
a bid to add value to their occupation. In Utrecht for instance, apart from merely
keeping themselves busy, officers sometimes hope that by adding streets to their
surveillance rounds, their managers might acknowledge their observations of new
incivilities. “We’re hoping they add this part to our rounds. If you find something
there, it might turn into a pattern and become part of the regular nightshifts,” one
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officer says. Or as another officer says about the taxi areas, “You’re moving around
anyway, maybe we can have some significance for those issues too”. Again, their
particular background as former city-wardens wanting to prove themselves as seri‐
ous policing officers seems crucial in this respect. In terms of the previous chapter,
the supply of these actively patrolling officers creates its own demand.
Ambivalence towards citizens reporting
A last testimony to a disagreement with assignments is the officers’ ambivalence
towards citizens’ complaint reports. These citizens have reported issues that are
temporary or confined to a few moments a week, according to municipal officers’
experiences, but still these reports have given neighbourhood managers and politi‐
cians the occasion to designate these areas as ‘hotspots’. Consequently, officers feel
that the requests for their presence in these areas are informed by reassuring com‐
plaining residents, by a need for mere symbolical presence. According to some
municipal officers in Utrecht the same applies to the area restraining orders that
are issued to target group members,
Those area restraining orders are mainly for the outside world, to show we are dealing with it.
But you have to do it in another way if you want to solve that problem. Now it’s mostly PR,
you’re doing it for the citizen who is complaining and is bothered by it.
In the eyes of the officers themselves, this symbolical presence has a rather low
relevance. As a result, they seem reluctant to visit some of these hotspots. They
simply want to keep themselves occupied and useful, but reassuring complaining
citizens is not perceived as meaningful. As an officer in Utrecht states, the council
is at a large distance from what is actually happening on the streets. Moreover,
these opinions show that in practice officers’ ideas do not always match with offi‐
cers’ emphasis on minor annoyances discussed in chapter 7.
The downsides of political logic are particularly evident in these cases. Profes‐
sionals and some of their coordinators get tired of political interference with their
work, being dragged around to different hotspots. Especially Utrecht’s city surveil‐
lance agency appears to have become a victim of its own success, as a coordinator
states. As with the Rotterdam youth enforcement officers, these officers are increas‐
ingly seen as a flexibly employable policing force that can be used to quickly
respond to the areas that are seen as urgent (see also chapter 6).
Consequently, other neighbourhoods suffer from this political cramp and
eagerness, several municipal officers state, “We used to have maybe 25 people in
the neighbourhood, now you should be happy if it’s two. There are so many
projects now”. Thus Utrecht’s city surveillance agency has changed, according to
many respondents, from a de-centralised organisation with neighbourhood teams
and close contact with other professionals around the city, into a flexible pool of
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municipal officers, housed in a central building. “You occasionally get into those
neighbourhoods,” one of them says, “but it’s so big, so you just go from one report
to the next”. In this respect, at times both professionals and coordinators see them‐
selves as victims of political populism and incident-related policies culminating in
a disproportionate emphasis on certain areas and certain reports.
5 Conclusions
This chapter showed that municipal disorder policing is the result of various inter‐
acting factors. Previous chapters already indicated that this profession is as much
the result of political preferences and municipal ambitions as it is of managerial
and frontline logic. In addition to those insights, this chapter illustrated that these
influences might mutually strengthen each other. This is particularly evident in the
strict enforcement approach towards target groups in the case studies that
informed this chapter.
Initially, new municipal policy to tackle anti-social behaviour was triggered by
changes in political attention. More specifically, the eagerness of mayors and alder‐
men to ‘listen to the citizen’ led to more pressure to address disorder. In Rotter‐
dam’s case, this partly explains why the earlier street coaches were replaced by
youth enforcement officers. Their introduction as a solution was supported by a
new eagerness for ‘acting out’ and showing who owns the streets (Garland 2001).
Likewise, in Utrecht’s case, initially the municipal officers in the city centre were a
political response to reporting citizens. In fact, only after the much discussed resi‐
dent meeting where “residents were standing up on the benches to yell how bad it
all was,” were municipal officers introduced as a solution to the problem.
However, this political focus can only partially explain why municipal officers
were assigned to these tasks. This policy change was enabled as the result of man‐
agers who saw these new problem definitions as a good opportunity to launch
their solutions (Kingdon, 2014). Thus policy changes also reflect managerial ambi‐
tions and wishes for more control. Furthermore, these political and managerial
preferences led to a tighter control of local policy: means of measurement are posi‐
tioned more prominently and the work of officers is made more accountable to
municipal managers. At times the pressure of these decisions turns the daily work
of municipal officers into a straitjacket of firm enforcement. Officers are engaged in
collecting information, policing hotspots and deterrence of target group members.
As such, these officers seem at least partly loyal to these assignments and they
seem content with the clear, zero-tolerance approach towards these target groups.
Moreover, their limited powers do not seem to hold them back in this respect.
Nevertheless, different stakeholders do not always agree. Managers might
express frustration at the political constraints and eagerness to constantly listen to
angry residents. In addition, particularly the experiences and ideas of frontline
professionals often conflict with political and managerial expectations. For
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instance, at times these professionals have boring days. However, this should not
lead to the conclusion that municipal officers necessarily want more target groups
to chase. In fact some of them express unease about the policy of deterring these
target groups. It might not be the most sustainable solution to the problem. In yet
other cases, municipal officers are dissatisfied with their responsibilities. They
often look for extra work and incorporate new-found tasks in their daily routines.
Finally, professionals are ambivalent about politicians’ inclination to rely on citi‐
zens’ reports. Often they see politicians as detached from “the reality on the
streets”.
In summary, whereas municipal officers might have a large range of strategies
and approaches at their disposal, one may wonder if these alternatives will be used
when assignments predetermine officers’ action as strictly as described here (Ber‐
voets, 2013; chapter 7). The point may even be made that officers in these cases are
‘kept small’, derogating their evolving professional standards by forcing them to
keep to strict assignments and hotspots. In addition, the tendency of these profes‐
sionals to fulfil more tasks than those to which they are assigned and their urge for
action and confrontations raises questions about the limitations of municipal disor‐
der policing in relation to police work. This theme will be discussed in the next
chapter.
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9 Municipal officers, police officers and
their work domains
1 Introduction
The work of municipal officers cannot be understood without taking developments
in police work and organisation into account. This applies to all levels of analysis
used here. On a macro level, the initial development of municipal disorder policing
must partly be understood as a response to changes in police policies and forces.
Next, local decisions on disorder policing depend on collaboration with the police
and their local priorities, as was noted in chapter 6. In addition, municipal officers’
views are reminiscent of how police officers deal with their work. In this respect,
they can even be seen as realizing a part of the police’s role in society. Finally, the
previous chapter illustrated how the involvement of municipal officers in new
tasks is dependent on the police’s position in specific cases. This close dependency
demands a more comprehensive approach to the relation between these two occu‐
pational groups, a discussion that provides further insight in how the division
between their respective work domains is seen.
This chapter provides such a discussion, albeit not in terms of a clear-cut over‐
view of the essential characteristics and tasks of both occupations. Instead, the
growth of municipal disorder policing and its relation to the police are seen as
depending on these professions as ‘social actors’. This Weberian inspired approach
regards occupations as “collectively conscious groups” with their own shared
beliefs and specific interests (Macdonald, 1995: 27; Van der Krogt, 1981). Hence not
only do divisions of task differ factually between municipalities, the views on this
division are also part of collective beliefs and subject to the strategies of the occu‐
pational groups involved. As such, this chapter challenges a functionalist approach
in which occupational domains are seen as stationary situations or defined by “sta‐
ble and fixed characteristics” (Macdonald, 1995: 8).
In what follows the views on the work domains of municipal officers and police
officers will be discussed in two consecutive steps. In the second section, some the‐
oretical notions are briefly explored. The same section introduces three types of
argumentations that are used in the debate on work domains – fundamental, eco‐
nomic and hierarchical argumentations. These modes of reasoning inform four
positions about the differences between the two occupations in the third section.
Two of these positions point out that there is a strict division between the work
domains of police and municipal officers (3.1 and 3.2) and in two positions the two
occupational groups are seen as closely related (3.3 and 3.4). The final section com‐
prises of an overview and a short reflection on these findings.1
2 Argumentations in occupational strife
The descriptions by both municipal and police officers to define occupational
domains are in no way neutral characterisations. Instead, these descriptions are
part of a constant strife over “the boundaries of [these] domains and the member‐
ship who belong within them” (Macdonald, 1995: 8). In this respect, the relation
between different policing occupations is reminiscent of the strife and negotiation
between other professions that also operate in a field with shared or closely related
goals – such as medicine or law. As with these professions, the division of a gen‐
eral (policing) function over various professions (‘plural policing’) implies that
occupations are constantly (re)defining, securing or improving their position (Lar‐
son, 1977; Macdonald, 1995). This has been so from the very outset of municipal
disorder policing. When the first city wardens were introduced, they entered an
existing occupational domain, a social order in which police had been the predomi‐
nant occupation and in which new professions would have to “strive to gain
autonomy” (Macdonald, 1995: 8). In the words of Larson (1977), municipal officers
have been involved in a professional project, attempting to wrest control of their
occupational domain, thereby defining the social reality of that domain.
Taking this idea of a professional project as point of departure, this chapter
aims at unveiling how various players take up positions in this project. Hence this
chapter provides both an overview of various positions on the division between
police officers and municipal officers and also scrutinises the arguments that are
used to support these. In doing so, the analysis builds on sociological approaches
of professions elaborated by Macdonald (1995), Larson (1977) and Freidson (2001).
Especially Freidson’s influential work Professionalism – the third logic (2001) pro‐
vides support in clarifying different positions. Freidson conceives of professional‐
ism as a third logic, in contradistinction to that of the market and the state, offering
a rich description of the ideal-typical elements of that logic. He sees the ideology of
professionalism as the “primary tool available to disciplines for gaining the politi‐
cal and economic resources needed to establish and maintain their status” (ibid.:
105).
1. This chapter is about rhetoric and less so about what police and municipal officers actually do in
practice. This deserves to be mentioned as there could be considerable differences between the two.
Police officers’ discourse for instance, might tend to bravado, action and machismo, whereas in
practice their approach shows more nuanced strategies (Reiner, 2010; Waddington, 2008; see also
chapter 8).
158 Municipal disorder policing
However, through a less ideal-typical and more empirical analysis, this exami‐
nation shows that positions are not only supported by this independent third logic
of professionalism. In fact, various players use arguments that also touch on eco‐
nomic considerations about scarcity (‘market thinking’) or bureaucratic considera‐
tions about hierarchy (‘state-centred thinking’). These different argumentations are
combined and creatively used by players to legitimate the distinction between the
two occupations in ways that best meet their interests.
Three argumentations
Hence, a first step in clarifying the debate on the respective work domains of
municipal and police officers’ is to shed light on what type of arguments are used
by municipal officers, police officers, and their managers and coordinators.2 Three
types are discussed here – fundamental, economic and hierarchical argumenta‐
tions.
Firstly, fundamental arguments about what is real police work and what is real
municipal surveillance work highlight the alleged core aspects of both occupa‐
tional domains. As such, these arguments might appeal to transcendent values that
imbue tasks of these officers with a higher goal (Freidson, 2001). On the one hand,
such arguments are used by police representatives, for instance in their focus on
core tasks. Moreover, their emphasis on such core tasks has certain consequences
for the way how they see the tasks of municipal officers. The work of municipal
officers is defined in the slipstream of this dominant occupation as assisting the
police and helping police officers to spend more time and energy on their proper
tasks by taking alleged improper tasks of their shoulders. On the other hand,
municipal officers, coordinators and managers have developed their own view of
what are their fundamental core tasks, often in defence of an alleged tendency of
police forces to increasingly transfer tasks to city surveillance agencies. These argu‐
ments are in line with what Freidson (2001: 56) calls an occupational division of
labour in which one occupation defines its position in relation to other occupations
on grounds of the content of its expertise.
In contrast with this reasoning, a second argument is of a less fundamental and
more pragmatic nature. In this case, doing police work is looked upon more in an
economic sense as a product that may be provided by various suppliers. Thus, the
distinction between both occupations might be informed by a sort of free market
thinking of unconstrained competition over policing work (Freidson 2001: 46).
Likewise, it is a form of reasoning that is used to support different positions. Thus,
some might fully embrace this free competition over policing work, as will be
2. For this chapter interviews with various respondents have been used, both from municipal city
surveillance agencies and from the police organisation and working in various levels of both
organisations. This variety was of importance to assure an encompassing overview of the perspec‐
tives on this hotly debated issue.
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made more evident in the third position below. Others, endorse an economic
approach to policing more instrumentally, for instance to support their view that
police officers are too expensive to use them for minor disorder or for basic surveil‐
lance. These tasks can thus be easily outsourced to others. Hence, the argument
here differs from the fundamental arguments described above: there is little funda‐
mental difference between various policing officers, and “the division of labour
can be very fluid,” without too many constraints or concerns over professional
standards or differences between the occupations involved (Freidson, 2001: 47).
A third and final argumentation about the differences between the two occupa‐
tions involves considerations about professional status and positions in the hierar‐
chy of law enforcement occupations. Although not fully coinciding with it, this line
of argumentation is related to what Freidson (2001) calls the bureaucratic division
of labour, implying “the organization of positions is pyramidal, establishing clear
lines of authority leading up to the ultimate executive officer” (Freidson, 2001: 49).
Many police respondents in particular use arguments that stress such a hierarchi‐
cal division between police officers and municipal officers, the latter being subordi‐
nate to the former, both in powers and in professional status. They highlight for
instance, that they can be distinguished from municipal officers through a claim on
the monopoly on violence. These arguments provoke much dispute: the professio‐
nal standards and the reputation of municipal officers are a constant source for
strife and debate. Some of these disputes pertain to the legal differences between
police officers and municipal officers. As described in chapter 1, most municipal
officers are formally enacted as BOAs, ‘Special Investigative Officers’, implying
they have the legal authority to write administrative fines or administrative penal
orders for a limited set of rule infringements. This implies municipal officers may
have coercive means at their disposal, such as pepper spray, a baton and hand‐
cuffs. However, these specific powers are looked upon differently and used to bol‐
ster various views. Some maintain municipal law enforcement is characterised by
deficient professional standards: these officers would lack capacity, skills, expertise
and knowledge. Others claim the professionalism of municipal officers has devel‐
oped notably, and these officers have developed into a fairly professional policing
body. Obviously such differences in views on (legal) competences result in differ‐
ent views about the respective occupational domains.
3 Division between municipal officers and police officers: four
positions
The views about the differences between municipal and police officers and their
work domains are informed by the three types of argumentations outlined above,
combining them in various ways. In what follows, this is further elaborated by
describing four positions.
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3.1 Strict division: police core tasks and ‘catching crooks’
One of the most frequently heard statements about what distinguishes police offi‐
cers from municipal officers is that the police have the legal mandate for criminal
investigation and is there to address serious crime. This statement is more than a
somewhat obligatory, bureaucratic task description that would be agreed upon by
everyone. It is commonly used rhetorically to indicate such a domain is not only
the police’s ultimate, but also their main responsibility: they should devote their
attention to ‘catching crooks’ (Van Stokkom, 2010). In fact, that statement is used
by respondents to fundamentally oppose other tasks and lies at the basis of the
inclination to transfer other problems, such as everyday annoyances and minor
issues of disorder, to other organisations. Many respondents express these
thoughts, such as this police officer,
The real bastards, that’s what we’re here for. All the other hassle, quarrels between neighbours,
parking on the pavement, a police officer may involve it in his daily shift now and then, but it
should not be his main task.
However, quite a few municipal officers share the same thought, as a municipal
officer in Eindhoven says,
Of course, the police don’t deal with household waste. They have to deal with domestic vio‐
lence, that sort of things. If your neighbour is beating up his wife, you call the police, not the
city surveillance agency.
Although respondents who support this view might acknowledge that minor dis‐
order tops the list of the most important annoyances of neighbourhood residents,
they maintain that the involvement of the police with these problems is not an
issue, because it does not belong to their core occupation of ‘catching crooks’. A
senior police officer for instance, concedes dog dirt is of no concern to the police.
“Dog dirt has no place in our vocabulary whatsoever. For us it’s no problem”.
This position – mainly based on fundamental arguments – is often voiced to
emphasise the distinctive nature of police work. The notion of ‘catching crooks’ is
utilised to further rhetorically absolve the responsibilities of the police from minor
issues. Some respondents would say for instance, that the one-on-one contact with
ordinary neighbourhood residents is not a police responsibility either. Police work
is misunderstood, a police chief thinks, if people feel the police should spend more
time with them. “Dear Madam, if a police officer spends a full hour having coffee
with you, something is terribly wrong,” he adds.
Furthermore, this emblematic task designation is used to give meaning to what
the police have been doing wrong in the past. Thus, it was a mistake for the police
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to be ever focussed on minor disorder or issues other than serious crime. A munici‐
pal manager explains this,
Police have always been doing things that don’t belong to their core business. They would say:
‘if we don’t do this, nobody will’. So you could say, municipal officers are now doing the tasks
that were inappropriately done by the police before.
Many policemen are quite vocal on this matter too,
Year after year, we have let the neighbourhood constable spread leaflets door to door. With all
due respect, but a constable or a police officer should be catching crooks, not spreading bro‐
chures. That’s something someone else should do.
Although this position is characterised by fundamental arguments, this same idea
is often framed in more economic terms too. Patrolling public places, policing
minor disorder and uniformed presence are all seen as a waste of precious police
capacity. A chief police constable says,
I’m really happy we are beyond that point of old fashioned thinking. That we don’t send four
officers to a funfair. It’s so useless. Maybe the general public likes to see us there, but I rather
put my people there were they are needed, assuming that others, and especially municipalities,
will think about how to solve this.
With regard to municipal officers this view implies that they are the ones that are
expected to deal with minor issues. The most commonly heard classification to dis‐
tinguish the two occupations in this respect, is that between ‘quality of life’ and
‘public safety’: municipal officers should focus on issues of the former, whereas the
police is responsible for the latter.3
In addition, many of the respondents who are convinced of the police as ‘crook
catchers’ use hierarchical arguments. They see police work as inherently different
from municipal officers’ work, defending police work as a special, distinctive job,
and police officers as a carefully selected elite. Often this lower position of munici‐
pal officers in the law enforcement hierarchy is supported by invoking the legal
distinction between the two types of officers: BOAs have fewer powers than police
officers. Remarkably, the ‘monopoly on violence’ is also invoked to bolster this
view. Many police officers claim they are the only ones allowed to use violence,
therewith wilfully overlooking the range of coercive means at the disposal of
municipal officers.
3. Remarkably, other studies show that police officers often predominantly use ‘serious crime’ as the
denominator of their work, thereby equally designating ‘public safety tasks’ as the responsibility of
other authorities (Van Stokkom & Foekens, 2015).
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Also the reputation and history of city wardens appears to have a large impact.
“They haven’t got enough quality there,” a police officer states when asked if
municipal officers can be compared to police officers. Some respondents question
whether municipal officers are sufficiently trainable. Can they learn how to deal
with youth gangs, a manager wonders,
I bet there are some that are fit for these trainings, but there are a lot there that will have a tre‐
mendous difficulty trying to grasp the material. And then they will have to be able to apply it in
practice as well.
Another neighbourhood manager adds, “If out of ten, two are capable, it would be
a lot”. Although some municipal officers are only too happy to do so, this should
be seen as an unwelcome development. You need to keep a close eye on it, accord‐
ing to a police officer. The same applies to the contact with homeless people and
alcoholics, as a police officer in Eindhoven states, “These are tough guys, tried and
tested, if you send in these officers, you send them wet behind the ears. You need a
solid, experienced neighbourhood police officer here, to give these guys sufficient
counterbalance”.
In summary, these respondents point out that municipal officers should be
doing substantially different work – a form of disorder policing designated for
non-police officers alone, for fundamental and economic, as well as hierarchical
arguments. These also enable police officers to designate the police as a specialised
occupation that is essentially different from municipal disorder policing. Police
officers here capitalise on their status as a core discipline, that “bear[s] on issues of
widespread interest and deep concerns on the part of the general population [and
that] address[es] perennial problems that are of great importance to most of
humanity” (Freidson, 2001: 161). This status is further accentuated rhetorically by
police representatives. This is not only done to defend their unique status as a pro‐
fession, to claim a “monopoly” over their discipline (ibid.: 199) or to strive for rec‐
ognition of their work as ‘crook catchers’, but also to ward off other tasks. Conse‐
quently, municipal officers are presented as operating in a universe that exists par‐
allel to that of police work, with little overlap between the two occupations.
3.2 Strict division: municipal core tasks and ‘quality of life’ policing
This emphasis on a sharp distinction between police and municipal officers is also
expressed from the municipal point of view. Some municipal officers also use an
argument of ‘core tasks’ and show the same tendency to highlight the unique char‐
acteristics of their work to rhetorically create a quintessential prototype of munici‐
pal disorder policing. Again fundamental arguments dominate this position.
The idea that municipal officers should do less police-like work forms the basis
of this position. Performing tasks that are discarded by the police distracts from the
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municipal core tasks, these respondents state. If municipal officers were to perform
heavier duties at all, it is only because they claim more work than is justified by
their expertise and professional level. As a result, municipal officers are seen as an
addition to the police at the most, with an independent line of work; they are a sep‐
arate policing force with its own responsibilities.
One way of highlighting these essential characteristics is by contrasting them to
previous tasks that are seen as work of a bygone time. The previous city wardens
and their tasks have an important role in this respect, as they are seen as the type
of officers that their recent successors are said to have left behind. As opposed to
these city wardens – officers who are generally depicted as having a lack of power
and a bad reputation – new municipal officers are capable of fining, have more
powers and know better how to address non-compliant citizens. They know how
to ‘make a difference’,
You used to have those wardens, and they would walk through the city, and say: ‘Sir or
madam, would you please get off your bike here?’ Then [citizens] would tell you to get lost, and
there was nothing you could do. Now you can fine those people.4
These respondents stress the city surveillance agencies have been able to develop
an independent working style, with their own approach and justification that is
mainly associated with ‘quality of life’ issues. As explained in chapter 5, the Dutch
term leefbaarheid originates in the seventies, but was introduced into municipal
public safety policy in the 1990s. It seems sensible that municipalities use their own
(new) personnel to control the issues that qualify as such, for instance dog litter,
rubbish or parking hindrances.
In some cities such distinctive characteristics of municipal officers are specifi‐
cally contrasted to police work. This is particularly common in the city of The
Hague. The surveillance agency of this city has been reorganised thoroughly,
implying a reorientation on its priorities of physical disorder (see chapter 5) and
the decision to house The Hague’s municipal officers at the city’s police stations.
Furthermore, police constables have been assigned as team coordinators. At the
time of research this caused a lot of consternation among the workers. The idea of
being managed by police constables led to the re-emergence of an old fear of
regressing to “the police’s postmen” (see chapter 5). As a result, many of The
Hague’s municipal officers opposed the transition vehemently by reference to the
fear their priorities would be overrun.
The ensuing defence of municipal priorities and the maintenance of a strict dis‐
tinction between municipal surveillance work and police work takes several forms.
One of these is by highlighting the amount of their own work. “What we are doing
right now is more than enough,” a municipal officer says. Another way of defend‐
4. See also chapter 5.
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ing municipal work is by fully defining it as concerning quality of life issues. Pub‐
lic safety issues are for the police to deal with. Another remarkable example of this
allegiance to quality of life tasks is how street youth are looked upon. Although
The Hague’s municipal officers do seem to have a task in this respect, they high‐
light that they are only willing to deal with street youth as far as the trouble they
cause can be seen as – again – quality of life issues. A municipal coordinator
explains how this might work,
When you come in parks where young people are causing a big mess, but who are in no way
criminal, you could step up to these kids, have a chat, show your face. [So youngsters know
that] these are the people that deal with quality of life. [They realise] ‘Municipal officers can
also fine us because we do not clean up our mess’.
For this reason – and not only in The Hague – many municipal officers oppose the
expansion of powers and equipment. Such extra coercive powers are not needed,
they state, when enforcing rules that concern dog dirt, for instance.
In effect, these respondents oppose the all too opportunistic reasoning of the
police. Police forces might be short of human resources, but this should not lead to
the use of equally scarce municipal officers for what are basically police priorities.
Thus, representatives in municipal disorder policing seem to defend the bounda‐
ries of their domain by highlighting the fundamental status of their own occupa‐
tion, and their own transcendental values of quality of life tasks (Freidson, 2001). In
addition, they appear to oppose police respondents’ stress on hierarchy and sub‐
servience. Instead, these municipal respondents highlight municipal disorder
policing has developed into a parallel occupation, with its own distinct domain
and related tasks. Remarkably, their legal status as ‘Special Investigative Officers’
is not seen by them as underwriting their subordinate position in the law enforce‐
ment hierarchy, but as proof of municipal officers being a professional group of
policing officers that needs to be taken seriously. Thus like police officers, munici‐
pal officers draw their own boundaries, also based on fundamental and hierarchi‐
cal grounds, albeit in their case as part of a new discipline that needs to defend
itself against dominant police thinking (Freidson, 2001: 202).
Hence both police officers and municipal officers highlight their respective core
tasks – ‘catching crooks’ or ‘dealing with quality of life’. Both maintain there is a
strict distinction between the two occupations, albeit for different reasons and with
different interests. Police stay true to their mantra of catching crooks in order to
legitimate their priorities and to define their occupation as a special profession that
deals with perennial problems for which they deserve recognition. Municipal offi‐
cers, for their part, are loyal to quality of life issues in order to reject police tasks
and equally to underscore the uniqueness and professionalism of their occupation.
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In effect, both sides of this perceived division in policing tasks are characterised by
their obstinacy in holding on to these (mainly) principled definitions.
3.3 No strict division: towards a new municipal police?
The third and fourth positions oppose these strict divisions as they are less con‐
cerned with the principles of the distinction between the ‘real police’ and other
enforcement officers. The third position is generally characterised by pragmatic,
economic reasoning. Consequently, the respondents taking this position are con‐
vinced that the replacement of police work by municipal officers can go much fur‐
ther than has been mentioned before.
The rhetorical device of ‘catching crooks’ enables police officers to define many
different tasks as ‘minor’, and thus as non-police work. Whereas the police officers
described before might highlight the uniqueness of their work, others creatively
appropriate the notion of ‘quality of life’ to designate some of their original respon‐
sibilities as municipal work. Municipal officers in Utrecht and Nijmegen for
instance, often deal with homeless people. Especially in Nijmegen, as several
respondents emphasise, this is done by defining these issues as ‘quality of life’, and
therefore as not a police responsibility.
Other respondents are even more flexible about this sharing of tasks, and seem
to fully embrace a distribution of tasks that is based on free market thinking (Freid‐
son, 2001). They highlight for instance, that traffic controls keep the police from
fighting real crime. “It’s a shame to use capacity for things like that. Other people
can do that,” a police constable says. A manager adds, “maybe cheaper sounds a
bit condescending, but it does play a role”. Police capacity is stretched, he adds,
and expertise should be reserved for areas where this is really needed. In some
cases, the responsibilities of municipal officers are stretched further. A police team
manager explains,
First of all, we as the police tackle the upper segment, violence, burglaries, muggings, robberies
and emergency calls. But there is a lot in between, from fraud to ordinary theft, shoplifting,
pickpockets, we don’t do that anymore, we don’t have the time anymore […] I want the city
surveillance agency and the police to get closer to each other in general. Now the municipality
is only doing the lower part, and the police is only occupied with the upper segment, and there
is a gap in between.
Consequently, the division of tasks between the police and the municipal city sur‐
veillance agencies is based mainly on economic thinking. Some literally speak of a
‘market’. For instance a policeman says,
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Public safety is a market, and if I were mayor […], I would start approaching the problem dif‐
ferently, and say: ‘Ok, I’ve got a problem, but I don’t have to call the police right away, maybe I
can solve this with municipal officers or private security officers’.
These respondents are less concerned with the principles of their profession than
those quoted in the previous sections. They simply state that the police have no
monopoly over police-like work, and thus counter occupational divisions of labour
in which police monopolise this specific domain (Freidson, 2001). For this matter,
the most important question in their view is whether municipal officers can also be
employed for ‘heavier duties’. A Utrecht police officer for example, sees municipal
officers as a big advantage. The police is there to deal with “structural problems,”
he states, and they can transfer (wegzetten) the responsibility for impromptu inci‐
dents to the municipal city surveillance agency. Others even say that there is no
predefined limit, other than “that the municipality should not be working on the
criminal justice side of police work,” as a police constable states. “All the things
that happen on a daily basis and are handled by the police could equally be dealt
with by municipal officers,” such as the enforcement of traffic laws, minor traffic
violations and traffic controls, he adds. “All the hot stuff where no crime is
involved,” is how an alderman puts it.
Others see mainly opportunities for the temporary employment of municipal
officers. An employee of the city surveillance agency in The Hague mentions
escorting a demonstration and surveillance during concerts. In addition, several
people suggest municipal officers can also run night shifts, such as those done by
Utrecht’s municipal officers described in the previous chapter. Another example is
using municipal officers more as the “eyes and ears” of the police. Some suggest
this can not only be done in the case of an increase in burglaries, but even for cer‐
tain aspects of criminal investigation. “If a particular property needs to be
watched, a municipal officer could do that too, assuming he has been trained prop‐
erly,” a police officer in Tilburg says. In addition, neighbourhood work as it is tra‐
ditionally done by local police officers can partially be adopted by municipal offi‐
cers. A police officer calls this ‘maintenance’. “A relatively quiet district can be cov‐
ered easily by other enforcement officers as well, such as municipal officers, or
even private security […] You can have them do some general work, patrolling,
talking to residents”. A Tilburg policy-maker even sees municipal officers eventu‐
ally as “the lynchpin with neighbourhood citizen platforms, citizen councils,
neighbourhood councils. Much, much more as an equal counterpart of the neigh‐
bourhood police officer”.
As such, some respondents are proponents of a more radical replacement of
police work by municipal officers. The only criterion is that they are well-trained.
“If people are trained and screened well, it doesn’t really matter if they work for
the police or the municipality,” a respondent says. Likewise, powers and equip‐
ment can be expanded. A police officer states, “So that they are trained in such a
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fashion they are allowed to do more than they do now”. In principle, there is no
objection to increase municipal officers’ powers and thus to expand the domain in
which these officers operate as replacement for the police. Some would connect
these ambitions with the term ‘municipal police’. A manager from the city of Til‐
burg says, “Don’t be so rigid about that dog litter”. These officers could do so
much more, but they are simply neglected by their partners due to prejudice about
their professional level, or because municipal officers themselves are too modest.
Hence, this plural policing position is also embraced with reference to other
types of arguments mentioned above. Some municipal officers seem eager for more
tasks to prove themselves as fully professional policing officers in contrast to previ‐
ous city wardens. As such, occupational pride and a need for recognition might
have conflicting effects. Instead of an obstinate allegiance to ‘quality of life’ core
tasks, defending the fragility of their newfound occupational identity, officers here
aim for more tasks as a way to prove themselves and to shed the past, or as part of
a preference to do work with a tougher and more serious reputation (see chapter
8). Previous chapters have shown plenty of examples of municipal officers who
appear to be ready for more tasks (see for instance chapters 7 and 8). In fact, for
many of them the legal possibilities given to BOAs are seen as limitations, hinder‐
ing a further expansion of municipal officers’ tasks. They loathe their limited pow‐
ers, such as this municipal officer in Tilburg,
We can now fine people for dogs. But often we see people sitting in their cars calling while driv‐
ing. Then I’m itching to do something. Here, in the city centre, I’m waiting for the traffic lights
sometimes, loads of people ignore those red signs. It really annoys me.
Often they can be heard to lament the alleged negative impact this has on the
authority they have among the public. Another officer also relates how he is
passed while waiting at a red light – “people just pass you by, laughing”. In addi‐
tion, some police officers believe that municipal officers can deal with a wider
range of issues because this enables police officers to do other things. As such, the
first position and this position seem alike, with the difference that police officers in
this case are less concerned about the principle of the limits of their profession.
This view on respective work domains indicates how municipal officers and
police officers agree on an expansion of municipal officers’ tasks, while using dif‐
ferent arguments. The cases of Rotterdam and Utrecht, as described in the previous
chapter, provide good examples of this. In both cities police officers, who claim
that they have too much to do, are welcoming eager municipal officers who are
willing to prove themselves and both sides of the divide form a temporary coali‐
tion. In contrast to the previous positions, this agreement between different officers
seems to be informed more by pragmatism, than by an obstinate allegiance to ‘tra‐
ditional’ tasks. In this case, municipal officers and police officers are seen as a part
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of the same policing family and tasks can and should be transferred more easily
from one organisation to the other.
3.4 No strict division: the police should do all disorder policing
The fourth and final position discussed here also refrains from drawing a strict dis‐
tinction between both occupations. However, instead of seeing municipal officers
as suitable for a wider variety of police tasks, it holds the view that it is the police
that should do more. Consequently, respondents in support of this position see the
policing of minor disorder as a traditional police responsibility that has unfortu‐
nately been ceded to others. This unique view of the division between the two pro‐
fessions can be found among a relatively small group of police officers.
These officers claim the introduction of municipal officers is due to doubtful
and regrettable choices made by the police in the past; doubtful, because the
advent of municipal officers impacts negatively on police officers’ own position in
neighbourhoods and on the legitimacy of the police. This view taps into both fun‐
damental and hierarchical argumentations about designated tasks for specific pro‐
fessions. A police officer in Nijmegen for example, points out how he used to do
these supposedly minor tasks, but was constrained to let them go,
We haven’t been doing this part of the police job for a long, long time, because we didn’t have
the time for it, and also because some of my colleagues see it as inferior work. But when I was a
neighbourhood police officer […] and I constantly had trouble with some rubbish bag, torn
apart […], I would go through it too [in search of an address], because I wanted to catch that
jackass. So in that sense, these guys are replacing us here.
Respondents who subscribe to this idea are often concerned about the pluralisation
of policing. A coordinator of a city surveillance agency states,
That which the police leave behind, will be automatically seen as a job for municipal officers.
[…] So eventually you’ll get the reinvention of the municipal police. And maybe the VNG5 says
they don’t want it, but they don’t put their money where their mouth is. And the same goes for
the minister, saying: ‘police, focus on criminal investigation and a tough approach’. This is hap‐
pening right now. And in practice, it can’t be reversed anymore.
A policeman states that many of his colleagues are acting too much on the princi‐
ple of core tasks. The reason the police would not want to deal with minor forms of
disorder is caused by rigidness – the refusal to be managed by municipalities.
“Because I deal with murder and homicide, not with those shitty rubbish bags,” he
summarises the ideas of his colleagues.
5. VNG stands for Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten: the association of Dutch municipalities.
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These respondents state that this stance leads to a loss of the police’s connection
with everyday life in neighbourhoods and of police legitimacy in the eyes of citi‐
zens. “Criminal investigation is important, sure, but what happens in those neigh‐
bourhoods has basically to do with matters of quality of life,” a civil servant from
Nijmegen states. As such, many of these officers do not really see the difference
between quality of life and public safety issues; these matters are closely related, at
least in the eyes of neighbourhood residents. Likewise, some think any form of law
enforcement should be done solely by the police, as they not only know best how
to address people, but to keep all forms of enforcement in one organisation also
prevents differences in performance.
As a result, municipal officers are looked upon in somewhat ambiguous ways.
On the one hand, the need for municipal officers is regretted, as it is police work
they are doing. As such, they are seen as a second best solution. “It would not
worry me if all of these municipal officers were policemen,” a municipal manager
adds. Others argue the police should also be out on the streets for general surveil‐
lance and should equally be approachable for neighbourhood residents. On the
other hand, many applaud the fact that at least there are officers who are willing to
concern themselves with these forms of disorder.
The same ambiguity can be heard in more economic arguments. The money for
municipal officers would be better spent on the police, a police officer states, but
unfortunately the budgets in his city are just not allocated in such a way,
They should’ve had a decent conversation with the police organisation. If they would’ve told
[the police], ‘here’s [a large amount of money]’, of course the police would have said, ‘yes
please, of course we will deal with those issues too’.
In addition, people who defend this position state that municipal officers may do
the things from which the police have drifted away. As a Nijmegen police officer
puts it: “If the police do not live up to the citizens’ expectations, you should be
happy with anything that can support you”.
These respondents express the view that the police should be very cautious not
to lose more credibility by a further withdrawal from public spaces. The police
should also be visible and – among other things – focus on general surveillance in
public spaces. “That entails walking beats, going around, cycle through the neigh‐
bourhood,” a municipal official from Nijmegen states. Moreover, “a good police
officer should have a feeling for his neighbourhood,” as a manager at The Hague’s
city surveillance agency puts it. Therefore, surveillance in public spaces can never
be fully outsourced to municipal officials. A manager in the same city says, “You
have to get to know your neighbourhood. […] Get a feel for the area. Go there,
walk around and visit those places”.
Thus, although these respondents see municipal officers as a somewhat regret‐
table supplement to the police, they acknowledge the plural policing reality of a
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shared domain of surveillance and law enforcement in public spaces.6 In other
words, they long for a traditional police profile as monopolistic guardians of law
and order, but at the same time see municipal officers as ‘junior partners’, or as
part of the same policing family.7 Respondents expressing this view are mostly
experienced neighbourhood police officers who have witnessed the various
changes in the police organisation and prioritisation.
4 Conclusions
This chapter started with the observation that the relations between regular police
officers and municipal officers play a vital role on all levels of analysis discussed
hitherto, demanding a more comprehensive discussion. In what followed, occupa‐
tions have been discussed as actors instead of stable functionalist domains that
actively engage in defining respective tasks and strife over domains and responsi‐
bilities (Larson, 1977; Macdonald, 1995). To understand the dynamics of this strife
and negotiation, three different types of argumentation were introduced in the sec‐
ond section and related to three different perspectives on divisions of labour as
they are proposed by Freidson (2001).
In the extensive third section four positions were discussed. Two of these stress
the unique characteristics and values of the respective occupations, one by repeat‐
ing the mantra that the police should be catching crooks, the other by stressing
municipal officers are just there for quality of life issues. In contrast to this, the
third and fourth positions highlight the common ground of the two occupations.
The third position sees the division between the police and municipal officers as
highly flexible and maintains that municipal officers should perform more police-
like work, whereas the fourth also acknowledges the similarities, but wants police
officers to deal with all disorder issues.
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that perspectives on the work domains of
municipal and police officers, for an important part, depend on the struggle
between a dominant occupation and the ‘newcomer’.
Another way of seeing the hitherto discussed positions is by highlighting them
either as protective or as expansive positions. In this respect, the first two positions
can be characterised as being protective, defending a strict division between the
two occupational groups, often with reference to alleged distinctive characteristics
and mostly based on fundamental arguments. In these positions, respondents dig
in their heels, holding on to the characteristics of their occupations. As such, the
professionalism described here differs from frontline logic in chapter 6. Frontline
6. This same position can be found among Dutch mayors. Although they are generally content with
‘their own personnel’ (see also chapter 6), these mayors generally seem to think the work of these
municipal officers should be done by police officers (Terpstra, Foekens & Van Stokkom, 2015).
7. The notion of ‘junior partners’ is elsewhere used for private security officers (Button, 2002).
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logic as a specific mode of local decision making gives prominence to practical
knowledge, the ‘short lines’ between various professionals and has a highly prag‐
matic nature. By contrast, the dominance of an occupational division of labour dis‐
cussed here refers to the emphasis on unique professional and transcendental val‐
ues, implying social closure (Freidson, 2001), instead of the rapprochement dis‐
cussed in chapter 6. In this respect, the police occupation still seems to exert a claim
of privilege, which “consists in holding a monopoly over the exclusive right to per‐
form a particular kind of work in the marketplace” (Freidson, 2001: 198).
Whereas Freidson understands this monopoly (or ‘social closure’) mainly in
relation to consumers, the above text suggests social closure might well apply also
to the distinction between these two occupations. As such, both occupations are
involved in their own professional project (Larson, 1977). However, this process is
not necessarily negative. Following Freidson, one could also see this formation of
boundaries serving the formation of “a body of formal knowledge and skill, or dis‐
cipline” (ibid.: 202), and “social closure is vital for the work of professions to sur‐
vive as distinct disciplines” (ibid.). In yet other words, the attachment to such tran‐
scendent values as ‘catching crooks’ or ‘quality of life tasks’ gives these occupa‐
tions meaning and justifies their position and independence.
As opposed to this, the third and fourth positions are generally informed by a
view that proposes a more expansive stance. Highlighting the shared ground
between both types of officers, the possibility of a more market driven distribution
of tasks is explored. In the third position this results in the belief of proactively
employing municipal officers for more police-like work. The fourth position adds
to this expansive view, albeit in this case proposing to let police deal with more
disorder issues.8 For one thing, such expansive positions seem to be more suscepti‐
ble to outside demands and make it easier to adapt policing supply to such
demands. Again following Freidson’s analysis of professionalism, these expansive
positions might mean that the formation and strengthening of an independent
body of knowledge is hampered. Likewise, replicating what police officers holding
the fourth position have said, it appears that the profound division of policing
tasks and other policing occupations could impact negatively on their legitimacy as
a distinct discipline.
In this respect, both the protective and the expansive positions have their own
particular down-sides. Professions that are self-absorbed with their own tasks
could fail to acknowledge outside needs. In other words, a strong inward focus on
their own professional project overlooks the consequences of a further division of
policing, a full retreat of the police to core tasks and a strict and somewhat artificial
allegiance to quality of life tasks by municipal officers. In contrast to this, the last
two positions invite other reflections. An overt eagerness to take on more and more
tasks could hamper professional work performance and the development of an
8. This position brings to mind one of the scenario’s presented by Van Stokkom and Foekens (2015).
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independent profession. Striving for ever new responsibilities might stand in the
way of structural training and practice, and the acquirement of a “body of shared
knowledge” (Abbott, 1988). This latter consideration is all the more relevant as the
third position described here might well become the most dominant one. The
developments in municipal disorder policing point to a likely further replacement
of police officers by municipal officers on tasks such as dealing with night life,
street youth, a large range of traffic offences, and intensified contacts with citizens
(see also Van Stokkom & Foekens, 2015).
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10 Conclusions
The aim of this study was to develop a better understanding of Dutch municipal
disorder policing in its societal, organisational and professional context. By adopt‐
ing a multi-level approach and involving diverse stakeholders, the resulting
impression is that of a fragmented occupation that is subject to various interests
and expectations. For one part it is the canvas upon which societal changes are pro‐
jected; for instance, a growth in feelings of insecurity, or ideas about the erosion of
collective norms. For another part, it might be the battle ground of local stakehold‐
ers as diverse as managers, frontline professionals and politicians, each with their
own views, interests and ways of decision making. For yet another part, it is one of
the prime areas in which changes in policing come to the surface and various ideas
about policing are made manifest.
This concluding chapter reveals dominant factors and perspectives by discus‐
sing and reflecting on the findings. This is done in four consecutive sections. Sec‐
tion 1 serves as an overview of the most important findings and as an introduction
to the sections that follow. In section 2 these findings are discussed in depth – the
concluding thoughts on dominant developments in municipal disorder policing.
Next, section 3 further reflects on these conclusions by referring back to several
sociological interpretations that were presented in chapter 3. The last section offers
a final discussion.
1 Findings: an overview
The development of municipal disorder policing
Municipal disorder policing is a relatively new profession with a short, specific his‐
tory that has a large impact on contemporary goals and views. Chapter 5 described
this development. The first forms of municipal disorder policing in the Nether‐
lands should be seen as part of a nation-wide focus on crime prevention. At the
end of the 1980s, city wardens were introduced after the Roethof Committee had
urged a new approach to the high level of petty crime in Dutch society. Reducing
the opportunities for such crimes was a then dominant approach and thus these
first wardens were mainly employed as basic uniformed surveillance, as guardians
to reduce the opportunities for vandalism, bicycle theft, shop lifting, etcetera.
The popularity of situational crime prevention in policy is but one of the factors
that explains how city wardens developed. The rapid spread of projects for city
wardens in the 1990’s is as much the result of the availability of unemployment
arrangements. Hence, the wish for ‘more eyes on the streets’ appeared to be at least
as important as providing unemployed people with a job. However, the promi‐
nence of these work reintegration goals hindered a clear definition of disorder
policing goals. At the same time, the wardens’ subordination to the police ham‐
pered their own unambiguous occupational identity; city wardens were simply
often employed to do surveillance chores that the police deemed unworthy of their
attention.
A first substantial change in early municipal disorder policing came in the first
years of the 21st century. In all municipalities in this study wardens were merged
into new city surveillance agencies and the emphasis in municipal disorder polic‐
ing shifted to firmer and tougher forms of law enforcement – ‘making a difference’
by imposing sanctions. This shift in approach, to a certain extent, can be attributed
to a national political urge for strict enforcement and less leniency. Other factors
which contributed to this shift concerned new ways of measuring citizens’ annoy‐
ances and feelings of insecurity, and the Dutch police’s tendency to focus on ‘core
tasks’. At the same time, the budget cuts for unemployment benefit schemes forced
municipalities to discuss the financing of city wardens. These developments con‐
tributed to the establishment of municipal city surveillance agencies and a begin‐
ning was made to attract new officers who were expected to fine (known as BOAs).
The emphasis on law enforcement and the quest for occupational pride and a new
occupational identity developed hand in hand.
In recent years these enforcement ambitions have been tempered. The city sur‐
veillance agencies have reconsidered their tasks and strategies. By and large this
has led to a (re)orientation on issues of physical disorder, such as littering,
unleashed dogs or parking violations. In addition, and in contrast to the strict tar‐
gets of fining of the preceding years, behavioural compliance has come to deter‐
mine disorder policing approaches. Finally, all municipal departments have turned
to some form of citizen oriented policing, implying that ‘minor annoyances’ and
residents’ concerns are given prominence in the work of municipal officers.
Local decision making
In chapter 6 the analysis shifted to a meso level, thereby showing that disorder
policing developments are as much the result of municipal policies and local stake‐
holders as of national policies. Three different ‘logics’ determine decision making
at this municipal level.
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First, decisions might be the result of political interests in disorder policing. On
the one hand a classic form of political decision making generally concerns specific
formative moments with regard to city surveillance agencies. On the other hand,
political decisions on disorder policing at times are stimulated by close contact
between the local administration and particular citizen groups. Likewise, the spe‐
cial interests of mayors in ‘their own’ enforcement workers play a large role here,
especially where the police tend to withdraw from minor disorder issues. Such
political interference often defines the work of municipal officers as a flexibly
employable form of disorder policing.
Second, local decisions might also be under the strong influence of managerial
logic. Senior managers in particular decide on disorder policing by using various
means of measurement that allow them to objectify disorder issues, such as quality
of life monitors or residents’ reports. At the same time these managers appear to
realize that citizens’ opinions about quality of life are but to a limited extent related
to the deployment of municipal officers. Thus, they do not use monitors and
reports as performance measurement in retrospect, but as ‘pre performance meas‐
urement’ to select the hotspots where officers are probably most useful. This way
of thinking is not confined to managers. Some municipal officers are equally dedi‐
cated to such figures and reports.
Finally, decisions might also be the result of frontline logic when disorder polic‐
ing is decided upon through everyday insights and ideas of municipal officers and
their operational coordinators. Instead of embracing top-down assignments, front‐
line professionals might equally highlight the worth of their own observations, or
their contacts with residents and other frontline professionals. Obviously, such
frontline notions could lead to conflicts with stakeholders who attach more value
to the measurable output mentioned above.
These different approaches to which problems should be tackled and how, result in
conflicts and tensions between stakeholders. For instance, municipal officers’ dedi‐
cation to formal assignments and citizens’ reports might lead to frustration among
partners who see this managerial approach as detached from neighbourhood reali‐
ties. Equally, managers and frontline professionals criticize political interference as
it draws attention away from their own assessments.
Views of professionals
Chapter 7 further scrutinised the ideas of municipal officers. Their reflections may
be divided into two segments – what they see as their prime responsibilities and
what they see as the most appropriate approach to disorderly behaviour.
Regarding their responsibilities, certain notions are strongly represented in any
and all reflections of municipal officers. The most prominent of these is the idea of
citizens’ annoyances. However, the explanation of how these annoyances should
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inform their work differs widely among officers. This results in large differences in
work style. Some directly interact with residents to find out what bothers them the
most, whereas others embrace managerial assignments. Some look for coordina‐
tion and collaboration with other neighbourhood professionals about these issues
(‘co-creational neighbourhood policing’), and yet others have a broader perspec‐
tive, picking up any issue of disorder they come across during their shifts (referred
to here as ‘street policing’).
This divergence also applies to officers’ views on non-compliant citizens. Most
officers see a respectable and decent treatment (bejegening) of non-compliant citi‐
zens as highly important. Some expand this to the context of a rule infringement;
not every infringement deserves the same response. In this respect the notion of
‘discretionary autonomy’ plays a prominent part in the discourse of these profes‐
sionals. Yet other professionals are more prone to consistent law enforcement, and
for different reasons. They might value their assignments, might believe consistent
fining sends a clear message that certain behaviour will not be tolerated, or they
believe strict law enforcement is the only answer for certain ‘target groups’.1
To sum up, municipal officers have developed into a new profession and have
learned to determine their chief responsibilities and the best approaches to non-
compliant citizens. Although these officers are typical street level bureaucrats
whose diversity of views brings to mind the variety in approaches of regular police
officers, some elements appear to be characteristic for their work. The most promi‐
nent of these is the combination of a focus on residents’ concerns and the occa‐
sional (but unmistakable) urge for strict enforcement, and the conflicts that could
arise between these two views.
Hotspots
After having discussed municipal disorder policing on various levels, chapter 8
presented two case studies that show how various ‘logics’ of local decision making
could reinforce each other. In two cases of policing ‘target groups’ – street youth in
the first case, and drug dealers, drug users and homeless people in the second case
– new municipal policy was shown to be the result of various factors. Not only did
the political focus on the grievances of a group of residents play a large role, also
coordinators’ ambitions to display the vigour of their officers, a managerial focus
on control and measurement, and the refusal of the police to increase their efforts
were of vital importance.
As a result, frontline professionals are more tightly controlled and steered, both
through measurement tools, stricter role definitions and more subject to the
authority of municipal managers. This confines their work, for an important part,
to hotspots and the deterring of the ‘target group members’ they find there.
1. A category that is comparable to what Reiner (2010) calls ‘police property’.
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Although quite a few professionals agree with this harsh approach to target
groups, frontline professionals’ experiences and views also conflict with their
assignments, ranging from sheer boredom at the sight of empty hotspots, to frus‐
tration at the assignments they get, to unease about the policy of strict enforce‐
ment. As such, these cases show that the variety of work styles and professionals’
views discussed in chapter 7 are under pressure in these new policies.
Strife over work domains
The final empirical chapter 9 dealt with the relations between police officers and
municipal officers. It showed that municipal officers’ emphasis on specific aspects
of their work is also greatly dependent on how they perceive their relations with
the regular police. This chapter showed that these two occupations do not have sta‐
ble, well-defined work domains, but that municipal officers and police officers
strive about definitions of goals and (core) tasks, and thereby disorder policing
itself.
Four positions in this strife were discerned, either highlighting the differences
or the similarities between the two occupations. On the one hand, both municipal
and police officers are prone to defend the uniqueness of their own profession by
highlighting respective core tasks – ‘catching crooks’ in the case of police officers
(position 1) and ‘quality of life issues’ in the case of municipal officers (position 2).
On the other hand, two other positions maintain a broader view of their respective
tasks. A third position thus sees municipal officers as capable of performing more
police-like work, whereas a fourth position maintains (conversely) that the police
should actually do all disorder policing.
2 A new profession dealing with disorder
Throughout these findings several characteristics of municipal disorder policing
stand out. First of all, the goals of city surveillance agencies and the work carried
out by municipal officers, for an important part, can be seen as typical for a newly
evolving profession. In that respect, municipal officers are still developing their
own professional domain and have to cope with the reputation of alleged unpro‐
fessional predecessors. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in subsec‐
tion 1. Second, Dutch municipalities shape disorder policing with a clear prefer‐
ence for specific goals and strategies. These are discussed in subsections 2, 3, and 4.
2.1 A new profession and its quest for organised autonomy
The initial decision to involve long term unemployed people for surveillance tasks
has cast a long shadow over municipal disorder policing, if not in professional
deficiencies, then in reputation. The early city wardens were generally only hired
10 Conclusions 179
for their uniformed presence, and work reintegration was more important than
public safety goals. Lacking a history as a surveillance profession and an associated
“body of shared knowledge” (Abbott, 1988), these officers could hardly be called a
profession at all. It is this image that set the stage for the phases to come. Municipal
officers’ values and preferences up to this day are haunted by the reputation of
‘living dolls’ and ‘uniformed road barriers’. Consequently, policies emphasising
more and tougher law enforcement at the beginning of the 2000s were not only the
result of political demands. Municipal managers’ urge to make a complete break
with the past and to prove the usefulness of the new municipal agencies should
not be overlooked as reasons to claim more powers and effectuate enforcement
strategies.
Thus dominant views in the practice of municipal disorder policing, for an
important part, can be understood as the result of a new occupation’s striving for
organised autonomy (chapter 9; Freidson, 1971). These officers, their managers and
coordinators have had to carve out their own habitat in the policing domain, prove
themselves to be a valuable policing occupation and combat a negative reputation.
The resulting self-awareness and occupational pride impact heavily on this new
profession and how it has professionalised over the years. Moreover, successive
phases in the development of municipal disorder policing can also be seen through
this lens of an evolving new profession. If the urge to ‘make a difference’ can be
explained as part of a self-assertive shedding of the past, the subsequent emphasis
on behavioural compliance for its part can be seen as countering the reputation of
‘fine-hunting officers’.
This process of an evolving occupational identity can also be framed in terms of
supply and demand (chapter 7; see also Bittner, 1970). Those involved in municipal
disorder policing became increasingly aware that they could decide autonomously
on their supply of policing without merely focussing on external demands of citi‐
zens reporting disorder. As such, municipal disorder policing became more of a
proper profession over the years, a new occupational group in which officers
developed their own professional habitat, using their own knowledge and exper‐
tise in response to citizens’ demands (Freidson, 2001).
However, this growing consciousness of independence as a new policing pro‐
fession cannot be considered as a uniform and evolutionary succession of different
stages. The preceding chapters discussed several practices that show that profes‐
sional autonomy played only a minor role (and even was given up) or – by contrast
– was given an exaggerated role. On the one hand, cases have been discussed in
which disorder policing is uncritically defined by the demands of citizens. In these
cases officers are forced to comply with requests by citizens as consumers without
further consideration. Chapters 6 and 8 provided examples of cases of hotspot
policing in which officers’ judgment was overruled by managerial and political
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decision makers and officers were simply expected to respond to citizens’ wishes.2
On the other hand, municipal officers might be strongly focused on their own
internal concerns and disregard external demands. Officers and coordinators at
times are still keen to prove that they are a valuable profession. It can partly
explain the tendency to look for new, police-like tasks (chapters 8 and 9), and the
tendency to claim typical municipal surveillance work in contrast to the domain of
the regular police.
In effect, municipal disorder policing can only be understood as part of a pro‐
fessional project in which the use of a specific discourse also functions to provide
autonomy to occupations (Larson, 1977, see also chapter 9). As such, terms such as
leefbaarheid (‘quality of life’) and kleine ergernissen (‘minor annoyances’), or veiligheid
(‘public safety’) and boeven vangen (‘catching crooks’) might function primarily as
occupational projections onto reality, reflecting the urge of professionals to carve
out their own work domain (see further section 4).
2.2 Citizens’ concerns at a central position?
From the outset citizens’ concerns have been at the core of municipal efforts to
fight disorder. Early city wardens focused on civic fear and discontent caused by
an abundance of petty crimes (chapter 5). Later on, the emphasis shifted to minor
annoyances. Thereby the needs, demands and fears of citizens directly informed the
work of these officers. As stated before, this was increased by the growing use of
new means of measurement, giving municipalities more information about what
bothered residents the most. In addition, terms that captured civic concerns – such
as leefbaarheid (‘quality of life’) or of schoon, heel en veilig (‘clean, intact and safe’) –
started to dominate municipal policies during the 1990s.
More recent policies are also imbued with citizens’ concerns. Municipal policies
prioritise common annoyances and residents are sometimes given the opportunity
to define directly which disorder problems should be dealt with. As such, munici‐
pal disorder policing is reminiscent of forms of community policing that involve
citizens in defining problems, or that expand the responsibilities of officers (chap‐
ter 3; Herbert, 2001; Skogan, 2006). In specific local projects residents are involved
in identifying problems and agenda setting, such as the citizen participation project
in Eindhoven, described in chapter 6, or similar projects such as the Buurt bestuurt
(the neighbourhood governs) in several other cities. However, these forms of citi‐
zen participation are used mostly to collect reports and to stimulate the ‘eyes and
ears’-function of the citizenry, not to bolster informal social control.
In this respect, not the reinvestment in citizenship or social cohesion, but resi‐
dents’ concerns are given prominence. That is, without a necessary relation to ‘col‐
lective efficacy’ (Sampson, Raudenbusch & Earls, 1997; Taylor, 2006). Dutch munic‐
2. Although some would also see the execution of assignments as a trademark of professionalism.
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ipal disorder policing is often informed by fairly straightforward ideas of serving
residents’ needs, leaving out why it might be important to address minor rule
infringements. Moreover, this focus on citizens’ concerns in many cases is particu‐
larly framed in the new public management discourse that depicts the citizen as a
‘customer’. Although individual officers might criticize managerial tools, (pre-)per‐
formance management and New Public Management-style analyses appear to be
important. Apparently, the objectification of disorder in managerial instruments
provides strong and convincing proof of what matters the most.
A direct consequence of this way of dealing with citizens’ concerns is that
‘policing the figures’ becomes a goal in itself. This is a typical example of goal dis‐
placement (Merton, 1968): quality of life indicators and report figures are adminis‐
trative abstractions of neighbourhood (dis)order, but quite often disorder policing
itself becomes defined by these abstractions. Hence individual contacts with citi‐
zens reporting issues matter less than aggregated patterns of complaints and disor‐
der policing becomes synonymous with responding to citizens’ reports on an
aggregated and abstract level. As a result, many respondents claim that city sur‐
veillance agencies are becoming alienated from the very same citizen they regard
so highly.
2.3 Pragmatic management of disorderly behaviour
Although municipal officers have largely changed from city wardens to professio‐
nal enforcement officers, the basic assumptions of their preventive approaches
have not. The idea that disorder is the result of situational opportunities and lack
of control remains highly influential. It is assumed that people behave in a disor‐
derly fashion, ranging from putting their household waste outside too early, to
street youth hanging around and causing noise, because nobody effectively
watches them and there is nothing or nobody to prevent them from acting in a dis‐
orderly manner.
What did change is the way that situational interventions are framed. Chapter 5
described how departments for surveillance now aim for behavioural compliance.
A term that says it all – rule infringements are seen as behavioural deviations that
can be prevented by influencing the choices of those who commit them. In their
own accounts of their work municipal officers also emphasise that it is important
to respond properly to non-compliant citizens, stimulating behaviour in various
ways and regulating behaviour by ‘decent treatment’ (chapter 7). This suggests
that the management of disorderly behaviour is generally deemed more important
than only giving fines to citizens.
However, municipal disorder policing is largely devoid of ambitions about
structurally altering the views of non-compliant citizens. Hence merely the situa‐
tional opportunities and temptations, not the beliefs of non-compliant citizens are
targeted. In yet other words, and adding to the previous section, neither informal
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social control, nor the beliefs of those that break the rules appear to play a promi‐
nent role in municipal disorder policing (save the ideas of some individual offi‐
cers). What is left is a pragmatic and precautionary focus on a range of behavioural
interventions, depending on the situational circumstances on the spot. Often this
implies officers aim at ‘solving problems by talking’.
On the surface, this image seems to be at odds with trends of strict law enforce‐
ment that have been discussed throughout this study. As noted, these trends can
often be related to a turn in Dutch national policy in the beginning of the 2000s
(Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice, 2002; cf. chapters 2 and 5). At that
time the idea of setting clear limits and being harsh on minor rule infringements
– in a zero tolerance style – became fashionable, but as noted above the urge for
strict enforcement was also stimulated by the rising professionalism of a new occu‐
pational group that feels it has to prove itself. Recent varieties of strict enforcement
– as discussed in chapter 8 – are often focused on particular localities and target
groups. However, on closer inspection these varieties of strict enforcement do not
differ qualitatively from the approaches of behavioural management discussed
above, although these interventions are mainly confined to deterrent options.
Moreover, these varieties can be seen as extreme examples of service provision in
which municipalities respond to continued reporting by a group of residents, often
encouraged by the attention paid to them by political players.
2.4 Hotspot policing
The prominence of service provision and a down to earth situational approach
might also explain the popularity of hotspot policing. The (rhetorical) claims that
disorder policing is meant to close the gap between local government and neigh‐
bourhood residents, have meant that in practice those areas where people report
the most complaints enjoy priority. Even the participation projects are less about
building trust between officers and residents than they are about instrumentally
collecting more reports (cf. Terpstra, 2016). Hotspot policing basically enables pro‐
viding service to those areas with most demands. Moreover, hotspot policing pro‐
vides an opportunity to adapt flexibly the investment of policing capacity based on
what might work best in each situation. By sheer uniformed presence, by fining as
a means of deterrence or by warning as another tactic to prevent disorderly behav‐
iour, the hotspot policing discussed here appears devoid of ambitions to structur‐
ally change citizens’ behaviour for the better. Likewise, harsher approaches to rule
infringements are merely meant as disincentives.
This hotspot approach is further encouraged by the prominence of managerial
logic described above. Those aspects of disorder that can be counted (literally) are
given prominence over less measurable aspects (cf. Pollitt, 1993). Moreover, hot‐
spot thinking is strengthened by political logic in focusing on the grievances of res‐
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idents, directing attention to places with the highest incidences of burglaries,
youths hanging around or junkies.3 Although these views have found their way
straight into the views of a sizeable share of the municipal officers (chapter 7), this
confinement of frontline work to strict requests and targets calls into question
whether municipal officers have sufficient room to shape their work according to
their personal (frontline) views and experiences. In section 4 this issue will be
addressed more extensively.
In summary, Dutch municipal disorder policing for the greater part defies categori‐
sation in the policing strategies discussed in chapter 2. Although some characteris‐
tics of the broken windows theory and community policing can be noted in the
policies and practices of city surveillance agencies, strengthening informal social
control, nor zero tolerance style policing as done in Giuliani’s New York are rele‐
vant in the context of Dutch municipal disorder policing. Dutch municipalities
appear to give disorder policing their own particular twist. If there is one strategy
that does appear to have a strong influence however, it is situational crime preven‐
tion. Theories and assumptions of opportunity reduction have been of constant
relevance for the practice of municipal disorder policing, be it in terms of situa‐
tional disincentives to prevent pretty crimes, or more elaborate strategies of behav‐
ioural compliance.
3 Interpreting municipal disorder policing
After having discussed municipal disorder policing as a new profession with spe‐
cific strategies and goals, this section interprets these developments against the
background of social, political and cultural changes. It does so by referring to the
four sociological interpretations discussed in chapter 3. The first interpretation pre‐
sented here is a benevolent reading, seeing municipal disorder policing as a
response to the general disappearance of informal social control and rooted in con‐
cerns about ‘The Citizen’ in general. In contrast to this, the second, sceptical inter‐
pretation links municipal disorder policing to the interests of a specific group of
complaining citizens who know how to influence the local government. The other
two interpretations discuss municipal disorder policing as rooted in governmental
concerns (instead of those of citizens). The third interpretation claims that disorder
policing should be seen as a state attempt at regaining symbolic authority, whereas
3. In some cases, frontline logic appears to be claimed as part of a political endeavor, such as in Rot‐
terdam’s regime change in public safety policy (Tops, 2007; see also chapter 2). The difference here
seems to lie in the political prioritising (and even marketing) of frontline action in Rotterdam, often
based on temporal or confined integral projects and meant to address notorious hotspots, versus
frontline logic described here, that seems to be characterised by a more spontaneous dynamic
between various professionals that ‘find each other’ in their common concerns, that ‘speak the
same language’ and address issues through ‘short lines’.
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the fourth interpretation claims that disorder policing is part of a governmental
focus on control and risk reduction.
3.1 Bolstering informal social control?
The descriptions above conjure up a rather pragmatic image of municipalities’
involvement with residents, as their interaction with citizens appears to boil down
to responding to reports and investing in behavioural regulation. Yet there might
be more behind this seemingly shallow focus on citizens’ reports – a concern about
neighbourhood decline and a common diagnosis of its root causes.
Firstly, some municipal politicians and managers appear to worry about pro‐
found problems beneath citizens’ concerns. In Nijmegen for instance, respondents
refer to worried citizens who felt abandoned by the police and the local govern‐
ment. In The Hague municipal policy for the new city surveillance agency is
informed by concerns about neighbourhood decline. Feelings of security among
citizens also played (and still play) an important role. Increased monitoring and
measuring residents’ concerns and their feelings of insecurity result in a claim that
addressing antisocial behaviour and related annoyances is of importance to keep
public places ‘liveable’ and inviting, making sure that the streets are safe enough to
attract visitors and customers. Secondly, municipalities agree in their diagnosis of
the causes for neighbourhood decline – the disappearance of informal social con‐
trol and the general erosion of social cohesion. This brings to mind Jane Jacobs’
work about the decline of social interaction in urban landscapes and the absence of
‘eyes on the streets’ (although she blames urban planning for it; cf. Jacobs, 1962).
Hence early forms of municipal disorder policing by city wardens were part of
the answer to these urban and social changes. These officers were meant to be new
‘eyes on the streets’, informed by worries about the decline in public spaces. In
addition, in a few specific, emblematic cases, problems, for instance with drug
dealers and users contributed to the idea that norms were eroding and the ‘public‐
ness’ of public spaces was lost (cf. Lyes, 2015). Thus, comparable to Jacobs’ seem‐
ingly regretful analysis of urban change, some respondents bring to mind ‘the
good old days’ in which people used to correct each other (Zukin, 2010; cf. Rana‐
singhe, 2012). Likewise, recent policies in cities like Nijmegen and Rotterdam aim
at officers who ‘know and are known’ locally, not only to collect more reports, but
ideally to get a better understanding of the neighbourhoods they patrol, at times
even suggesting stimulating informal social control by using ‘familiar faces’.
In general however, such ideas about bolstering social cohesion or informal
social control appear to be more of a rhetorical exception in Dutch municipal disor‐
der policing. Although these ideas might have an impact on public safety policies
of some municipalities (Van Houdt & Schinkel, 2014), citizens’ concerns mostly
appear to matter in themselves, and not because communities need to be strength‐
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ened or residents are expected to take social control into their own hands.4 The rea‐
sons for this prominence of citizens’ concerns are varied and rather hard to discern
in a discourse that merely states that ‘the citizen should be listened to’. These may
be related to consumerist ideas of serving citizens’ needs, to democratic beliefs that
citizens must be given the opportunity to partake in local decision making, or to a
sheer urge for measurability. In any case, municipal officers and managers accept
the erosion of collective norms, sometimes resignedly, and conclude that informal
order is something from the past. Officers do not have the ambition to restore that
order, they merely ‘fill the vacancy’ and their interventions in public spaces are a
long shot from providing the opportunity for ‘strangers to meet’ or for a ‘sidewalk
ballet’ (Jacobs, 1962).5
3.2 Reclaiming public spaces as exclusivist practice?
Other findings in this study oppose a benevolent interpretation altogether and
point to the more exclusivist tendencies in disorder policing. This particularly
applies to forms of law enforcement that deal with specific ‘target groups’. The
policing of street youth or homeless people for instance, is generally not accompa‐
nied by punitive or disciplinary intentions, or by attempts at correcting behaviour.
These practices can be simply considered as an ‘aesthetic removal’.6 The creative
and expansive application of powers by municipal officers further supports such
exclusivist tendencies. In this respect, denouncing hanging around in doorways
and ‘fixing target groups up with a fine’ bring to mind what has been said about
‘defining deviancy up’ and the ‘anti-social behaviour agenda’ in chapter 3. In addi‐
tion to such target group policing, more general questions can be raised about
municipalities’ relations with citizens. The reports and quality of life scans men‐
tioned as important managerial instruments restrict neighbourhood order and dis‐
order to a narrow interpretation as only those familiar with the process of report‐
ing are heard. This emphasis on reporting strips disorder of a context that might
provide more understanding of the causes of disruptive conduct, such as underly‐
ing conflicts, intolerance or bad-temperedness of those who complain (see also sec‐
tion 4).
4. This in fact is a stance that is reminiscent of Dutch varieties of community policing (Terpstra,
2008b, cf. chapter 2). As such, these findings contradict the advent of a ‘participation society’ or a
‘do-it-yourself democracy’ (Van de Wijdeven, 2012).
5. If there is any indication of municipal officers acting as officers that provide opportunities for care‐
free interaction – as Jacobs would have it – it would be in the notion of being a host in public
spaces. However, this idea of ‘hosting’ is under pressure in times when municipal officers are keen
to assert themselves as proper policing officers and are eager for new and more tasks that are alleg‐
edly more serious (chapter 9).
6. See also Walby & Lippert (2011) on the dispersal of homeless people by conservation officers in
Ottawa, Canada (cf. Allen & Crookes, 2009; Becket & Herbert, 2010; Millie, 2008).
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Such findings raise the question how such a parochial vision of neighbourhood
order must be understood. Interpreted sceptically, these practices could be seen as
the result of revanchist tendencies of middle class citizens. These citizens want to
cleanse their environment of those that tarnish the reputation of their neighbour‐
hood and have a negative influence on their quality of life (cf. Smith, 1996). How‐
ever, in the cases discussed here there is but little evidence for such class-based
revanchism. First of all, residents’ frustrations do not appear to be rooted in a spe‐
cific class-based urge to drive out marginal people. Rather, complaining residents
feel threatened by drug dealers and drug users or they claim they are tired of street
youth disturbing their sleep. Moreover, neo-liberalism has but little explanatory
value here (unlike Smith’s analyses of revanchism), especially since municipal offi‐
cers predominantly patrol neighbourhoods and parks where notions of ‘keeping
the city free for consumption’ hardly applies (Sleiman & Lippert, 2010). If there is
any indication for exclusivist law enforcement in these terms this is limited to spe‐
cific urban areas and times (cf. Hae, 2011; Hobbs et al., 2000; Van Aalst & Van
Liempt, 2012). In addition, in the Netherlands municipal disorder policing by and
large is still done by public providers and paid for by public resources, unlike else‐
where, where for instance, some public areas are incorporated in business develop‐
ment districts and the policing of disorder seems to be part of a further neo-liberal
privatisation of public places (Beckett & Herbert, 2008; Mitchell & Staeheli, 2006;
Smith, 2002; Terpstra et al., 2013). Lastly, even the toughest approaches described
here show that the deterrent approach by municipal officers is often but one of
many strategies and rationalities in play. Numerous other partners and organisa‐
tions deal with these ‘target groups’, ranging from health care and psychiatric aid,
to youth work and social work (see also Baillergeau, 2014; Deverteuil, May & von
Mahs, 2009).
Instead of an intended exclusion of marginal groups, ‘sweeping the streets’
often seems to be more related to the managerial ambitions and the evolving pro‐
fessional identity of municipal officers described above. As such, municipalities do
not opt for an open war on deviancy, but want measurable results in streets and
areas with recurring problems. Hotspots are expected to be downscaled, the num‐
ber of residents’ reports is meant to drop and their evaluation of the district to go
up. These measurable goals can allegedly be achieved most easily if the persons
who cause trouble in these hotspots are simply deterred. By predominantly listen‐
ing to a group of citizens and prioritising their annoyances, municipalities define
disorder as merely that which irritates citizens the most.
3.3 Symbolic politics: acting decisively and regaining authority?
Hence municipal disorder policing is but seldom meant as a downright exclusion
of marginal groups. Often it is the combination of different interests and ‘logics’
defining its practice as such. In other words, instead of seeing these practices as the
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conscious defence of middle class status, a variety of interests determines relatively
strict enforcement approaches – those of managers, officers and – last but not least
– politicians.
This points to a third way of interpreting seemingly exclusivist policies – look‐
ing at what politicians and local government actors would have to gain from such
policies. Here David Garland’s theory of a culture of control could be of help. As
discussed in chapter 3, Garland (2001) refers to a policy predicament of high crime
(and disorder) and insufficient state capacity to deal with it. Policies of strict law
enforcement by municipalities might be seen as a way to deny this predicament. In
fact, by emotionalised reactions, vocal ‘acting out’, and a ‘turn to the people’ who
have to be protected against the “fearsome stranger”, local governments might
well attempt to regain authority over issues of crime and disorder (2001: 137).7
Many findings support this view. Disorder policy in some cases can be interpre‐
ted as a governmental desire to regain an authoritative reputation, as interventions
with strong symbolic characteristics. Rotterdam’s efforts to reclaim the streets for
instance (chapter 5), or – again – the vocal and tough responses to target groups in
the cases of chapter 8 can all be seen as examples of ‘acting out’, responding to the
demands of a frustrated citizenry meant to reinvest in the idea that the local gov‐
ernment is in control. Moreover, as these local policies were stirred into action by
the pressure applied by small groups of residents, they are adjusted to the interests
of the victims of disorder. In other words, neighbourhood residents’ fears and frus‐
trations define municipal policies.8 This is underscored by officers when they state
they are obliged to keep on patrolling in empty hotspots and when they resignedly
observe there is a lack of structural solutions for disorder. Sometimes they state
that their work consists of removing the source of citizens’ annoyances and
acknowledging their feelings of insecurity by reassuring them through physical
presence. In this respect, ‘reassurance policing’ appears to play a somewhat ambiv‐
alent role. Neither in the policies as described in chapter 5 nor in the views of
municipal officers this concept is highly regarded. However, when political logic
dominates decision making, as described in chapter 8, reassurance by uniformed
municipal workers does appear to play an important role.
In these cases politicians and local government actors such as mayors and
aldermen interfere more directly with their own forces of municipal surveillance,
transmitting citizens’ wishes directly to ‘their’ municipal officers. Nevertheless, it
might not be these citizens’ interests that are decisive here. Quite a few respond‐
7. The policy predicament on which Garland’s rests his theories in the Netherlands can be recognised
most clearly in the 1980s when the Roethof committee was launched. One of the reasons why the
Roethof committee was established in the first place was because police and justice did not seem to
be capable of addressing the abundance of petty crimes. Other partners had to be involved. Munic‐
ipalities and their early city wardens were among the first to deal with the large number of petty
crimes.
8. As such, municipal disorder policing might be devoid of considerations about how to enhance
trust between citizens, but it might still enhance the trust of citizens in government agencies.
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ents are candid about the eagerness of council members to pay attention to resi‐
dents’ whims from electoral motivations (cf. Garland, 2001: 131). Municipal offi‐
cers’ own views and judgments are overruled in these cases, and their discretion‐
ary autonomy is smothered in political demands. They become ‘civil servants’ in
the most literal meaning of that term: servants of citizens.
3.4 Managing risks and controlling deviancy?
This focus on governmental interests also provides an opportunity to understand
other aspects of disorder policing discussed here. As said, municipalities seem
mostly interested in managing the risks of (numerous) rule infringements by influ‐
encing the behaviour of non-compliant citizens in certain situations. This could be
seen as representing another characteristic of Garland’s notion of a culture of con‐
trol. In their adaptive response to high crime (and disorder), governments invest in
behavioural management, initially through opportunity reduction, later through
problem oriented strategies (see section 2). Such strategies reflect the dominance of
a risk reduction paradigm, as order is upheld by a basic controlling of opportuni‐
ties and thus reducing the risk that rule infringements occur in the first place.9
The notion of a culture of control highlights deviancy as part of everyday life:
crime and disorder are seen as arbitrary, quotidian events, and it is plausible that
any individual will take advantage of opportunities (Felson, 1998; Garland, 1999).
This seems to apply to how city surveillance agencies approach littering and park‐
ing a car in the wrong spot. In the municipal response to such infringements the
malleability of situations plays a key role. Thus through the emphasis on situa‐
tional crime prevention non-compliant citizens are expected to be sensitive to dis‐
incentives. Policing disorder in these cases does not lead to excluding the disor‐
derly or re-conquering lost neighbourhoods but is tailored to minor interventions
in opportunity structures. Such ideas are also expressed by municipal officers
described in chapter 7. Officers’ cynical view that most or perhaps even all people
are incorrigible and that normative standards have declined in general, logically
leads to a preference for dealing with disorder by controlling it. Even the adminis‐
tering of fines is often considered to be a behavioural intervention that is meant to
have a preventative effect on other citizens, as a strategy that in some cases might
work best to control widespread misbehaviour. The growing tendency to use
municipal officers for surveillance in hotspots, during night times and for areas
9. As discussed in chapter 3, Garland notes how state actors also adapt to the predicament of high
crime and low capacity by filtering cases out of the criminal justice system. By ‘defining deviancy
down’, the amount of behaviour that will become penalised is lowered, thus demanding less
capacity. However, the developments in Dutch municipal disorder policing appear to be indica‐
tions of the opposite. Although some maintain the invention of administrative fines and penal
orders could be seen as support for ‘defining deviancy down’ as a large amount of incivilities are
kept out of the criminal justice system (see for instance Devroe, 2012), these new forms of law
enforcement show in fact more instead of less forms of behaviour are subject to fines.
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where the police claim to lack capacity also points to the dominance of a risk man‐
agement paradigm. These officers are deemed to be most suitable for controlling
anti-social behaviour in specific areas with a high incidence of incivilities (see also
Van Stokkom & Foekens, 2015).
Furthermore, the idea of behavioural control can be recognised in the ‘network
approaches’ of some municipal departments. In effect, not only municipal officers
deal with rule infringements, but other responsible municipal parties are also
involved in helping to manage disorderly behaviour. These departments, such as
Public Maintenance or Urban Planning, share in the responsibility for behavioural
management. These networks may be called examples of ‘preventative partner‐
ships’ in a Garlandian fashion. Through a more tight-knit network of partners
– involving those originally outside public safety, such as youth work or healthcare
(see chapter 8) – the control of deviancy has certainly expanded.
This section reflected on the findings from four different angles. The first two of
these sociological interpretations are useful to explain some specific policies. The
benevolent reading that sees disorder policing as rooted in concerns about the loss
of informal social control for instance, seems apt to interpret some of the initial
impetuses to city surveillance agencies. Viewing disorder policing as an exclusivist
practice might have relevance for specific cases in which ‘target groups’ are scared
off.
However, municipal disorder policing is not only about residents’ wishes to get
rid of deviant groups. Garland’s theory of a culture of control shows that new
forms of municipal disorder policing provide politicians, managers and officers
alike with the opportunity to show force and decisive action, thus hoping to regain
authority. Hence, residents’ wishes are also encapsulated and appropriated by
managers and politicians to meet their own interests. This study is rich in examples
that support that view. At the same time city surveillance agencies appear predom‐
inantly concerned with containing and controlling a set of disorder issues. As a
result, municipalities have embraced various risk management strategies to pre‐
vent rule infringements.
4 Discussion
This book dealt with a new response to concerns about incivilities and anti-social
behaviour – municipal disorder policing. It portrayed a profession that at times
might be searching for its occupational identity, but that also claims to know how
to deal with disorder effectively.
This pragmatic focus on the effects of situational prevention leaves other, more
fundamental approaches to disorder aside. In this respect, the earlier debates
between proponents of a ‘root causes’ approach to crime and disorder and those
supporting situational crime prevention have clearly been concluded in favour of
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the latter. In a classical article on situational crime prevention, Clarke made a point
for a more “realistic approach” to crime prevention by emphasizing “choices and
decisions made by the offender” (Clarke, 1980: 136). Clarke targeted the dominance
of the root causes theory: an overt stress on ‘dispositions’ of offenders makes it
“difficult to achieve any effects, i.e. in relation to the psychological events or the
social and economic conditions that are supposed to generate criminal disposi‐
tions” (ibid.: 137). By contrast, Dutch municipal disorder policing is connected with
Clarke’s pragmatic ‘alternative’: situational interventions only aim to influence
people’s choices. As such, this profession does not pretend to provide answers to
citizens’ deeper concerns about disorder and does not deal with what could be
behind incivilities, littered streets, non-compliance or a general feeling of insecuri‐
ty.
This choice invites various reflections. On the one hand, these officers cannot be
expected to deal with fundamental, social problems and a radical approach to dis‐
order can hardly be demanded from them. On the other hand, however, by dis‐
missing the root causes of (complaints about) disorder, municipal disorder policing
is for its part severely limited. In this final section I reflect upon these limitations
and its consequences.
4.1 The complacency of a pragmatic profession
This study showed that municipal disorder policing, for an important part, is the
result of increased attention to citizens’ feelings of insecurity and concerns about
incivilities. More specifically, municipal officers are one of the means to address
sentiments of unease, annoyance and fear.
This municipal attention is often applauded. Many respondents claim we
should be content that something is done about residents’ basic annoyances and
fears. Whereas the police are seen as withdrawing from such issues (see chapter 1),
at least these officers are willing to ‘listen to the citizens’ and to acknowledge their
concerns. Municipal officers appear to do what the police have left aside (see also
chapter 9). This seems to imply that municipal officers’ tasks are so self-evident
that any debate can be ruled out in advance. Rules stating that you should not let
your dog litter public places, that you should not cycle in pedestrian zones, park
on the pavement, throw your rubbish out too early or hang around in doorways
are seen as defending basic forms of public order with which anybody agrees.
However, disorder issues and incivilities are not of themselves demanding to be
policed. In fact, civic annoyances and feelings of insecurity might only be on the
surface of more profound societal changes; they represent the tip of the iceberg, so
to say. Lists of top annoyances do not reveal a great deal about how residents see
their living environments, nor do they address the potential deeper causes of dis‐
satisfaction and insecurity. In this respect, feelings of insecurity might be related to
issues as diverse as a moral unease about societal changes (Spithoven et al., 2012),
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images of threatening outsiders, frustrations about immigrants or tensions between
different groups of residents.
These underlying feelings and considerations appear to play a minor role in the
policy and practice of municipal disorder policing and perhaps not surprisingly so.
These pragmatic officers focus on what can be achieved through short term inter‐
ventions aimed at behavioural change – interventions at which they have become
increasingly proficient. Thus, new forms of Dutch disorder policing are quite shal‐
low in their problem definitions: agencies for city surveillance address citizens’
complaints without much interest in what causes them.
Moreover, in their eagerness for pragmatic and effective interventions, actors in
municipal disorder policing create their own definitions of what is disorder and
what is not. They do so by focussing on those issues that are highest in the quality
of life monitors or those that are reported most frequently. Hence, only specific citi‐
zens’ reports are eligible for policing, as noted in chapter 6. As these reports appear
to form the most important relation municipal officers have with the neighbour‐
hoods that they are policing, they limit disorder to a specific set of annoyances and
strip it of its context. Instead of getting in touch with complainants to make sense
of what problems are bothering them and why, the complaining citizen is regarded
as always being right. Meanwhile, practices and policies of disorder policing that
complacently proclaim they are ‘listening to the citizen’ in fact might cloak the fact
that municipalities do not have the answer to complex urban problems, of which
complaints about disorder in public places is merely one of the symptoms (cf. Wac‐
quant, 2008). ‘The Citizen’ here appears as a rhetorical device, writ large in these
monitors and lists, while tensions between different groups of residents or between
residents and authorities themselves are ignored.
In this respect, municipal officers are like well-skilled craftsmen, plumbers who
know technically how to deal with the leakage, but overlook fundamental changes
of the piping. Even more, it might be in their own interest to advertise their prag‐
matic and effective, but temporary solutions to such local leakages: it is what
grants them legitimacy as a profession. Hence disorder policing is not only about
defending norms, it also creates these norms (Harcourt, 2001). By focusing exclu‐
sively on a limited set of disorder issues “the category of the disorderly is the prod‐
uct, in part, of the quality-of-life initiative itself” (ibid.: 162).
4.2 Interpreting disorder
A second possible explanation for municipalities’ pragmatic approach to issues of
disorder, takes the interpretation of disorder itself into account. As such, municipal
officers’ approach cannot be wholly reduced to a new profession’s adherence to its
own disorder definitions.
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Beneath municipal officers’ pragmatic focus seems to linger another assump‐
tion: disorder is conceived as unambiguously signalling decline and aloofness and
should therefore be dealt with quickly and effectively (see also chapter 5). Put sim‐
ply, disorder needs to be removed from sight. In this respect, the same assumption
that informs broken windows policies informs municipal disorder policing: a dis‐
orderly neighbourhood communicates to residents and visitors ‘it does not care’
(Herbert & Brown, 2006; Harcourt 2001). A logical inference in terms of disorder
policing therefore seems to be that improving neighbourhoods might succeed by
focusing exclusively on signals of disorder (cf. Bottoms, 2006). It explains the stress
on pragmatic interventions that claim to derive their success from banishing devi‐
ancy from public spaces, be it physical or social (cf. Becket & Herbert, 2010).
However, just as complaints or figures in quality of life monitors ‘say’ little
about the neighbourhoods whence they come, the appearance of disorder might
‘say’ various things. Obviously nobody likes to see litter, but can it be assumed that
litter symbolises that “nobody cares”, or that people do not take care of norms of
citizenship? Rubbish, dog litter or vandalised property could be inconvenient,
annoying or even induce fear, and therefore deserve to be dealt with, but can they
be interpreted simply as signalling people do not care? It might just as well indi‐
cate that people care about other things, have other things on their minds, are sim‐
ply unaware of the rules or consider disorderly signals as a proof of a vital city.
Without wanting to deny the relevance of dealing with these signals of disor‐
der, it could be relevant to consider various forms of disorder more thoroughly.
This applies specifically to ‘disorderly persons’. Throughout this study, it seemed
that ‘target groups’, such as loitering youth or homeless people seem to be inter‐
preted in similar ways as litter or wrongly parked cars, as unsettling other neigh‐
bourhood residents, and as “unsightly trash to be removed, objects with limited
aesthetic value” (Walby & Lippert, 2012: 1029; see further chapter 8). Such framing
of disorder caused by homeless people or street youth overlooks the fact that these
people might well have a lack of space at home, lack a home at all, have a troubled
relation with their parents, deal with addictions, or they might simply be looking
for diversion.
Although this book did not discuss alternative solutions to problems of disor‐
der, it could be worthwhile to pause briefly at solutions that are side-lined through
the specific choices made in municipal disorder policing. Early Dutch attention to
disorder by the Roethof committee for instance, encompassed a wider range of sol‐
utions to the problem of what was then called ‘petty crime’. The early solutions
proposed by this committee were more than mere pragmatic options to diminish
the opportunities for disorder, but also involved investment in the sources of disor‐
der, for instance by ‘social bonding’ of juvenile offenders to society. It appears that
with the introduction of Dutch administrative prevention, the establishment of
local ‘integrated public safety policy’, but also a general preference for quick prag‐
matic approaches and the rejection of ‘patronising’ social interventions, these solu‐
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tions have been moved to the background (cf. Garland, 2001; Van Swaaningen,
1995). More specifically, this study showed that through a mutually reinforcing
process of political preferences, a managerial urge to control, eagerness of munici‐
pal officers to prove themselves and the withdrawal of the police, pragmatic
approaches became the key solution to the problem of disorder. Although some
local policies propose alternative solutions to disorder, knowledge about the effects
of minor rule infringements, the context of disorder issues and how it relates to
other, social problems in neighbourhoods is generally taken into account only to a
limited extent.
4.3 Some consequences
Hence Dutch municipal disorder policing has developed into pragmatic
approaches to issues of disorder, but limits its solutions to addressing the symp‐
toms. This has important consequences. Although irritation and unease might be
diminished to a certain extent by the presence of more uniformed officers who
know how to deal with incivilities, such solutions are hardly sustainable. It might
be impossible to relieve feelings of insecurity with more uniforms and more reas‐
suring surveillance for the simple reason that these feelings and the need for reas‐
surance to an important extent are irrational and ineradicable (Boutellier, 2004). As
such, they may even be part of a ‘culture of fear’, a trait deeply rooted in late mod‐
ern culture that is entwined with a permanent distrust in mankind (Furedi, 2007).
In addition, there are certain risks to the uncritical embrace of complaints. As
said, this overlooks possible tensions between groups of residents and between
residents and the local government. If these tensions and issues are solved by issu‐
ing more fines for incivilities, by more hotspot policing, by merely responding to
the complaints of a limited group of residents, this new form of municipal policing
could lose credibility among other groups of residents. Instead of a new police
force that ‘listens to the citizen’, they will be perceived as the instrument of an
assertive ever-complaining minority that has the skills and power to influence
municipal authorities. In this respect, sending municipal officers or police officers
to ‘disorderly neighbourhoods’ might not only be a poor approach to solving
issues of disorder, it might also exacerbate tensions, especially in those neighbour‐
hoods where residents are suspicious of state agencies, or even oppose them.
Moreover, by uncritically answering to the demands of these assertive residents
and banishing all forms of disorder from public spaces, the resilience of big city
residents might be further eroded, further feeding their fear for deviancy and ham‐
pering interaction between different users of public spaces (cf. Crawford, 2009; Van
Stokkom, 2013a). A more thorough understanding of what causes complaints and
unease about disorderly behaviour might be needed before establishing new hot‐
spots and jumping to pragmatic interventions.
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Of course these considerations imply too great demands on a policing profession.
Municipal officers cannot be blamed for not being embedded in their neighbour‐
hoods when they are sent to ever new hotspots. They lack time and capacity to
investigate the backgrounds of complaints and of disorder, or to approach issues of
disorder from multiple angles, when it is merely demanded of them that they
enforce the rules. Perhaps they cannot be blamed either for not knowing how to
make an estimation of various forms of disorder, other than ‘not to ignore litter
when you’re out for parking tickets’, when they do not have sufficient possibilities
to develop a holistic image of the neighbourhood (cf. chapter 6).
As such, the critique that this holistic image is lacking among municipal officers
might better be directed at how approaches to anti-social behaviour are distributed
over various professions. Youth work for instance, is expected to deal with issues
of social assistance, such as education and employment, health care with mental
health problems. However, this study suggests that there is a fair chance that the
knowledge and insights of these professionals do not reach municipal officers. Due
to the lack of communication between various professions and the ‘compartmen‐
talisation’ (verkokering, see chapter 6) of their respective tasks, every profession
might well work in its own ‘bubble’. The work of municipal officers is thus limited
to the basic approach of situational prevention of disorder described here.
Whereas agencies for city surveillance have developed notably in a relatively
short time, the issues considered here pose challenges that are too great. Although
municipal officers themselves sometimes have relatively nuanced views about the
causes of disorder (see chapter 8), they are evidently hampered by the limitations
of their assignments and the municipal and political context in which they have to
do their work. They are expected to get rid of disorder, whether it is physical or
social, without having the position, power or capability to re-examine the very
norms they are supposed to uphold.
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Samenvatting
In de afgelopen dertig jaar zijn in Nederland zorgen over overlast in de publieke
ruimte sterk toegenomen. Meer dan voorheen krijgen ergernissen over bijvoor‐
beeld illegaal geplaatst huisvuil, foutparkeren of op de stoep fietsen de aandacht.
De bestrijding van deze overlast is meer en meer de verantwoordelijkheid van
gemeenten geworden. Die rol van lokale overheden vindt zijn oorsprong in de
vaststelling van de commissie Roethof in 1984 dat de toename van (toen nog)
‘kleine criminaliteit’ meer aandacht verdiende en dat dat niet van politie en justitie
verwacht kon worden. In de loop van de jaren ’90 is de betrokkenheid van
gemeenten bij overlastbestrijding verder toegenomen, terwijl de Nederlandse
politie zich in de afgelopen twintig a dertig jaar steeds meer op haar ‘kerntaken’ is
gaan richten. Haar aanwezigheid in de publieke ruimte en aandacht voor veron‐
dersteld kleinere overlastfeiten is daardoor juist afgenomen.
Samen hebben deze ontwikkelingen geleid tot de opkomst van een nieuwe be‐
roepsgroep: gemeentelijk toezichthouders en handhavers. In dit boek staat deze
beroepsgroep centraal.
Hoofdvraag en opbouw studie
Deze studie richt zich op de historische, maatschappelijke en organisatorische con‐
text waarin deze nieuwe toezichthouders en handhavers hun werk doen. De
hoofdvraag luidt: Vanuit welke factoren en perspectieven kunnen het beleid en
de praktijk van het Nederlandse gemeentelijke toezicht & handhaving begrepen
worden?
Het eerste, theoretische gedeelte van deze studie behandelt vormen van toe‐
zicht & handhaving aan de hand van een drietal politiestrategieën uit internatio‐
nale literatuur. Om een vergelijking met die strategieën mogelijk te maken wordt
gemeentelijk toezicht & handhaving opgevat als municipal disorder policing. Ook
wordt een drietal sociologische interpretaties besproken. Daarnaast wordt de
methodologie uiteengezet. Er is vooral gebruik gemaakt van case studies en etno‐
grafisch onderzoek.
In het tweede, meest omvangrijke gedeelte van deze studie wordt in vijf empiri‐
sche hoofdstukken toezicht & handhaving in zes grote steden besproken. Achter‐
eenvolgens worden het dominante beleid en de veranderingen daarin bestudeerd,
de wijze waarop lokale besluiten tot stand komen en de opvattingen van individu‐
ele toezichthouders. Daarna wordt door middel van twee case studies besproken
hoe toezicht in ‘hotspots’ tot stand komt en wordt vorm gegeven. Tot slot staat de
verhouding tussen het werk van toezichthouders en handhavers enerzijds en poli‐
tiewerk anderzijds centraal.
Gemeentelijk toezicht: beleid door de jaren heen
De eerste vormen van gemeentelijk toezicht & handhaving volgden direct op de
zogeheten Roethof projecten. In navolging van de gelijknamige commissie trachten
deze projecten nieuwe oplossingen aan te reiken voor het probleem van veelvoor‐
komende kleine criminaliteit: door veranderingen in de bebouwde omgeving, door
‘binding’ van jongeren aan de samenleving en door extra functioneel toezicht. De
eerste Nederlandse stadswachten sloten aan bij het laatste type oplossing. Dit
nieuwe geüniformeerde personeel was daarmee vooral bedoeld om de gelegenheid
voor kleine criminaliteit te helpen inperken.
Toch werden de eerste stadswachten niet alleen als succesvol gezien vanwege
het effect dat zij hadden op kleine criminaliteit. Stadswachten werden namelijk
vooral ook als oplossing gezien voor hoge werkloosheid en veel gemeenten zetten
stadswachtprojecten op via subsidies voor langdurig werklozen. Het gevolg was
dat stadswachten weliswaar een rol vervulden in de preventie van kleine crimina‐
liteit en overlast, maar dat de ontwikkeling van een eigenstandige professie gehin‐
derd werd door re-integratiedoelstellingen en de ondergeschiktheid aan de politie.
De eerste grote wijziging in gemeentelijk toezicht & handhaving vond plaats in
de jaren tussen 2002 en 2007. Zowel op nationaal als lokaal niveau klonk een roep
om meer toezicht en strengere handhaving van overtredingen en overlast. Op
lokaal niveau speelden daarbij nieuwe leefbaarheidsmonitoren en veiligheidsin‐
dexen en de vaak geringe aandacht van de politie voor betrekkelijk kleine overtre‐
dingen een belangrijke rol. Tegelijkertijd zagen ambtenaren en bestuurders de be‐
staande stadswachten als incapabel. Deze ‘Melketiers’ zouden te weinig in huis
hebben om ‘het verschil te maken’ en er was behoefte aan handhavend personeel dat
kon bekeuren voor de overtredingen die behoorden tot de belangrijkste ergernis‐
sen van grootstedelingen. Deze veranderingen leidden tot de oprichting van
nieuwe gemeentelijke diensten toezicht & handhaving. Deze afdelingen zouden
gaandeweg volledig moeten bestaan uit ‘BOA’s’ (buitengewoon opsporingsambte‐
naren), een type functionaris dat gemeenten al sinds de afschaffing van de gemeen‐
tepolitie in 1993 de gelegenheid bood om eigen ambtenaren actief te laten bekeuren
voor specifieke overtredingen. De neiging tot strenger optreden werd versterkt
door het verlangen naar een duidelijker beroepsidentiteit en de ontluikende be‐
roepseer van deze nieuwe beroepsgroep.
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De meest recente fase wordt gekenmerkt door een heroriëntatie bij de jonge
diensten toezicht & handhaving. Beleid richt zich de laatste jaren minder op
handhaving en meer op alternatieve manieren om ‘nalevingsgedrag’ te bevorde‐
ren. Ook beteugelen sommige diensten hun ambities. Ze beperken zich tot het toe‐
zien op een welomschreven aantal vormen van overlast, zoals verkeerd aangebo‐
den huisvuil, parkeerproblemen en hondenpoep. Tot slot zeggen alle diensten zich
nadrukkelijker op burgers te willen richten, bijvoorbeeld door hen actiever te laten
meebeslissen over prioriteiten van de diensten toezicht & handhaving.
Lokale besluitvorming
Toch bepaalt dit beleid maar tot op beperkte hoogte de feitelijke inzet van toezicht‐
houders en handhavers. Veeleer hangen besluiten over inzet samen met verschil‐
lende, meer informele beleidsnetwerken en vormen van besluitvorming die niet in
beleid vastgelegd zijn. In hoofdstuk 6 worden die verschillende wijzen van besluit‐
vorming besproken aan de hand van een drietal ‘logica’s’: een politieke, een ma‐
nagement en een frontlijn logica.
Een eerste, politieke logica heeft betrekking op hoe politieke besluitvorming
over toezicht en handhaving plaatsvindt. Hoewel een gedeelte van die besluiten op
een ‘klassieke’ manier genomen wordt – via raadsdebatten – werkt deze logica ook
op andere wijzen. Zo spelen incidenten een grote rol, zoals bijvoorbeeld in het
geval van ernstige overlast veroorzaakt door jongeren, daklozen of cafébezoekers.
Burgemeesters en wethouders zien in zulke gevallen toezichthouders en handha‐
vers vaak als een snelle oplossing voor acute kwesties die onder de aandacht
gebracht zijn door een groep bewoners en/of lokale media. Deze manier van
besluiten wordt verder versterkt door de terugtred van de politie en door het ge‐
geven dat veel coördinatoren en BOA’s zich graag willen bewijzen als professio‐
neel en ‘politie-achtig’.
In het geval van een ‘management logica’ draait het om het objectiveren en
meten van overlast. ‘New public management’-taalgebruik speelt daarbij vaak een
grote rol: inzet van toezichthouders wordt bepaald op basis van ‘contracten’, ‘pres‐
tatiemanagement’ en de neiging om te sturen op de ‘productie’ van gemeentelijk
toezicht en handhaving. Een drietal verschillende middelen wordt gebruikt voor
het sturen van toezichthouders en handhavers: leefbaarheidsmonitoren, meldingen
van bewoners en bonnenquota. In de praktijk worden er zelden harde conclusies
aan de uitkomsten van dit soort instrumenten verbonden. Ze worden vooral
gebruikt om vooraf een beeld te ontwikkelen van de plekken waar toezichthouders
het meest van nut zouden moeten zijn. Evenwel betekent de inzet op ‘hotspots’
met de meeste meldingen en de laagste beoordelingen door burgers dat minder
meetbare werkvormen – zoals preventieve surveillance of contacten met wijk‐
bewoners – het onderspit dreigen te delven.
Samenvatting 199
Een laatste logica hangt nauw samen met de observaties van toezichthouders
zelf en hun ervaringen in de alledaagse samenwerking met partners, zoals wijk‐
management en politieagenten. In deze ‘frontlijnlogica’ spelen metingen en mel‐
dingen maar een beperkte rol en gaat het er vooral om actief te kunnen inspelen op
overlastsituaties zoals deze geobserveerd worden door professionals op straat.
Deze laatste logica lijkt daarom ook niet zozeer te draaien om hogere of abstracte
doelen, maar om ‘dingen voor elkaar krijgen’ en ‘dezelfde taal spreken’.
Deze verschillende ‘logica’s’ botsen vaak. Zo hebben lokale frontlijnpartners
soms kritiek op de bureaucratische houding van toezichthouders en handhavers.
Volgens hen denken zij teveel in termen van managementopdrachten en abstracte
doelen. Daarnaast ontregelt de dominantie van een politieke logica de voorkeuren
van uitvoerders. Doordat bestuurders en politici inzet van BOA’s eisen op nieuwe
en acute hotspots, wordt het in sommige gevallen moeilijk om een structurele
vorm van toezicht en handhaving te ontwikkelen, zo menen sommige uitvoerders
en coördinatoren.
Opvattingen van toezichthouders en handhavers
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de ideeën van toezichthouders en handhavers zelf geanaly‐
seerd.
Ten eerste hebben deze professionals vaak uitgesproken opvattingen over hun
verantwoordelijkheden. Zo zeggen veel BOA’s zich in hun werk nadrukkelijk op
burgers te richten, al verschilt de manier waarop sterk. Sommigen menen dat in
direct contact met burgers uitgezocht dient te worden wat deze burgers het meest
dwars zit. Anderen vinden dat opdrachten en meldingen genoeg inzicht bieden.
Toch zijn er ook uitvoerders die een bredere opvatting van hun taken huldigen. Ze
bekritiseren de neiging van sommige wijkbewoners om voor iedere kleinigheid de
gemeente te bellen. Liever treden ze in contact met andere professionals of gaan ze
uit van eigen observaties om te bepalen wat er moet gebeuren.
Daarnaast hebben BOA’s ogenschijnlijk sterk uiteenlopende opvattingen over
overtreders. Veel van hen benadrukken het belang van ‘bejegening’ en beklemto‐
nen dat overtredingen met een goed gesprek opgelost kunnen worden. Sterker
nog, een goede bejegening vergroot de kans op structureel ‘nalevingsgedrag’.
Anderen leggen vooral de nadruk op de context waarin een overtreding plaats‐
vindt: iedere situatie verdient een andere benadering. Opnieuw lijkt het streven
naar ‘nalevingsgedrag’ hier de drijvende kracht. Tot slot ziet een aantal uitvoerders
meer heil in een stringente aanpak. Ook in dit geval wordt het regulerende effect
van bekeuren als een van de belangrijkste motivaties opgevoerd.
Al met al lopen opvattingen van toezichthouders en handhavers sterk uiteen.
Die variatie staat niet op zichzelf. Zo kunnen deze professionals gezien worden als
typische street level bureaucrats en zouden hun opvattingen begrepen kunnen wor‐
den als een wijze om hun ‘routines’ uit te leggen en te legitimeren. Ook doen de
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opvattingen van deze uitvoerders denken aan sommige opvattingen onder politie
agenten, al benadrukken veel toezichthouders en handhavers dat er een groot ver‐
schil is tussen de ‘typische politiecultuur’ en hun eigen beroepsgroep. Bovendien
zijn bepaalde spanningen wel degelijk uniek voor deze professionals. Vooral de
spanning tussen ‘dienstverlening’ en ‘handhaving’ valt op, temeer omdat ‘dienst‐
verlening’ bij toezichthouders meer voorop staat dan bij de politie en er redenen
zijn om streng te handhaven die voor de politie minder van belang zijn.
Handhaving in ‘hotspots’
In hoofdstuk 8 worden twee casestudies besproken. In deze casestudies gaat het
om de omgang met overlast van specifieke ‘doelgroepen’: jongeren in Rotterdam
en een gemengde groep van drugdealers, druggebruikers en daklozen in Utrecht.
In beide gevallen begint nieuw beleid voor een doortastende aanpak met bes‐
tuurlijke aandacht voor ernstige overlast, mede als gevolg van aanhoudende
klachten van wijkbewoners. Veranderingen in beleid worden vervolgens vooral
mogelijk gemaakt door de ambities en inzet van managers die politieke aandacht
zien als een goede gelegenheid om meer grip te krijgen op de aanpak van overlast.
Zo werd in Rotterdam de politieke druk om iets aan jongerenoverlast te doen door
managers vertaald in meer top-down controle van de aanpak van jongerenoverlast
en jongerenbeleid. In Utrecht grepen managers de politieke aandacht aan als gele‐
genheid om gemeentelijk toezicht en handhaving nadrukkelijker op de kaart te zet‐
ten als oplossing voor de problemen in het centrumgebied.
Deze ontwikkelingen leiden er enerzijds toe dat de rol van toezichthouders en
handhavers nauwer omschreven wordt en dat ze zich doorgaans moeten beperken
tot strikte handhaving, het verzamelen van informatie om de ‘doelgroepleden’
beter te kunnen reguleren en (vaak) te verjagen van vooraf bepaalde ‘hotspots’.
Anderzijds blijkt tijdens diensten en interviews dat er ook ongemak en onvrede
leeft onder uitvoerders. Zo is er lang niet altijd genoeg te doen, ervaren sommige
BOA’s ongemak bij de stringente aanpak, worden sommige opdrachten gehekeld
als wereldvreemd en zoeken zij naar nieuwe taken.
Werkdeling tussen toezichthouders en politie agenten.
In het laatste empirische hoofdstuk wordt uiteengezet hoe verschillende respon‐
denten het onderscheid tussen gemeentelijk toezicht & handhaving en de politie
zien. Toezichthouders, agenten en andere respondenten bepalen (en betwisten)
actief en op uiteenlopende wijzen de werkverdeling tussen beide beroepsgroepen.
Er zijn daarin vier verschillende posities te onderscheiden.
Twee daarvan hebben een ‘defensief’ karakter en benadrukken de uniciteit van
beide beroepsgroepen. Zo menen veel respondenten dat de politie wezenlijk ver‐
schilt van andere handhavende beroepsgroepen. Ze stellen dat politiewerk om een
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aantal specifieke kerntaken draait en dat dit werk ontdaan moet worden van taken
die afleiden van ‘boeven vangen’. Daarentegen benadrukken anderen juist dat
gemeentelijk toezichthouders en handhavers zich uitsluitend zouden moeten
richten op ‘leefbaarheid’. Deze positie lijkt op haar beurt bedoeld om te vermijden
dat de politie al te veel taken naar gemeenten afschuift.
Tegenover deze defensieve posities staan twee ‘expansieve’ posities, zienswij‐
zen die gestoeld zijn op bereidwilligheid meer taken op zich te nemen. Zo menen
sommigen dat er veel meer politietaken uitbesteed kunnen worden aan
gemeenten. Politiewerk is een ‘markt’, zo wordt gezegd, waarin gemeenten een
grotere rol kunnen spelen. De laatste positie stelt juist dat niet BOA’s meer taken
op moeten pakken, maar dat de politie terug moet naar toezicht in de openbare
ruimte. Zij menen weliswaar dat toezichthouders en handhavers wezenlijk werk
verrichten, maar hadden liever gezien dat de politie dit was blijven doen.
Conclusies
In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt een aantal conclusies getrokken over de veranderin‐
gen en perspectieven binnen deze zich snel ontwikkelende beroepsgroep.
Allereerst blijkt het om een nieuwe beroepsgroep te gaan die zijn plaats aan het
ontdekken en (soms) bevechten is. Wijzigingen in beleid, maar ook opvattingen
van individuele BOA’s zijn vaak het resultaat van een zoektocht naar een eigen‐
standige positie en de afbakening tot politiewerk. In die zin kan de komst en ont‐
wikkeling van gemeentelijk toezicht & handhaving mede gezien worden als de
professionaliseringsstrijd van een nieuwe beroepsgroep.
Een tweede belangrijke conclusie is dat gemeentelijk toezicht & handhaving
zich sterk richt op de zorgen van burgers, al is het beleidsdiscours in de loop der
tijd wel verschoven. Zo ging het aanvankelijk om de zorgen om ‘kleine criminali‐
teit’, maar draaide beleid later vooral om ‘kleine ergernissen’ en deden termen als
‘leefbaarheid’ en ‘schoon, heel en veilig’ hun intrede. De gemeentelijke diensten
toezicht & handhaving lijken hiermee verder weinig pretenties te koesteren. In
tegenstelling tot sommige vormen van community policing gaat het hier niet om het
verstevigen van informele sociale controle of sociale cohesie, maar vooral om
dienstverlening, om het simpelweg aanpakken van die overtredingen waar de
meeste meldingen over binnenkomen. Daarbij worden zorgen vaak ook verwoord
in een typisch New Public Management discours, waarbij burgers als klanten wor‐
den gezien en meetinstrumenten – zoals leefbaarheidsmonitoren en aantallen mel‐
dingen – een belangrijke rol spelen.
Ten derde valt op dat gemeentelijke diensten toezicht & handhaving de nadruk
leggen op een pragmatische benadering van overlast. De gedachte dat overtredin‐
gen het resultaat zijn van gelegenheden waarbij overtreders een rationele afweging
maken beheerst het gemeentelijk toezicht al vanaf het moment van oprichting, zij
het dat die benadering gaandeweg een wat andere formulering heeft gekregen.
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Waar stadswachten aanvankelijk een rol werd toebedeeld in termen van ‘situatio‐
nele preventie’, werd later de nadruk gelegd op nalevingsgedrag; hoe kunnen de
afwegingen van mogelijke overtreders zo beïnvloed worden dat ze de regels na‐
leven? Als zodanig draait toezicht & handhaving vooral om het beïnvloeden van
gelegenheden en niet om de overtuigingen van mensen die regels schenden. Zelfs
de voorbeelden van stringente handhaving die hier zijn besproken draaien vaak
om dergelijke pragmatische overwegingen.
Deze twee elementen – een nadruk op de zorgen van burgers en op een pragma‐
tische benadering van overtredingen – lijken mede ten grondslag te liggen aan de
populariteit van de hotspot benadering. Simpel gezegd biedt die benadering zowel
de gelegenheid om het aanbod toe te snijden op de plekken met de meeste meldin‐
gen, als om capaciteit flexibel aan te passen aan wat nodig is om het aantal overtre‐
dingen effectief terug te brengen. Als zodanig lijken Nederlandse gemeenten welis‐
waar geïnspireerd door politiestrategieën uit het buitenland (en dan vooral door
ideeën over gelegenheidsreductie), maar hebben zij toch een typisch, eigen variant
van toezicht & handhaving ontwikkeld.
Gemeentelijk toezicht & handhaving kan daarom begrepen worden als een vorm
van pragmatische formele sociale controle, zonder verdere pretenties dat dit zou
helpen om sociale cohesie of informele sociale controle te verstevigen. Ook al spe‐
len zorgen om verloedering en buurtverval een rol bij de oprichting van een aantal
diensten toezicht & handhaving, in hedendaagse praktijken lijken managers en uit‐
voerders zich vooral te richten op de meldingen van wijkbewoners. Daarbij moet
vermeld worden dat slechts een kleine groep wijkbewoners zijn zorgen over over‐
last gevende groepen op de agenda weet te krijgen, maar dat het zelden gaat om
een bewuste uitsluiting van specifieke groepen. Eerder hangt een stringente aan‐
pak van bijvoorbeeld jongeren op straat of daklozen samen met een streven naar
meetbare resultaten en de geldingsdrang van sommige uitvoerders of managers.
Ook in andere opzichten blijkt dat niet zozeer de belangen van burgers de door‐
slag geven, maar die van overheidsactoren zelf. Zo wordt toezicht & handhaving
door lokale bestuurders enerzijds soms gezien als een middel om gezag terug te
winnen. Krachtdadige pogingen om de straat te ‘heroveren’ op de asociale jeugd of
op drugsdealers en -gebruikers lijken niet zelden ingegeven te worden door een
verlangen een signaal af te geven dat de lokale overheid grip op ernstige overlast
heeft. Anderzijds lijkt veel van de bovengenoemde pragmatiek terug te voeren op
de wens om overlast vooral beheersbaar te houden.
Diensten toezicht & handhaving zijn dus weinig geïnteresseerd in factoren die
achter angst, ergernissen en ongenoegen kunnen schuilen. Dat kan van hen ook
niet verwacht worden; het past simpelweg niet bij een professie die draait om toe‐
zicht en handhaving. Mede om die reden overheerst een benadering van situatio‐
nele preventie van overlast en antisociaal gedrag, vooral op hotspots. Die aanpak
gaat er echter wel aan voorbij dat ongenoegen en angst wel eens structureel en de
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behoefte aan meer toezicht onbevredigbaar zouden kunnen zijn. Bovendien lopen
gemeenten met een dergelijke aanpak het risico spanningen tussen groepen be‐
woners en tussen burgers en de overheid te veronachtzamen.
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Appendix – Six city surveillance agencies
In addition to the similarities in policy goals and tasks described in chapter 5, the
city surveillance agencies in this study can be distinguished by their own particu‐
lar approaches. These differences are caused, for instance by the available human
resources. In Tilburg and The Hague especially, a ‘Melkert-heritage’ brought along
limitations as a relatively large number of officers in these agencies originally were
part of work reintegration projects. In addition, various political preferences and
differences in administrative culture have an impact on local disorder policy. Like‐
wise, collaboration with the police (or the efforts to improve it) might be of influ‐
ence on their orientation. Here each city surveillance agency is briefly character‐
ised.1
Rotterdam’s city surveillance agency has three sub units – Surveillance, Law
Enforcement and Parking. The unit for Law Enforcement is the most relevant here.
With about 370 employees spread over three geographical clusters and one sub
team for flexible use of municipal officers, this is the prime responsible organisa‐
tion for municipal surveillance in Rotterdam’s public spaces.
The municipal officers in Rotterdam are part of a tradition of ‘firmness’ and
ambitious public safety goals, but were reprimanded by their Audit Office. At the
time of writing, this agency seemed caught between two tendencies. On the one
hand, municipal officers were expected to focus on residents’ annoyances and
develop a more locally embedded form of neighbourhood surveillance through
locally well-known municipal officers. On the other hand several ‘central teams’
clearly have a more repressive approach, such as environmental officers, ‘interven‐
tion teams’ (investigating the causes of residential disturbances), youth enforce‐
ment officers and a central team of bikers.
The Hague’s city surveillance agency, called Leefbaarheid en Toezicht (‘Quality of life
and surveillance’), is spread over The Hague’s eight boroughs. These teams con‐
tain between ten and twenty employees. In addition, these teams supply a total of
1. This characterisation is based on findings that were reported in 2014. By the time this study is pub‐
lished, these numbers and organisational circumstances will probably have been changed.
16 bikers to a central team for flexible use, for instance to patrol big events and spe‐
cial actions.
The Hague’s city surveillance agency has been preoccupied with concerns
about professionalisation and the relation with the police. Not only did policy plan
Handhaven op Haagse hoogte lead to a stricter definition of tasks, it also paved the
way for a thorough reorganisation of its employees by placing The Hague’s munic‐
ipal officers in police stations and under the command of police constables.
Although there was not enough space to investigate the impact of these changes,
another study has shown this mainly improved information sharing and did not
lead to other priorities for municipal officers (Van Stokkom & Foekens, 2015).
At the time of writing, Utrecht’s city surveillance agency (Toezicht en Handhaving
Openbare Ruimte ‘Surveillance and Law enforcement Public Space’) had just centralised
its five geographical teams into a more central team with opportunities for flexible
use of municipal officers. THOR employs about 150-160 officers.
In Utrecht no recalibrations or revisions of policy goals can be noted. On the
contrary, Utrecht’s city surveillance agency seems willing to fulfil new tasks that
are sometimes reminiscent of police work, such as surveillance in areas with a high
incidence of burglaries, a special ‘firework team’ or nightshifts in the area of the
city centre. Nevertheless, not all employees welcome these changes as they impact
on the capacity on other terrains2, and some of them express doubts as to whether
the present workforce can manage all these extra, heavier duties.
The city surveillance agency in Eindhoven (Stadstoezicht) has about seventy fte in
personnel, divided over several teams – citizen participation, enforcement of fiscal
laws, a team for CCTV and citizens’ reports, a team ‘action plans public safety’, a
team special tasks and a team ‘complex surveillance’.
In Eindhoven municipal officers also have a considerable amount of public
safety related tasks. Eindhoven’s city surveillance agency derived notable priorities
from Eindhoven’s public safety agenda3, for instance to inform entrepreneurs on
how to prevent robberies, or for surveillance to prevent theft from cars, anti-social
behaviour caused by street youth, or bicycle theft. Collaboration with the police is
also given considerable attention. At the same time, Eindhoven’s city surveillance
agency aims at improving the relation with citizens reporting disorder through the
establishment of a project for citizen participation.
2. Something also noted by Bureau Berenschot (2013). In their evaluation of the investment in the
Breedstraat area by Utrecht’s city surveillance agency, they noted prevention, general surveillance,
and a ‘neighbourhood approach’ in other areas of Utrecht were under pressure due to such new
tasks.
3. Gemeente Eindhoven (2009) Beleidskader Integrale Veiligheid 2010-2013.
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Stadstoezicht Tilburg is divided over two large geographical teams, comprising a
total of 54 employees. A relatively large portion of these are surveillance employ‐
ees without additional powers. An additional seven employees man the CCTV
post and six more work in the special Task Force Tilburg Safer in which police offi‐
cers and municipal officers closely collaborate to tackle several priorities indicated
by Tilburg’s city council (cf. Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014).
In Tilburg issues of professionalisation played a large role, due to Stadstoezicht’s
relatively large share of employees with a background of long-term unemploy‐
ment. Revisionary plan Stadstoezicht 3.0, in part, was meant to tackle the issues that
resulted from this past. Nevertheless, the municipality of Tilburg cherished high
ambitions at the time of writing, for instance to allow Tilburg’s municipal officers
play a role in fighting youth crime and collaborate more with the police.4 A special
project that might serve as a prediction of such ambitious collaboration is the Task‐
force Tilburg Safer, in which police officers and municipal officers jointly address
five public safety priorities (cf. Eikenaar & Van Stokkom, 2014). The involvement
of these officers in citizen participation was one of other designated objectives,
together with more neighbourhood specific surveillance.5
Finally, Nijmegen’s Bureau Toezicht (‘Bureau for surveillance’) consists of sixty
employees, divided over three teams – the ‘Neighbourhood team’, the ‘Centre
team’ and ‘Street coach team’. Added to this are six employees for flexible use.
On the one hand, Nijmegen’s municipal officers are ‘integral officers’ with an
all-round task description and designated for ‘holistic policing’ (see chapters 6 and
7). According to many, they function as ‘hosts’ in public space, and less so as law
enforcement officers. Special ‘network officers’ in the city centre are in accordance
with this approach. On the other hand, several managers highlight the importance
of rule enforcement, especially since some expect the mayor to give these officers
more tasks in response to the withdrawal of the police. As a result a debate on the
extent to which municipal officers can be expected to replace the police is clearly
notable in Nijmegen.
4. Gemeente Tilburg (2012) Definitief afdelingsplan Afdeling Veiligheid en Wijken, Gemeente Tilburg
(2011) Kadernota Veiligheid. Samen voor meer veiligheid.
5. Gemeente Tilburg (2012) Collegeadvies Doorontwikkeling professionalisering Stadstoezicht.
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The policing landscape in the Netherlands has 
changed considerably over the past three decades; 
now various new uniformed officers share patrolling 
duties with the traditional police. This book is about 
one of the most prominent groups of these recent 
surveillance professionals: the municipal officers. 
It discusses how this profession has changed over 
time, how municipal officers act in public places, 
and how these new officers view their work. 
Through a rich yet compact analysis, the author 
shows that the emergence of this new occupational 
group can be understood as being the result 
of a focused (political) approach to citizens’ 
annoyances, concerns and fears. The book also 
demonstrates that the work of these officers is a 
unique Dutch phenomenon, partly defying theories 
of disorder policing developed in other countries. 
This study will appeal to readers with an interest 
in plural policing or policies on urban disorder, as 
well as to those interested in how local governments 
respond to their citizens’ concerns.
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